A study of the human security of North African economic migrants through a gender lens by Coetzee, Jodi Anne
A Study of the Human Security of North African Economic Migrants 
through a Gender Lens 
by 
Jodi Anne Coetzee 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in 
Political Science in the Faculty of Arts and 
Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University 
Supervisor: Professor Amanda Gouws 
April 2019
The financial assistance of the South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) towards this research is hereby 
acknowledged. 
1 
DECLARATION 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein 
is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly 
otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will 
not infringe any third-party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part for 
obtaining any qualification.  
Jodi Anne Coetzee 
April 2019 
Copyright © 2019 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2 
Acknowledgements 
Giving honour where it is due, I would like to express indescribable gratitude to my supervisor, 
Professor Amanda Gouws, a renowned academic who has certainly left her mark on Gender 
Politics and Political Behaviour in South Africa. Your consistency, encouragement and 
wisdom served as a great encouragement to me during this process. You have embodied 
humility and grace and have indirectly provided me with the best academic programme of my 
life thus far. Thank you for always making time for me and for prioritising my goals along with 
yours. You have invested in me and I am eternally thankful for that. Thank you for setting such 
a wonderful example to us young women in academia.  
My sincerest gratitude is directed towards the South African Research Chairs Initiative, for 
affording me the opportunity and necessary funding required to complete my Master’s degree 
in Political Science at Stellenbosch University. Thank you, Professor Gouws and SARChI for 
extending great kindness and generosity towards me. Dr Ubanesia Adams-Jack and Dr 
Derica Lambrechts, thank you both for presenting stimulating courses, demonstrating 
excellence and pushing me to grow. May you both continue to impart the love of learning.  
To my mom, Lavinia Coetzee, thank you for everything you have done to bring me this far 
and all the sacrifices you made in the years past. Thank you for your support, encouragement 
and the perspective you have brought. You have taught me to enjoy life and this is as much 
your success as it is mine. To my dad, Neten Kara, thank you for being part of this journey - 
I am grateful that you get to share in this.   
Keith Smook, thank you for demonstrating a tremendous amount of love, support and 
encouragement. Your friendship and consistency propelled me forward during the difficult 
times and I am so thankful that you have walked alongside me in this. Thank you for inspiring 
courage in me by embodying the humble type of hard work that you do. Monique James, 
Dalene Kotzé and Irmarie Luijk thank you for all the joy you have brought to my life, for the 
constant follow-ups and for always valuing my heart above my deadlines. Thank you for 
prioritising friendship and for cheering me on!  
This research is dedicated to my late Oupa, John Coetzee, and my Ouma, Ina Coetzee. Thank 
you both for always believing in my abilities and for guiding me in wisdom and love. Thank 
you both for encouraging me to reach higher and go further. You have never doubted that I will 
achieve greatness and that has meant so much to me.  
Lastly, I would like to give all the glory to my Heavenly Father and my Lord Jesus, without 
whom this would not have been possible. A love not found on earth, not seen but so real has 
carried me throughout this process. Knowing the Truth has set me free countless times and I 
thankful to know that my life has a greater purpose far beyond what I could imagine. Thank 
You for being just, true and faithful and my guiding Light. Hallelujah!  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
Contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................... 6 
Opsomming ................................................................................................. 7 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................. 9 
Chapter 1: Introduction........................................................................... 10 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 10 
1.2 The Crisis of Refugees and Migrants ......................................................................... 14 
1.3 The EU ........................................................................................................................... 15 
1.4 Italy & The Libyan Coast Guard ............................................................................... 16 
1.5 Research Problem & Justification .............................................................................. 17 
1.6 Research question and Objectives .............................................................................. 19 
1.7 Significance of the research ......................................................................................... 19 
1.8 Theoretical Underpinning ........................................................................................... 19 
1.9 Research Question, Objectives & Methodology ........................................................ 21 
1.10 Data Collection ........................................................................................................... 22 
1.12 Overview of Chapters ................................................................................................ 23 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................. 25 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 25 
2.2 The Arab Spring ........................................................................................................... 26 
2.3 Migration of Women post-Arab Spring ..................................................................... 31 
2.4 Push & Pull Factors of Migration ............................................................................... 34 
2.5 Regulations of Migrant-receiving countries .............................................................. 37 
2.6 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 39 
Chapter 3: Methodology .......................................................................... 44 
3.1 Chapter Overview ........................................................................................................ 44 
3.2 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 44 
3.3 Human Security: A Human-Centric approach ......................................................... 45 
3.4 Feminist Security Theory: Linking everyday experiences to security .................... 48 
3.5 Why the Human Security framework & Feminist Security Theory? ..................... 49 
3.6 Challenging Realism .................................................................................................... 51 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
3.7 Research design & Methodology ................................................................................ 51 
3.8 A Case in Study ............................................................................................................ 52 
3.9 Italy & France............................................................................................................... 53 
3.10 Analysis of Secondary Data ....................................................................................... 56 
3.11 Shortcomings & Limitations ..................................................................................... 56 
3.12 Value for international, migration and gender studies ........................................... 56 
3.13 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 57 
Chapter 4: Secondary Data Analysis ..................................................... 59 
4.1. Chapter Overview ....................................................................................................... 59 
4.2 The Carceral State ....................................................................................................... 60 
4.3 Push & Pull Factors ..................................................................................................... 61 
4.3.1 Push Factors ........................................................................................................... 61 
4.3.1.1 Conflict in North Africa ................................................................................... 61 
4.3.1.2 Modern-day Slavery ......................................................................................... 63 
4.3.2 Pull Factors ............................................................................................................ 65 
4.3.2.1 Economic Opportunity ..................................................................................... 65 
4.4 State Responses ............................................................................................................. 66 
4.4.1 EU Entry Policies ................................................................................................... 66 
4.4.1.1 The Dublin Regulation .................................................................................... 68 
4.4.1.2. EURODAC ...................................................................................................... 68 
4.4.1.3. The Common European Asylum System ....................................................... 69 
4.4.1.4. French Policies ............................................................................................... 70 
4.4.1.5 Italian Policies.................................................................................................. 71 
4.4.2 Categorisation of Persons ..................................................................................... 72 
4.4.3. Securitisation & Externalisation ......................................................................... 75 
4.4.3.1 Border Control ................................................................................................. 76 
4.4.3.2 Frontex ............................................................................................................. 76 
4.4.3.3 NGROs .............................................................................................................. 77 
4.4.3.4 The Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) ...................................................................... 78 
4.4.3.5. Search & Rescue (SAR) .................................................................................. 80 
4.4.3.6 Returns, Resettlement & Relocation ............................................................... 83 
4.4.3.7 Closing Ports & Disembarkation ..................................................................... 84 
4.4.3.8 Hotspot Approach & Detention ....................................................................... 85 
4.4.4. Citizen Responses ................................................................................................. 89 
4.5 Threats & Dangers to Migrant Women ..................................................................... 90 
4.5.1 Reception Conditions ............................................................................................ 91 
4.5.2 Sexually Exploited in Transit & Abroad ............................................................. 93 
4.5.3 Reproductive Challenges ...................................................................................... 94 
4.6 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 95 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ............................................................................. 99 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 99 
5.2 Findings ....................................................................................................................... 100 
5.3 Implications of the study ........................................................................................... 102 
5.4 Informing Human Security & Feminist Security Theory ...................................... 102 
5.6 Gaps for Further Study ............................................................................................. 103 
5.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 103 
6. Bibliography ....................................................................................... 106 
 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
Abstract 
Migration, the movement of people across various distances and through various means, has 
changed significantly in the current global era. Since 2010, migration has taken on a different, 
more irregular nature, as people are determined to improve their livelihoods, some being driven 
by desperate circumstances to do so. Migration has also become increasingly feminised. During 
migration, the human security of migrants is at risk and their vulnerability persists throughout 
migration.  Human security is an issue that reaches far beyond the individual, as human security 
issues shape national issues. It would be ignorant to assume that the two are mutually exclusive, 
as the influx of migrants to Europe in the post-Arab Spring context has illustrated.  
This thesis employs a gender lens to understand the nature of human security issues that 
economic migrants, who migrate from North Africa to Europe, experience. By exploring the 
push and pull factors of migration, the thesis provided an overview of the human security of 
migrants pre-migration. Conflict in North African and modern-day slavery largely drive 
migration from North Africa to Europe and exacerbate the human insecurity of migrants. 
Economic opportunity has been identified as the most significant pull factor for migration to 
Europe. By analysing the responses of Italy and, to a lesser degree, France, to migrants, the 
thesis produced insights into the human security of migrants in Europe. The differences 
between the experiences of men and women migrants were also considered. Using feminist 
security theory and a human security framework, this thesis maintains that security on the 
ground is important, perhaps more so than high politics. Valuable insights were provided on 
how Italy and France have managed migration and the impact of this on how citizens perceive 
and receive migrants. Central to the study was the focus on the securitisation of state responses 
to irregular migration, which include measures like border control, search and rescue 
operations, returns, resettlement and relocation, the closure of ports and refusals to disembark, 
the Hotspot Approach and detention. From these, successes and shortcomings have been 
identified, illustrating the nature of state protection to non-citizens. The human insecurity of 
migrants has been compounded by the lack of provisions, including medical attention and 
safety provisions, and the unique threats to women migrants. Although men and women 
migrants face similar risks and experience similar challenges during migration, women remain 
more susceptible to gender based violence and sexual exploitation and are, therefore, more 
vulnerable than their counterparts.  
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Opsomming 
Migrasie, die beweging van mense oor verskeie afstande en wyses, het drasties verander in die 
nuwe globale era. Sedert 2010 het migrasie 'n ander, meer onreëlmatige aard aangeneem, omdat 
mense, gedryf deur hul desperate omstandighede, vasbeslote is om hul lewenskwaliteit – en 
bestaan te verbeter. Die feminisering van migrasie is ook besig om toe te neem. Tydens 
migrasie is die menslike sekuriteit van migrante in gevaar. Migrante bly ook kwesbaar tydens 
die proses van migrasie. Menslike sekuriteit is 'n probleem wat ver buite die individu strek, 
aangesien menslike sekuriteitskwessies nasionale kwessies vorm. Beide dié kwessies is 
afhanklik van mekaar soos geïllustreer deur die vloei van immigrante na Europa tydens die 
post-Arabiese lente. 
 
Hierdie tesis gebruik 'n genderlens om die aard van menslike sekuriteitkwessies van 
ekonomiese migrante, wat van Noord-Afrika na Europa migreer, te verstaan. Deur die druk- 
en trekfaktore van migrasie te ondersoek, gee die tesis 'n oorsig van die menslike sekuriteit van 
migrante se pre-migrasie. Konflik in Noord-Afrika asook hedendaagse slawerny dryf migrasie 
grootliks vanaf Noord-Afrika na Europa en benadruk die menslike sekuriteit van migrante. 
Ekonomiese geleenthede is geïdentifiseer as die belangrikste faktor vir migrasie na Europa. 
Deur die response van Italië en, in mindere mate, Frankryk, aan migrante te analiseer gee die 
tesis insig in die menslike sekuriteit van migrante in Europa. Die verskille tussen die ervarings 
van mans en vroue-migrante is ook ondersoek. Met behulp van feministiese sekuriteitsteorie 
en ŉ menslike sekuriteitsraamwerk, word daar geredeneer dat veiligheid op die grondvlak 
belangrik is, miskien meer belangrik as hoë politiek. Waardevolle insigte word verskaf oor hoe 
Italië en Frankryk migrasie bestuur, asook hoe burgers migrante waarneem en ontvang. 
Sentraal tot die studie is die fokus op die sekuritering van staatsreaksies op onreëlmatige 
migrasie, wat maatreëls insluit soos grensbeheer, soek- en reddingsoperasies, terug stuur, 
hervestiging en herlokasie. Die sluiting van hawens, die weiering van toestemming om af te 
klim van vaartuie, asook die “hotspot”- benadering en aanhouding is ook onder oë geneem. 
Hiermee is suksesse en tekortkominge wat die aard van staatsbeskerming aan nie-burgers 
illustreer, geidentifiseer. Die gebrek aan menslike sekuriteit van migrante is vererger deur die 
gebrek aan hulpbronne soos mediese aandag en veiligheidsverkaffing wat unieke bedreigings 
vir vroue-migrante inhou. Alhoewel mans en vroue-immigrante dieselfde risiko's en 
soortgelyke uitdagings tydens migrasie ervaar, bly vroue meer vatbaar vir geslagsgeweld en 
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seksuele uitbuiting. Vroue is dus baie meer kwesbaar as hul eweknieë tydens die proses van 
migrasie.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
International Relations (IR) has seen a surge of critique by feminist and gender scholars that 
IR scholarship revolves mostly around issues of war and peace, with the assumption that states 
protect those who form part of the political community, instead of asking who is being 
protected by security policies (Blanchard, 2003: 1289-1290). Therefore, that the impact of war 
on states has received more attention than the impact of war on individuals. Feminist security 
theory sides (FST)1 with this critique, questioning the degree to which states protect women in 
times of war and peace (Blanchard, 2003: 1290). What about the human security and human 
rights of individuals, security theory asks, as it considers the risks to individuals. One of the 
processes in which the human security of individuals has the potential to be seriously infringed 
upon, because of uncertainties and dangers surrounding the process, is migration.  
Migration, the movement of people from one place to another often for the sake of improved 
living conditions and quality of life, continues to mark the contemporary global era. However, 
migration also poses great challenges to states and individuals, as managing human mobility 
remains a complex task for destination countries (World Economic Forum, 2017: 10). The 
Arab Spring and subsequent conflicts have played a crucial role in the migration of people from 
the Arab region to Europe. As such, European countries continue to grapple with a variety of 
migration issues, amongst which are migration flows, granting refugee status and managing or 
preventing border crossings. Therefore, the mass arrivals and accompanying mass deaths that 
occur en route to the Mediterranean from North Africa and the Middle East, the violent contexts 
and political deterioration that push migrants from home countries have demanded 
international attention. Thus, migration directly affects the human security of women 
worldwide, especially when the means of migration are unconventional and dangerous, as in 
the case studied in this thesis.  
Sami, an eighteen-year old Eritrean male who left his home country for Libya, was taken to an 
illegal detention centre in Bani Walid where he and many other migrants endured horrific 
abuses, such as electrocution, beatings and other forms of torture (Naib, 2018). Living there 
for nine months, he recalled that “many girls and women were raped … [and the men in the 
neighbouring building] would hear their screams and cries” (Naib, 2018). After two failed 
                                                          
1 FST refers to Feminist Security Theory, the core theoretical framework for this thesis. It is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 3.  
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attempts to reach the coast, Sami was amongst a group sold to an Eritrean smuggler, Walid, by 
Libyan coast guards; a group of about 320 were then kept in a “container-like shed” and shared 
one toilet. Today, Sami works in a mosque in Tripoli, where he tries to care for other Eritreans 
trapped in the city and, though he wished to escape life in Eritrea, [he said that] he would rather 
die at sea with the possibility of reaching Europe than return to the “hell [he] saw in Libya and 
the hell awaiting [him] in Eritrea” (Naib, 2018).  
Esther, a Nigerian migrant residing in a centre for refugee women in Syracuse, Italy, was nine 
months pregnant when she embarked on her journey to the Mediterranean from Libya and her 
experience illustrates the complex nature of women’s migration (Plambech, 2017). Some 
women depart during pregnancy, some fall pregnant on-board ships, whilst others give birth 
on-board and others miscarry along the journey. A study conducted in 2014 reveals that as 
many as eleven percent of women migrants arrive pregnant (Plambech, 2017). Stories like this 
demand further inquiry, as it provides insights into the complex nature of migration in the 
twenty-first century, highlighting the different contexts of women migration and migration of 
men.   
The stories cited above illustrate that, although migration is accompanied by numerous benefits 
and can often be an empowering experience, it also comes at elevated risk, as migrants, the 
most vulnerable group in society, are often exposed to gross human rights violations, abuse 
and discrimination. Women and child migrants, even more vulnerable face the danger of being 
drawn or forced into human trafficking and other forms of exploitation (United Nations, 2017: 
1). According to statistics, women comprise 48.4% of international migrants and, in Europe, 
the share of women migrants has increased from 51.6% in 2000 to 52% in 2017 (United 
Nations, 2017: 15). As the role of women has changed over time and migration has become 
increasingly feminised, women no longer migrate merely as companions and for family 
reunion, but in search of employment. Therefore, it is also important to understand the 
processes that women go through and the risks and dangers they face during migration. Various 
questions have emerged and prompt inquiry into the migration of women and state protection 
of women, or lack thereof. One such question is whether the migration of women leads to 
women’s empowerment or women’s domination. Migration has the potential to increase a 
woman’s autonomy, yet disintegrate family relations. Furthermore, most migrant women face 
a double discrimination of being women and foreign (Marinucci, 2007: 17).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
This study adopts a gender lens that will include the experience of women and men, but in 
some instances will highlight the experiences of women. By paying attention to the experience 
of women migrants, one can better understand the priorities of receiving countries and the 
general sentiments of states towards migration. The responses of states to crises, and the 
protection offered or withheld, and measures taken to mitigate crises can provide great insights 
into the workings of the international community and shortcomings thereof, where it is 
discriminatory, whom it favours, where it contradicts itself, what it values and who it regards 
as important. Men, women and child migrants face precarious conditions along the journey and 
once they arrive in receiving countries, but also during pre-departure and upon return to home 
countries. For example, detention centres in Libya are ridden with violence, robberies, rape and 
murder among returned migrants, posing a threat to the wellbeing of vulnerable groups, such 
as women and children.  
A key reason as to why the migration of North African migrants is important for research, is 
due to the precariousness that is attached to their migration. What is meant by precariousness 
in this instance, are conditions that contribute to the uncertainty and insecurity of migrants’ 
lives and futures. Some scholars explore the precariousness associated with transnational 
identities that migrants possess (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 833). Others have highlighted the 
vulnerability and agency associated with bodies, which is induced or suppressed under certain 
social and political conditions (Butler, 2004: 29). In light of these considerations, questions 
around whose lives matter and whose lives are ‘grieveable’ begin to emerge (Butler, 2004: 20). 
One could take this a step further by inquiring who has the power to determine the extent to 
which lives and bodies matter and how these forces go about protecting lives and bodies.   
In order to emphasise the role of the state as a unit of analysis, yet at the same time bring gender 
to the fore, a gender analysis and, what Pessar & Mahler (2003: 815) refer to as a “gendered 
geographies of power framework” is useful. The framework seeks to examine gender across 
transnational spaces. The three elements upon which the framework is based are: geographic 
scales (as gender operates across various spatial and social scales across transnational 
landscapes), social locations (that is, positions within interconnected power hierarchies created 
by a range of factors) and power geometries (types and degrees of agency that people exert 
depending on their social locations) (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 815 – 816). This framework 
allows the state and gender to play an equal role in the analysis of transnational migration. It is 
important to understand how the state has related to, impacted on and assisted or suppressed 
migrant women. Governmentality, which can be considered as the mode of power relating to 
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the control of people and bodies, operates through various platforms (Butler, 2004: 52). The 
thesis is mainly concerned with the governmentality of bodies, specifically migrant bodies and, 
as far as possible, the bodies of migrant women and children.   
A transnational approach to migration contributes valuable insights into how state policies 
contour the experiences of migrants in home and receiving countries (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 
821). Therefore, policies around restrictions, such as border and migration control, are analysed 
to determine the impact of these on the lives of migrants, as the increased restrictions imposed 
by European Union member states which have exposed “vulnerable migrants to even greater 
physical other risks” illustrate (ODI, 2015). Another important insight that a gender framework 
to studying migration provides, is the emphasis on power hierarchies in which migrants find 
themselves which differ exponentially (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 822). What this means is that 
conditions favouring migration itself and arrival in receiving countries differ across various 
intersections of identities; race, class, age, marital status, sexuality and especially gender. For 
purposes of this study, it is the gender aspect and some of its intersections that this thesis will 
focus on.  
The study links globalisation to economic migrants2, more specifically so by using the Arab 
Spring in North Africa. It also seeks to understand how the responses of migrant-receiving 
countries influence the human security of economic migrants. In the current global era, the 
refugee crisis in Europe has demanded much attention from various intra-state, state and 
regional organisations, thus providing an intriguing, yet urgent topic of study. It is worthwhile 
considering the process of migration, which, as we have seen, can become a foreign policy, 
state security, human security and national political issue and relates to identity politics, 
citizenship, labour and human rights (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 252). The study recognises the 
complexity associated with legal terminology, especially where it concerns who is considered 
a migrant, an asylum seeker and a refugee. However, it works with the assumption that, 
although not all migrants are considered refugees or asylum seekers, refugees and asylum 
seekers initially form part of the ‘migrant’ population. 
Assistant High Commissioner for Protection at the United Nations, Volker Türk, recently 
commented that refugees illustrate well that multilateralism is the way forward and highlighted 
the impact of treating refugees poorly, on society as a whole, not only on the individual, as this 
                                                          
2 The thesis has chosen to focus on economic migrants as they comprise the majority of persons migrating from 
Libya. Though they might be considered refugees when they arrive in Libya, as they depart, they take on the 
role of economic migrants 
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leads to the “dehumanization of individuals and the brutalization of a society as a whole” 
(Dobbie, 2017). This study will interrogate the push and pull factors of economic migration, 
from North Africa, and the power relations involved.  
1.2 The Crisis of Refugees and Migrants  
The refugee crisis in Europe has had immense political, social and economic global impacts. 
In 2016, Al Jazeera published an article titled “2016: The year the world stopped caring about 
refugees”. Such a bold statement demands inquiry. Human Rights Watch, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Eurostat and the World Bank have provided 
useful resources in understanding the magnitude of the refugee crisis.  Statistics show that 
145 433 sea arrivals were received in 2017, compared to 362 753 in 2016, 1 015 078 in 2015 
and 216 054 in 2014, of which an estimated 2 784 were dead and missing (UNHCR). The 
demographics of these Mediterranean Sea arrivals indicate that 17.9% were children, 12.9% 
women and the remaining 69.3% were men, and most arrivals to Italy came from Turkey, 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Greece (UNHCR). Furthermore, Frontex3, the EU's external 
border force, which is responsible for monitoring the routes migrants use and numbers arriving 
at Europe's borders, said that more than 1 800 000 migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 from 
Africa (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts, 2016).  
According to UNHCR (2017), “in recent years, the number of people [believing they can find 
jobs but end up trying to escape life-threatening insecurity, instability, unfavourable economic 
conditions and widespread exploitation and abuse] crossing by sea from North Africa to 
southern Europe has increased”. Three main routes used by refugees and migrants to reach 
Europe include the Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes, with Libya being the most commonly used and dangerous route (UNHCR, 2017). The 
Displacement Tracking Matrix has revealed the following insights into Libya: of the migrants 
present in Libya at the time, the main countries of intended destination were Libya, Italy and 
Germany and those for migrant arrivals were Libya, Italy and France (International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2018: 2). Of the migrants recorded for these purposes, 97 
per cent of them were adults and three per cent were minors, with 60 per cent of minors being 
unaccompanied (IOM, 2018: 2). There were said to be approximately 700 000 to one million 
migrants in Libya in 2016, which currently has a population of 6.3 million (IOM, 2017). 
                                                          
3 Frontex is the common term given to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, an EU agency given the 
mandate to control borders of the European Schengen Area. The concept will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
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Statistics for 2018 so far, reveal that 2 421 migrants have been rescued or intercepted. In 
February 2018 alone, 375 migrants have been rescued or intercepted and thirty-four bodies 
retrieved, most of these taking place at Zuwara, Azzawiyah and Tripoli, along the coast of 
Libya (IOM, 2018).  
Further statistics reveal that Italy received the second highest number of first-time asylum 
applicants in the second quarter of 2017, at a total of 34 200, or 23% of all applicants in the 
EU Member States (Eurostat, 2017).   Therefore, the number of asylum seekers in Italy 
increased by 7 500 more than in 2016. Additionally, Italy issued the third most total first-
instance decisions during the second quarter of 2017; 19 200 (Eurostat, 2017). For purposes of 
this thesis, it is necessary to differentiate between what is mean by the terms ‘asylum seekers’, 
‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’. An asylum seeker is one who has fled their home country in search 
of international protection, but whose status has not yet been made ‘refugee’, whereas a refugee 
is one who has been recognised under the 1951 UN Convention as a refugee, having fled from 
their home country due to war or persecution and holds the status of refugee. A migrant, on the 
other hand, is one who has made a conscious decision to leave their home country in search of 
a better life elsewhere. To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis will be to understand the EU’s 
relationship to economic migrants from Africa. 
1.3 The EU  
Human Rights Watch (2016), observing that the EU undercut core values and rights protections 
with its foreign policy that was dictated by the desires of member states, observed the 
following:  
The EU also started to negotiate and conclude several questionable readmission and 
other migration cooperation agreements with third countries, paving the way for the 
return of asylum seekers and migrants to countries that are neither safe nor stable. The 
hallmark of most of these agreements—that also serve to prevent asylum seekers and 
migrants from coming to the EU—does not appear to focus on the advancement of 
protection of the most vulnerable, but on protecting the EU from having to deal with 
them on its own territory.  
As previously mentioned, migration has posed increasingly complex challenges since the Arab 
Spring in North Africa and the Middle East, especially to neighbouring European states that 
receives the bulk of migrants. As a regional bloc that is focused on integration and extension, 
the EU has tried to protect member states from the crisis, whilst trying to mitigate negative 
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consequences of the Spring in its neighbourhood. With calls from various organisations, such 
as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Amnesty International and Medecins Sans 
Frontiers, amongst others, and the media capturing the realities of migrants’ journeys from 
North Africa to Europe, the EU has had to respond to the refugee crisis with urgency. However, 
the EU has been criticised for the way it has handled the inflow of migrants from the Middle 
East and North African region, especially since the outbreak of the refugee crisis.  
1.4 Italy & The Libyan Coast Guard 
Italy, the case under scrutiny in this thesis, was said to have received approximately 138 000 
asylum applications by 2015, EU countries offered asylum to 292,540 refugees and Italy 
granted 29 615 claims for asylum (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven 
charts, 2016). Towards the end of 2016, the Human Rights Watch (2016) found that 164,695 
migrants and asylum seekers had reached Italy by sea, comprising mostly Nigerians, Eritreans, 
and Sudanese. Additionally, the numbers of unaccompanied children had increased 
significantly, and an estimated 23 000 migrant children were traveling alone to Italy by mid-
September 2016, compared to 12 360 in 2015. Though new asylum applications increased in 
2016, so did rejection rates, due to tightened border controls by neighbouring countries, which 
prevented onward movement of refugees and migrants. Though the thesis concerns itself 
primarily with economic migrants, it is useful to provide a backdrop of the movement of people 
to Italy.  
To address the crisis, Italy intensified negotiations with countries such as Sudan, Gambia, and 
Libya on migration control, including the facilitation of deportations and, after a memorandum 
of understanding was reached with Sudan in August 2016, Italy deported 48 Sudanese who had 
allegedly not applied for asylum amid concerns about the application procedure. In Italy, which 
has witnessed increased intolerance towards migrants amongst citizens, there has been much 
anger over the government’s inability to decrease the number of migrants. Schechter (2018) 
indicates that there were 119 000 illegal Mediterranean crossings to Italy in 2017, despite a 
reduction of these by a third, highlighting that, since 2013, Italy has absorbed close to 700 000 
migrants arriving by boat from Libya.  
Figures for 1 January 2018 and 28 February 2018 illustrate that Italy received a total of 5 247 
arrivals by sea with 316 deaths, Spain received 2 306 migrants with 102 deaths and Greece and 
Cyprus received 2 653 migrants and 37 migrants respectively, both without deaths 
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(Meditteranean Update, 2018). According to the International Organisation for Migration, 
2832 migrants died whilst making their way from North Africa to Italy in 2017, down from 
4581 in 2016 and approximately 119 310 reached Italy alive in 2017, less than the 181 436 in 
2016 (Jones & Dalgleish, 2018). Integral to the migration of people from North Africa to 
Europe, is Libya, the most common departure point for migrants making their way to Europe.  
Intended to form part of the solution for the many deaths of Mediterranean crossings is the 
Libyan Coast Guard (LCG)4, which will also form part of the study’s analysis. Described as a 
“decentralised force often accused of working with local [Libyan] militias and smugglers”, the 
LCG also forms part of Europe’s response to the refugee crisis (Campbell, 2017). Despite 
controlling Libya’s borders and supposedly working towards preventing incidences of deaths 
during migrant boat crossings, the LCG has also violated the human rights of migrants as 
various human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, the United Nations and 
Amnesty International, emphasise. Unable to engage with Libya on land due to continued 
political conflict, the EU has invested in the LCG and, more importantly, Italy has engaged 
with Libya’s Government of National Accord and municipalities providing aid in return for 
border and migration control (Micaleff & Reitano, 2018). The relationship between the Coast 
Guard and the EU will provide intriguing insights into what this thesis understands human 
security to be and in understanding the ways in which these stakeholders impact vulnerable 
persons.  
1.5 Research Problem & Justification  
The problem with which this thesis will grapple is an issue of human security, with a keen 
focus on women’s human security. The main objective of the thesis is two-fold. Firstly, the 
thesis seeks to identify the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to the EU, 
bearing in mind the consequences of the Arab Spring. Secondly, is seeks to understand how 
the measures taken by EU Member States have protected, or failed to protect, North African 
migrants in Europe. By studying Italy, an EU Member State having received the biggest influx 
of migrants from North Africa, and, to lesser degree, France, a major transit country for 
migrants, the research seeks to identify how migrants are received and accommodated. 
Furthermore, it seeks to understand how these states have managed and responded to migration 
from North Africa. Adding to this study of migration, is a gender lens, which seeks to identify 
                                                          
4 LCG refers to the Libyan Coast Guard, which forms part of the Libyan Navy. Its role in migration 
management will be discussed in detail Chapter 4.  
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the unique challenges that men, women and child migrants face in transit and in Europe. A 
gender analysis of migration considers how conditions of migration are shaped by migrants’ 
cultural and social contexts, their membership of social groups and how economic and political 
conditions impact decisions about migration (Omelaniuk, 2005: 1).  
Key to the study of Italy, because it serves as an entry point for migrants, is the island of 
Lampedusa, located in southern Italy, closer to Africa than Europe but Italian territory, to which 
many migrants have made their way during the refugee crisis. Understanding the 
implementation of regulations, initiatives and security measures by Italy and considering the 
nature and impacts of these, will help answer the research questions. Furthermore, this will 
help illustrate how these structures advance or hamper the ability of individuals to make 
choices, illustrate how EU member states perceive the concept of care and reveal the limitations 
that are imposed on migrants to make choices.  
The Arab Spring in North Africa refers to the uprisings that took place towards the end of 2010, 
spilling over into 2011. There are numerous factors that contributed to these revolutions, 
though each combination unique to the countries in which they occurred, what will be referred 
to as ‘push and pull factors’ throughout this thesis. According to Doerschler (2006: 1100), these 
factors have “a lasting impact beyond the decision to immigrate”, as they also largely influence 
the integration of migrants in destination countries. Push factors refer to conditions that evoke 
and aggravate feelings of discontentment and dissatisfaction amongst people in their present 
locale, whilst pull factors are conditions and characteristics of destination countries that appeal 
to migrants and attract them to those specific countries. Though economic conditions are 
usually looked to as the main cause for migration, the importance of social, cultural, 
environmental and political factors cannot be underestimated. The Arab Spring in North Africa 
illustrates this well, as these revolutions had such severe consequences for the state and 
individuals that migration from these countries cannot merely be attributed to economic factors.  
The Arab Spring in North Africa was welcomed by citizens of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, as 
the prospects for freedom, democracy and improved quality of life seemed great. However, the 
ensuing outbreaks of conflict that resembled civil war in subsequent years, have changed the 
sentiment amongst citizens to the degree that life elsewhere looks more promising. Crime and 
violence, deteriorating social conditions and the lack of economic opportunity, and overall 
disappointment at the failure of democratic transitions, are of the largest factors that have 
pushed people out of North Africa towards Europe. Europe, a safer and more stable region, 
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with social welfare and greater economic opportunity, has provided a hope for disappointed 
and fearful migrants, pulling them out of North Africa towards Europe.   
1.6 Research question and Objectives  
The research question is the following: using a gender lens, what is the nature of human security 
issues that economic migrants, who migrate from North Africa to Italy, face?  
The research objectives for the thesis are:  
• To understand how push and pull factors contribute to the precarious human security 
of migrants.  
• To determine whether EU responses, as implemented by Italy and, to a lesser extent, 
France compound or alleviate the human insecurity of migrants. 
• To understand how the experiences of men and women migrants differ.  
1.7 Significance of the research  
The devastation caused at various levels by conflict, inequality and regime changes are not 
often enough acknowledged. In a world where realities can be so contrasted, despite the 
seeming benefits of globalisation, it is necessary to ask what impact these processes have on 
states and, more importantly and too often overlooked, the human security of individuals. The 
study seeks to understand the relationship between economic migration and state responses. It 
will also consider what it means for migrants to live precariously as a consequence of migration 
management and the securitisation5 thereof. While the EU was formed in the name of 
integration, to allow for the free movement of goods and people across borders to create a 
larger regional community, it is important to understand how these arrangements are 
exclusionary and how state protection is sometimes manipulated to serve national and regional 
interests.  
1.8 Theoretical Underpinning  
This thesis is grounded on Feminist Security Theory and Human Security Theory. Pettman and 
Hall (2014: 251) emphasise that studying migration through a gender lens is important, 
especially since women are increasingly moving across international borders and because their 
experience of migration differs from that of men. This thesis, like Pettman and Hall (2014: 
                                                          
5 Securitisation refers to the responses of states towards migration, as it is regarded as a security issue, and 
migrants, as they are perceived and handles as threats to national security. Furthermore, it refers to the 
politicisation in which refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are portrayed as threats to national security and 
national identity.   
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185), acknowledges that “the decision to go, the process of moving, [and] the consequences of 
displacement or resettlement” are experienced differently by migrant men and women, as 
family politics, opportunities and constraints at borders and in new states, wars and the global 
political economy treat women differently to men. Furthermore, it is important to recognise 
political resistance of citizens to migrants and the resulting need to study individual state 
immigration policies and practices (Pettman, 2014: 253).    
A gendered perspective of migration and the human security of migrants is valuable, as the 
analysis of the situations that women and child migrants endure produce different insights to 
analysing those of migrant men. These insights illustrate the impact of legislation, cultural 
practices, policies and programs on women and child migrants. According to Pettman and Hall 
(2014: 251) gendering migration has a number of virtues: it provides insights of migration 
flows and patterns, and various stages of migration, which include post-migration identity 
politics. Furthermore, it poses questions around the functioning of different kinds of 
boundaries, the racialisation of migration, and why some bodies are more visible than others 
(Pettman & Hall, 2014: 251). FST asks who is welcome and allowed, and who is not and 
recognises that “migrant bodies are racialised as well as classed and gendered” (Pettman & 
Hall, 2014: 254).  
A gendered perspective of migration points out that the entire process, despite whose decision 
it is to leave, is gendered according to roles and relationships in the home, available work at 
home and abroad, forms of violence, exploitation, violence and discrimination in new states 
and are also related to other body differences, such as race, class and nationality (Pettman & 
Hall, 2014: 254). Furthermore, a gendered perspective emphasises that one cannot generalise, 
as migration is filled with complexities. In the current global era, FST also considers 
citizenship, asking how membership impacts insiders and outsiders, how they are engaged and 
holding that “how a state treats its non-citizens is as important for democracy, gender equality 
and human rights, as how it treats its citizens” (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 261). According to 
Blanchard (2003: 1290), FST asks: who is being secured by security policies and recovers 
women’s experiences, bearing in mind gender-based exclusion from decision-making roles, 
and questions the degree to which women are “secured by state ‘protection’ in times of war 
and peace”.  
As such, security is no longer confined to the realm of ‘high politics’ but considers the ordinary 
lives of women. It is FST’s critique of the state, focus on emancipation, investigation into and 
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problematisation of the relationships between women, security and peace and war/conflict that 
is particularly useful for this thesis (Blanchard, 2003: 1298-1299). By challenging ideas of 
protection by problematising the state in its role as protector and power to protect and 
emphasising the effects and consequences of migration on migrants, FST is a valuable 
framework through which to approach the topic of this thesis. The utility in Human Security 
theory lies in what Gazizullin (2016) refers to as its “’human-centric’ vision”, which calls for 
the assessment of security risks and the understanding that “when a human faces a threat, so 
does international security”.  Therefore, the focus shifts from the state to the individual. Human 
Security theory will provide this study with key insights and considerations, as it will deal with 
the question “How do threats to refugees and migrants impact international security”? In the 
current global era, globalisation has ensured that no state goes unaffected by global phenomena, 
the migrant crisis being evidence of this.  
As Tsai (2009: 19) cited the UN’s Commission on Human Security, “[the state] often fails to 
fulfil its security obligations [and] that is why attention must now shift from the security of the 
state to the security of the people – to human security”. This is important to this thesis, as it 
will undertake a study on whether and how EU member states have failed to fulfil their 
obligations towards refugees and migrants from North Africa. Using Human Security Theory, 
this thesis concerns itself mainly with the objective of understanding the security of individuals, 
specifically migrants and refugees in the EU and the threats that they continue to face despite 
having migrated. The thesis wants to determine how macro level actions, specifically those of 
states, autonomously and in relation to one another, influence social relations. By adopting the 
Feminist Security and Human Security theoretical approaches, the migrant crisis and events on 
the ground can explore the treatment of migrants. The study recognises the incomparable value 
of FST and will, for this reason, employ its theoretical insights to answer the research question 
and meet the research objectives.  
1.9 Research Question, Objectives & Methodology   
To answer the research questions and meet the research objectives of this thesis, a unique 
investigation and critical analysis will be required. The chosen method of inquiry for this thesis, 
is to conduct research by means of an exploratory case study and desktop research that 
illustrates arguments with examples from Italy and France. This ought to assist in determining 
the extent to which states are committed to adhering to national and regional legislation and 
policies and how these compete with their national interests.  
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The reason why Italy has been selected as the primary study area for this thesis, is the influx of 
economic migrants from North Africa that have arrived in Europe since the migrant crisis broke 
out in 2015. Furthermore, by identifying the push and pull factors of people to the European 
Union, the relationship between these factors ought to provide some insights into legislation 
and policy, considering the changes brought about by globalisation. By studying the case of 
Italy, as an example of an EU country, this thesis hopes to provide a clearer understanding of 
how big of a priority migrants are in Europe, to what extent these states provide refuge seekers 
with protection and to which social services migrants have access. The primary study of Italy 
will be coupled with a brief study of France to better understand certain aspects of migratory 
experiences. This seeks to showcase specific instances of human rights abuses, especially 
concerning women and children, living conditions inside refugee camps, the treatment of 
women and children in refugee camps and during screening processes, opportunities afforded 
to displaced women and children and integration into society. This thesis seeks to understand 
the ‘push and pull’ factors and the precariousness this causes in migrants’ lives and journeys.  
1.10 Data Collection  
Secondary data has been consulted in this thesis, most being collected by studying online news 
articles, resources created by transnational bodies and consulting a broad spectrum of grey 
literature with the inclusion of a few EU policy documents. A limitation of this thesis is that 
no empirical data collection has been undertaken.   
1.11 Limitations  
There were several limitations to the study conducted, mostly concerning time demands and 
limitations to the nature of the study. Firstly, the wealth of information available to the 
researcher was, at times, overwhelming and data collection and analysis demanded a significant 
amount of time. It was also integral to determine which sources were deemed appropriate, 
credible and unbiased during the process of data collection. These were identified and provided 
great insights. Furthermore, the focus of the study had to be slightly adapted due to the limited 
amount of information currently available to study the topic from a gendered perspective. 
Finally, the complexity of irregular migration within North Africa and from the region to 
Europe, posed a challenge during the stage of the secondary data analysis. Segregating 
information into sections or themes proved challenging, as many of these overlap with one 
another, and the researcher had to be careful not to repeat content.  
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1.12 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 1  
The first chapter of the thesis introduces the study by describing the post-Arab Spring refugee 
crisis and, especially, the European Union’s (EU) role therein. It also briefly discusses the 
importance of a gendered framework for studying migration and describes the study’s research 
problem, question and objectives, as well as describes the theoretical foundation and 
methodology of the study.  
Chapter 2 
The second chapter consists of a literature review of contemporary literature relating to the 
topic. Since not much has been written, some information will come from the internet.  
Chapter 3 
This chapter describes the philosophical underpinnings and theoretical framework of the study 
and provides justification for the methods and approach adopted as well as the reason for 
selecting Italy and, to a lesser extent, France as the countries under study. It also explains how 
research will be conducted and why, and identifies central concepts of the study, whilst 
providing motivation for the type of data collection and analysis undertaken and highlighting 
the implications of the study.  
Chapter 4 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the data collected during the research process, 
to achieve the desired research objectives and, importantly, to answer the research question of 
the study. The chapter commences with a description of the concept of the ‘carceral state’ and 
identifies the main push and pull factors for migration from North Africa to Europe. Push 
factors are those pushing migrants out of North Africa whereas pull factors are those attracting 
migrants to Europe. Push factors of migration from North Africa include conflict and modern-
day slavery and economic opportunities in Europe has emerged as the leading pull factor.  
The chapter then moves on to describe the responses of EU member states to the influx of 
North African migrants post-Arab Spring, by, firstly, describing EU entry policies and, 
subsequently, considering those of Italy and France. Then, the securitisation measures that Italy 
and France have adopted are explored, of which include border control, search and rescue 
operations, returns, resettlements and relocations of migrants and refugees, the closing of ports 
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and refusal to disembark and, finally, the Hotspot Approach6 and detention. Subsequently, the 
responses of citizens towards migrants from North Africa are described and, finally, the threats 
and dangers that migrant women face before, during and post-migration to the EU, with 
specific focus on detention and reception conditions, sexual exploitation and reproductive 
challenges they face. 
Chapter 5 
This final chapter of the thesis concludes the thesis and conveys the major findings and results 
of the study, which has sought to understand the gendered nature of EU policies and processes 
towards North African migrants. Furthermore, the implications of findings for further research 
will be identified, as will suggestions and recommendations for future research on the topic.  
  
                                                          
6 The Hotspot Approach, a migration management strategy developed by the European Commission, has been 
used to provide EU member states located at the external border with assistance (https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/hotspot-approach_en). The concept will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction  
This literature review will explore existing literature concerned with migration from North 
Africa to Europe, policies of migrant-receiving countries and the gendered perspective of these, 
to provide an overview of the scholarship related to the topic. This section will, thus, be divided 
into three sections: The Arab Spring, Push and Pull Factors of Migration and Women’s 
Migration post-Arab Spring and Regulations of migrant-receiving countries in the European 
Union. The contributions of the Arab Uprisings coupled with push factors out of Africa and 
pull factors to Europe will provide insights as to why women migrate from Africa to Europe, 
providing a clear outline of the literature that covers the topic of this thesis. Due to the lack of 
academic literature on the migrant crisis in Europe, the EU’s response to it and the threats and 
dangers posed to the human security of women who migrate from North Africa to Europe, 
these have been excluded from the literature review. Perhaps the lack of academic literature is 
due to the recent and rapidly evolving nature of these events and the contexts in which they 
occur, however, it is hoped that literature will emerge and become academic priority in the 
coming years.  
Various insights into the impact of the Arab Spring on migration, the reasons for migration 
from North Africa to Europe, the nature of women’s migration post-Arab Spring and the 
regulations of migrant-receiving countries will be provided. Overall, evidence has suggested 
that the nature of migration has changed in the post-Arab Spring context as has the relationship 
between the MENA region and Europe. Furthermore, whilst conflict, economic opportunity 
and democracy are driving forces behind migration from North Africa to Europe, scholars have 
illustrated how Europe has fallen short in migration management, externalising it and becoming 
more concerned with national security rather than human security, especially as it has provided 
transit countries with support in efforts to curb migration. Although the nature of migration 
differs significantly for North African migrant women than it does for migrant men, literature 
suggests that not enough attention has been paid to these differences and the implications 
thereof. The review has also found that EU regulations have largely proved to be inadequate 
and unhelpful for the cause of migrants and Member States alike, and pitfalls have been 
identified across academia and, moreover, how a lack of consensus around migration 
management has harmed human and national security alike.  
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2.2 The Arab Spring 
In December 2010, a young Tunisian man, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself alight in front of 
municipal buildings in December 2010, after being assaulted by police. News of his death 
travelled fast and eventually culminated in what has been called the Arab Spring. The Arab 
Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that broke out in North Africa, starting in Tunisia and 
spreading across the Middle East and North Africa, to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Central to the series of uprisings, is the role of social media, since 
news of Bouazizi’s self-immolation travelled fast via various social media platforms. Thus, 
similarly frustrated and oppressed citizens across the Middle East and North Africa, were 
sharing stories and could ban together to protest authoritarian regimes. Social media has been 
considered as one of the causes for the spread of protests across the region, as it provided a 
platform in which ordinary people could engage in political conversation. Quite important for 
the revolution, was the fact that many young, urban, educated youth, of whom many were 
women, could coordinate protest action despite where they were geographically (Howard, 
Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari, Mazaid, 2011: 2). Therefore, the Arab Spring was often 
described as a digital revolution.  
Since the uprisings allowed young and educated women to partake in protests, it is important 
to consider the treatment of women protestors by authorities, especially since the patriarchal 
and authoritarian nature of these states were being challenged. Women played a significant role 
in the Spring through various activities not limited to protesting. These included blogging, 
hunger strikes, and they provided support services to protestors, including medical assistance 
at protest sites (Rice, Marsh, Finn, Sherwood, Chrisafis and Booth, 2011). However, responses 
to women during the uprisings illustrate that women participants of the revolutions risked their 
human security and safety. In Egypt, for example, women protestors and observers were 
threatened and assaulted, as the case of Lara Logan, a journalist who was sexually assaulted by 
approximately 40 men in Tahrir Square, Egypt, illustrates (FIDH, n.d. Women and the Arab 
Spring: taking their place?, 18). Overall, the treatment of women during the Spring did not 
bode well for women, as they were arrested and beaten across the region, especially in Egypt, 
Tunisia and Bahrain, where many of whom were medical staff (Rice et al., 2011).  
Though many scholars have recognised the significant contribution of the Arab Spring of 
2010/2011 to IR scholarship, as it has challenged long-held theories, especially concerning the 
resilience of authoritarian regimes, effective structures and strategies and the importance of oil 
wealth, ethnic polarization and external support, it is literature and scholarly debates around 
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the Arab Spring’s role in insecurity which has led to migration that this particular literature 
review is interested in. To start with, De Sousa Ferreira (2014: 73) acknowledges that, although 
the intention of the Spring was to improve standards of living and prospects for Arabs, the 
revolutions caused so much instability that has culminated in refugee crises (Libya and Syria), 
irregular migration and an overall threat to human security not only to Arab states, but also the 
Mediterranean region. An alarming aspect that has emerged, is the threat posed by organised 
crime networks for irregular migration and, thus, to human security (de Sousa Ferreira, 2014: 
80). Likening migration to an alternative form of protest, some (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012: 2-
3) have inquired whether the revolts provoked an increase in irregular border crossings to the 
EU. 
Scholars (Aral, 2014 & Johannson-Nogues, 2013) have highlighted how the responses of 
regimes to the uprisings have led to human insecurity. Aral (2014: 194), by providing an 
overview of the revolts in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, considers how the United Nations’ 
Security Council was selective in its responses to these revolts, especially with regards to 
sanctions and military enforcement actions. In this sense, the Arab Spring exacerbated human 
insecurity that contributed to migration, as security forces were ordered to fire on 
demonstrators, when demonstrators were arrested, and prisoners tortured by regimes who were 
being protested against (Aral, 2014: 184). For example, at the end of Ben Ali’s regime in 
Tunisia, women were subjected to sexual harassment or rape by security forces (Johansson-
Nogues, 2013: 399 – 400). In Egypt, female protestors were “violently attacked by state-paid 
thugs” and tortured, sexually degraded and underwent virginity tests (Johansson-Nogues, 2013: 
399 – 400). In Libya, aggression towards women was used to humiliate men (Johansson-
Nogues, 2013: 399 – 400). Thus, the extent of civilian deaths and displacements, have emerged 
as the common result of regimes’ responses to the uprisings. Johansson-Nogues, 2013), who 
devotes her work to understanding the impact of the Arab Spring on women, has emphasised 
the hypermasculinist mode that Arab states eventually entered, as they employed what was an 
effective tool – gender violence. The conclusion that most women have fled Libya for fear of 
sexual assault by state forces as opposed to the war and armed violence itself illustrates the 
degree to which human security has been threatened by the Arab Spring and, more so by the 
response of regimes to the Arab Spring (Johansson-Nogues, 2013: 401).  
Analysing the role of human security concerns in the Arab Spring, Nuruzzaman (2013: 52) has 
found that NATO-led intervention into Libya was counterproductive and exacerbated human 
insecurity in the Arab region. Though motivations for intervention were justified, as gross 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
 
human rights violations had indeed been committed by the Gaddafi regime, the approach to the 
Arab Spring’s aftermath increased human insecurity: NATO intervention forces killed many 
civilians, civilian sites were targeted during military operations, rebels were given arms and 
ammunition and air coverage, despite there being a no-fly zone (Nuruzzaman, 2013: 60). 
Shifting the gaze to post-Arab Spring human security of women, the inclusion or exclusion 
from political transitions remains dismal.  
Although political rights have been advanced, women’s representation and access to 
policymakers remains limited. In Tunisia, the role of women has experienced setbacks and 
rights are diffuse, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood government and new Constitution do not 
hold much hope for women’s rights and, in Libya, women’s rights remain weak (Johansson-
Nogues, 2013: 403 – 405). Furthermore, the Arab Spring, and the long-term effects of war and 
war-making, has entrenched male guardianship over women in MENA and the legal status of 
women remains precarious (Maktabi, 2017: 7 & 20). Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos (2012: 
12) agree that the denial of citizens’ rights by flawed constitutions and unjust laws, the 
prohibition of establishing political parties and imposing limitations on the activities of 
opposition parties and the same approach towards civil organisations increased human 
insecurity in the Arab region. 
Though there might be assumptions that the Arab Spring caused increased migration to Europe, 
this can also be attributed to the opportunity presented by the lack of border control, and not 
the structural changes brought on by the Arab Spring. Therefore, the revolutions rerouted 
migrants instead of stimulating new flows (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012: 4). De Sousa Ferreira 
(2014: 79 & 88) agrees that the deficit in border control created a window of opportunity for 
migrants who flee from revolutions and those who were already participating in migratory 
processes and believes that the Arab Spring did not cause a “massive influx of migration to 
Europe” as movement was predominantly of a south-south nature. Additionally, de Sousa 
Ferreira (2014:72) introduces another aspect, that is the fear of large-scale migration and 
insecurity amongst Europeans, hence the human insecurity of Arabs and Europeans enter the 
scholarly debate. As migrants risk their lives to pursue ambitions of a better life in Europe, the 
Mediterranean becomes a geopolitical region plagued with concerns about human (in) security 
(de Sousa Ferreira, 2014: 74).  
Perthes (2011: 74) highlights that Europe, as immediate neighbour to the Arab region, is the 
only major international actor tied to the Mediterranean and North African region by political 
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and security relations and trade, economic and development interests.  Thus, the role of the EU 
in and response to the Arab Spring remains a key topic of interest. Hollis (2012:1) has found 
that EU policies helped trigger Arab Spring, as the EU “departed from its own normative 
principles and aspirations for Arab reform [whilst] consistently prioritising European security 
interests over ‘shared prosperity’ and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean”. 
Additionally, by offering financial support, increasing border control, Frontex joint operations, 
supporting democratic transition, making its expertise available and calling on the participation 
of civil society and non-government organisations, the EU failed to devise new approaches and 
in doing so, reaffirmed old positions towards migration (de Sousa Ferreira, 2014: 84). 
Agreements with dictatorial regimes of the Arab region and the EU’s counterterrorism policies, 
fears of political Islam and support for Arab states, meant upholding authoritarian Arab regimes 
by affording Arab states with leverage (Hollis, 2012: 21 – 23) 
Bauer (2013) also criticises the EU for neglecting potential risk discourses, despite its emphasis 
on domestic democracy and civil society, thus failing to respond to the evolving security 
situation in the Mediterranean. Similarly, Whitman and Junco (2012: 147) recall the EU’s 
failure to act accordingly during the Libyan crisis, however, they ascribe the reasons for the 
EU’s inability to positively impact the region to the following factors: the sovereign debt crisis, 
institutional problems related to the implementation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and a lack of consensus among member states. Perthes (2011: 75, 77) recognises the 
need for a clearer stance of the EU towards the Middle East and North Africa region and its 
societies and highlights a need for the EU to present itself as an open Europe, to people and 
goods, offering states undergoing transitions a “new form of partnership”. Though efforts were 
made to deepen democracy, Whitman and Juncos (2012: 160) find that the EU’s capacity for 
active crisis management remains vague. Similarly, Asseburg (2013) also discovered a 
weakness in the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management roles. Thus, the EU’s failure 
to effectively support transformation and assist in overcoming obstacles to democratic 
transition remains neglected (Asseburg, 2013: 56). To some (Asseburg, 2013: 48, 56), the 
uprisings were seemingly welcomed by the EU, especially since the liberalisation of political 
and economic systems would contribute towards long-term stabilisation. This would strengthen 
EU-Arab relations and transform the EU’s Southern neighbourhood. The EU has also been 
criticised for imposing Western concepts on Arab states, as responses in Libya and Syria 
illustrate (Asseburg, 2013: 57, Bauer 2013: 9). If the EU was not imposing, it was neglecting 
a duty to intervene, as in Libya where Islamist militants flourished (Asseburg, 2013: 50).  
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Many scholars (Whitman and Juncos (2012), Bauer (2013), Ayadi and Sessa (2013), Asseburg 
(2013) and Del Sarto (2016) have unpacked the significant implications of the Arab Spring for 
European-Mediterranean and North African relations. The Arab Spring did not only affect the 
countries in which it took place, but also in the region. In a world increasingly focused on 
security, questions around how these uprisings affected the Mediterranean region, and to what 
extent, emerged. Much literature has also been devoted to determining potential outcomes for 
Arab States and the immediate region. De Sousa Ferreira (2014: 72 & 82) points out that 
priority divergences have characterised these relations and that the political and social 
upheavals of the Arab Spring as well as the aftermath pose a threat to regional and international 
security.  
Salamey (2015: 15), who has identified several democracy development prerequisites for 
establishing accountable governments, highlights the implications of corruption and large-scale 
financial scandals for the already-struggling economies of North Africa. The rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood has also emerged as an obstacle to the democratisation of North African states 
(Salamey, 2015: 125). On the contrary, Dalacoura (2011: 71), who considers the prospects for 
democratic change in the Arab states, regards “thinking in terms of a ‘transition’ to democracy” 
as naïve and one dimensional, assuming that there is one path for these different Arab states to 
follow to democracy. According to some (Bauer 2013, Ayadi & Sessa, 2013), the prospects of 
a Mediterranean security community look uncertain and the Arab Spring has played a 
significant part in changing migration policy and governance. Additionally, some scholars ask 
about addressing the most urgent problems and security needs in the Arab region, support for 
transitional and democratisation processes and how the EU is influencing economic recovery 
and security (Bauer, 2013: 13). Ayadi and Sessa (2013: 5) has since found that the EU is 
trapped in a ‘business as usual’ scenario. Linked to the impact of the Arab Spring on the region, 
Aras and Falk (2016: 2252) list the various “transformations” that have taken place as a result: 
state-society relations, resilience of authoritarian regimes, state failures, failed transitions to 
democracy and shifting alliances within the MENA region.  
The violent confrontation and threat of civil war in Syria, weak state institutions in Yemen and 
the same coupled with weak civil society, the presence of armed militias and the absence of a 
strong central authority in Libya force some to disregard the prospects of democracy 
(Dalacoura, 2011: 72). Furthermore, if support for border control increases the strength of 
forces of repression, thus increasing human insecurity, it could jeopardise democratic transition 
(Fargues and Fandrich, 2012: 14).  The role of Islam post-Arab Spring and implications for 
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human security have also been questioned by some (Dalacoura, 2011: 74 – 75). Fargues and 
Fandrich (2012: 1) have agreed that a failure in the transition to democracy, and more so the 
failure to achieve intended political freedoms and economic security, would cause post-Arab 
Spring migration to increase.  
2.3 Migration of Women post-Arab Spring 
Literature focused on the feminisation of migration in the context of the Arab Spring and 
thereafter has been somewhat limited. However, a range of literature has contributed to this 
topic, forming a foundation upon which future scholarly debates can be built. Key to these 
debates are the relationship between the Arab Spring and migration flows, the causes of post-
Arab Spring migration and the nature thereof and the participation of women and the youth in 
migration from North Africa to Europe. Another important aspect, which resonates deeply with 
this thesis, are the dangers and threats posed to the human security of migrant women.  
Looking at migration more broadly at first, irregular migration and a type of new migration 
created by the Arab Spring has received a lot of scholarly attention. Mihalcioiu (2013: 42), for 
example, has discussed this irregular migration, where migrants enter transit and destination 
countries illegally and stay there, or are victims of trafficking and rejected asylum, in depth. 
Considering the relationship between the Arab Spring and migration shortly after the uprisings, 
Fargues (2011: 4) found that, if governments were responsive to the people’s demands and 
economic conditions were favourable, return migration could be expected, and if not, increased 
emigration could be expected. Another dimension of importance is reasons for migration to 
Europe, and the role of the impression of Europe held by migrants. For example, Fargues 
(2011: 4) finds that migrants, especially those in Tunisia, thought Europe to be in closer 
proximity to Africa than it is. Thus, Europe appealed more during the political unrest in Libya, 
already a transit country for migrants from across Africa, and, thus, migrants and civilians in 
Libya fled insecurity for Europe. Coupled with this, Abdelfattah (2011: 1) agrees insecurity 
and chaos in Libya, especially, pushed foreign workers and natives abroad. By analysing the 
impact of the Arab Spring on migrant sending and receiving Arab states, (Abdelfattah, 2011: 
8) has found that studying new waves of potential migrants in the younger generation, such as 
in Egypt, to be useful. Parshotam (2018: 9) highlights the misconception that African migrants 
are uneducated or semi-skilled and notes that, as a result of this, European states and African 
countries establish agreements that enhance border control under the guise of development 
assistance programmes.  
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Turning to the feminisation of migration, described by Gouws (2010: 170) as “the migration 
of women independent of men”, some have contributed meaningful insights into why and how 
women have migrated post-Arab Spring (Killian, Olmsted and Doyle 2012, Gerard and 
Pickering 2013, Fierke 2015, Virkama 2015, Bartels 2015, Boucherf 2017, Miletto, Caretta, 
Burchi and Zanlucchi 2017). For a pre-Arab Spring context, Gouws (2010: 169) identifies push 
factors for women’s migration as the severe gender-based violence women in Africa 
experience as a result of civil wars, food insecurity, economic decline, corruption, human rights 
violations and attempts to escape human trafficking. Virkama (2015) and Bartels (2015) have 
studied migration in two different Arab states: Morocco and Tunisia. They both find that rising 
levels of education and the consequent increase of women entering and competing in and 
saturated labour markets have played a role in migration out of North Africa to Europe 
(Virkama, 2015: 2, 4 & Bartels, 2015: 64).  Virkama (2015: 2) and Bartels (2015: 64) both 
emphasise a resistance towards the patriarchal ideals and systems that excluded the youth and 
women. Additionally, they agree that the response to this was a pursuit of individual and 
personal freedom, which included freedom of movement (Virkama, 2015: 10 & Bartels, 2015: 
66). As such, migration post-Arab Spring can be regarded as challenging gender roles and 
escaping discrimination. Whereas women used to migrate for other reasons, they increasingly 
do so for reasons of survival and, thus, gender roles within families and societies change 
(Gouws, 2010: 170).  
To illustrate the extent to which migration has become feminised, Fierke (2015: 185) highlights 
how war and poverty has caused migration to become increasingly feminised, such that women 
are estimated to make up at least half of the world’s migrant population, while specific 
migratory flows, for instance, from the Philippines and Somalia, have been composed primarily 
of women. 75 per cent of contemporary victims in war are civilian, and most of them women 
and children. Miletto, Caretta, Burchi & Zanlucchi (2017: 13 & 21) have highlighted the share 
of women migrants in 2015, globally, the share of women migrants globally was 48.2 per cent 
and women constituted 52 per cent of international migrants in Europe, with 46.5 per cent being 
young women and girls. Furthermore, Gouws (2010: 169) explains that currently, many single 
women or those with children migrate.  
Killian et al. (2012: 432) attribute Arab women’s migration to political, educational and 
employment-related reasons, whilst at the same time acknowledging political and economic 
forces, educational and familial motives. Furthermore, Boucherf (2017) provides valuable 
insights, by illustrating how the nature of women’s migration has changed. Previously, women 
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in Arab Mediterranean countries migrated as family members and mostly for purposes of 
family reunification, however, women now have higher levels of education, which allows them 
to migrate without an accompanying man (Boucherf, 2017: 7). At the same time, however, the 
migration of women remains limited by their status and position in countries where 
conservative values persist.  
Gerard and Pickering (2013: 342), have found that academic empirical research concerned with 
the gendered dimensions of the experiences of migrants through Africa is limited and, 
therefore, providing an overview of the feminisation of migration from North Africa to Europe 
has been challenging. They have, however, engaged with refugee women who have travelled 
from Somalia to Malta, and have been in transit through countries marked by sustained conflict, 
famine and political instability (Gerard & Pickering, 2013: 344). Others (Miletto et al. 2017: 
20), however, still believe that the mobility of women in the global south is limited and as a 
result, they migrate later than men, often leaving behind children and leaving the responsibility 
of care to other family members, associating the feminisation of migration with the 
disintegration of families. Furthermore, it has been suggested that hierarchies existed during 
migration, where women were at the bottom and given the most precarious positions on boats 
and at most risk to onboard injuries (Gerard & Pickering, 2013: 352). Gouws (2010: 173) 
reiterates that the exclusion and subordination of women is founded on sexual divisions of 
labour. Though the impact of migration post-Arab Spring requires further inquiry, Miletto et 
al. (2017: 20) have touched on this topic by highlighting the intense psychological impacts of 
the process on women, as they also carry the burden of tending to the emotional needs of family 
and are exposed to sexual violence in transit. The precariousness of women and child migrants 
also makes them more vulnerable to abuse (Miletto et al. 2017: 20). 
A key area of interest for the topic is the dangers posed to the human security of women 
migrants, especially considering what is known as the Libyan Corridor and associated slavery, 
however, finding literature on this has proven difficult. Gouws (2010: 171) also highlights the 
risks associated with women’s migration, which has as a result of increased globalisation 
changed the nature of women’s labour to include sex work and associated gender-based 
violence and exploitation. Despite these concerns, basic amenities, applications for asylum, 
and conditions at reception centres and refugee camps are amongst the biggest concerns. As a 
point of departure for looking at the dangers that threaten women migrants, the REACH report 
(2017: 22) have found that access to basic amenities such as healthcare services, shops and 
municipal services is more limited for refugee women than men, especially when there are no 
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males to accompany them. To illustrate, the FIDH (2012: 50 – 51), who met with women 
refugees who had been in Libya for several years, found that some had not been able to meet 
with a representative of their embassy and another whom had been very ill but had no access 
to medication nor a doctor and many pregnant. After being intercepted at sea, most migrants 
are taken to Libyan camps run by militias with often no access to doctors, without trauma 
counselling and locked up in cells and subject to poor hygienic conditions (FIDH, 2012: 50). 
Women are also put into a more precarious position, as their applications for asylum are 
generally less successful than their male counterparts. The lack of evidence makes their 
applications less credible, as they do not actually have proof of persecution, whereas men often 
to have in the form of proof of belonging to a party (Bonewit & Shreeves, 2016: 12). 
Furthermore, discriminatory cultural and traditional beliefs and practices and customary and 
traditional laws enforcing these also put migrant women at risk during transit and in the host 
country (Sansonetti, 2016: 23). This means that migrant women, who are subjected to 
discrimination in their country of origin and even transit countries, might not be able to or 
choose to defend themselves against the same treatment, and sexual assault, whilst in transit 
and in Europe, either out of fear or because they are unaware of their rights. Furthermore, there 
is the lack of consideration of gender when new migration policies are developed (Gouws, 
2010: 179). Additionally, overcrowded reception centres with little space and privacy make 
women and child migrants a lot more vulnerable to sexual violence and other violence, 
especially when they are sent to collective accommodation centres (Bonewit & Shreeves, 2016: 
13 & 21). Single women and single mothers fall victim to sexual assault more so than married 
women as they are unaccompanied and even despised by men in reception centres (Bonewit & 
Shreeves, 2016: 27). For example, in Libyan refugee camps, men and women are kept separate 
and couples are not allowed to see each other (FIDH, 2012: 47).  
2.4 Push & Pull Factors of Migration  
This section of the literature review provides an overview of existing literature that focuses on 
the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to Europe. As previously noted, many 
migrants making the journey from North Africa to Europe, though they depart from Libya, are 
mostly foreign nationals and not Libyan. Most irregular migrants in Libya are Egyptian, 
Nigerien, Chadian, Sudanese, Ghanaian, Nigerian, Malian and Bangladeshi and Senegalese 
(International Organisation for Migration, DTM: Libya Migrant Report, 2017). This 
complexity in the migration process necessitates that literature that focuses on both push 
factors, which cause migration out of North African countries to Libya and push factors, which 
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cause for migration from Libya to Europe, be considered. Vice versa, it is useful to consider 
factors that pull migrants to Libya and to Europe. Dorigo and Tobler (1983: 1) distinguish 
between push factors as “life situations that give one reason to be dissatisfied with one’s present 
locale [and] pull factors are those attributes of distant places that make them appear appealing”. 
Emerging themes related to push factors include: sources of frustration that existed pre-Arab 
Spring, especially illiberal democracy and corruption, and post-Arab Spring results, such as a 
failure to establish democratic institutions, worsening violence and insecurity and migration 
management by regimes. Those related to pull factors include: existing migrant communities 
in Europe, education, rights and democracy in Europe.  
Migrants in Libya were already in precarious conditions prior to the Arab Spring, as, prior to 
the 1990s, the country’s migration policy allowed entry to foreign workers as the economy 
required them, but getting rid of them during times of economic downturn (The International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 2012: 11). Environmental factors, such as drought and 
famine, coupled with conflict and instability have also pushed people from neighbouring 
countries into Libya (FIDH), 2012: 10). Generally, Yazgan, Utku and Sirkeci (2015: 182) 
attribute migration to Northern African states to “discomforts, difficulties, restrictions, clashes 
and violence and wars at the country of origin”. Across the region, however, various 
characteristics of Arab states have caused frustration and resulted in the Arab Spring. 
Monopolised media, the use of oil to build alliances, the manipulation of electoral processes 
and uneven economic development were sources of frustration for local populations (Daoud, 
2012: 176). Similarly, unemployment, income inequality, urbanisation, the suppression of 
minorities and opposition and the youth bulge also spurred on the Arab Spring (La Graffe, 
2012: 73 & Yazgan, Utku and Sirkeci, 2015: 183). Illiberal democracy was used to entrench 
the power of autocratic regimes repressed and limited openness in Arab States, as the constant 
threat of repression in Egypt and Tunisia, deeply fragmented civil society and corruption and 
intolerance towards opposition, especially so in Libya, illustrate (Joffe, 2011: 512 – 514, 521). 
Other factors pushing migrants out of Africa include Libya’s long history of immigration, 
economic and political instability, civil war and the presence of a growing Islamist threat as 
well as Tunisia’s political instability (Cummings et al., 2015: 25 – 26).  
The effects of the inability to replace authoritarian regimes with a functioning state and society 
has been one of the main reasons for migration towards Europe, as life in the MENA region 
appear as dire as before the Arab Spring, perhaps even more so. Hinnebusch (2015: 205) echoes 
that even four years after the revolutions, evidence of democratisation was limited, as was the 
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establishment of stable and inclusive democratic institutions. Additionally, Salamey (2015: 
112) recalls failure of the Arab Spring to become a Democratic Spring, as monarchies proved 
resilient.  Hence, the ‘Islamist Winter’ that followed the Arab Spring. This state-weakening 
and state collapse, especially evident in Libya and Syria, have been caused by the simultaneous 
processes of democratisation, authoritarian adaptation or succession and state failure 
(Hinnebusch, 2015: 206 & Magen, 2012: 2). Identifying reasons for state failure, Magen (2012: 
8 – 11) has listed four major causes of state failure in the region: revolutionary wars, ethnic 
wars, adverse regime changes and genocides or politicides. In the aftermath, structural 
economic conditions have not been conducive to democracy and the region has displayed a 
lack in security, credibility and capacity to provide necessary welfare-enhancing public goods 
(Magen, 2012: 7). Furthermore, the impact of the so-called Islamic Winter on individual 
liberties and regional stability has been counter to what was hoped to have been achieved by 
the Arab Spring, fuelling migration to Europe (Behr, 2013: 20).  
Cummings, Pacitto, Lauro and Foresti (2015: 21) explicitly point to the collapse of Gaddafi’s 
regime, caused by political instability in Libya, as the reason for people migrating from Libya. 
This suggests that state collapse is perhaps the most important push factor for migration from 
North Africa to Europe, as other factors exist and did so before the Arab Spring, but this one 
factor alone could be enough to push people out of North Africa to Europe.  Therefore, even 
though precarious conditions pre-existed, the degree of conflict became too big a threat and the 
insecurity too much, for migrants to stay put (Yazgan et al., 2015: 182). The persistence of 
armed struggles, violence clashes, states plunged in anarchy, the institutionalisation of 
corruption and persistent and worsening poverty continues to mark the region and pushing 
migrants out of a seemingly hopeless situation (Salamey, 2015: 112 & 125 & Park, 2015).  
After the Arab Spring, the foreign population, considered by the FIDH (2012: 20) as more 
vulnerable due to violence, unemployment and insecurity than Libyan citizens constituted a 
substantial proportion of those migrating to Europe. Nigerian women, for example, many of 
whom were in Libya prior to the Arab Spring, were fearful, as militiamen targeted foreign 
women, arresting, killing and beating them and wives were detained whilst husbands worked 
(FIDH, 2012: 55). Mass detention was a strategy of Libya’s migration management, and 
irregular migrants were detained at overcrowded and unhygienic camps, however, as Gaddafi’s 
government was overthrown, migrants had an opportunity to flee the camps (FIDH, 2012: 44).  
Additionally, migrants face the risks of labour exploitation, arbitrary arrest and prolonged 
detention and human trafficking (Cummings et al., 2015: 21).  
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Though one could envision the pull factors to Europe as the opposites of the push factors 
mentioned above, it is useful to discuss. The African Research Bulletin (2011: 18854) gives 
credibility to the sizeable migrant communities that already exist in Europe, such as those of 
East Africans in the United Kingdom, as a factor that pulls migrants from Africa to Europe. 
Since unemployment and income inequality characterised many Arab States, the youth, seeking 
the right to education and work that is available across Europe, migrate in the hope of gaining 
these ideals and rights for themselves (Yazgan et al., 2015: 186). Though migration is certainly 
not limited to the youth, one ought to acknowledge that the youth’s disaffectedness and 
dissatisfaction, that fuelled the Arab Spring, can certainly fuel the process of migration from 
North Africa to Europe. The expansion of modern and global education and a culture of rights 
is what Salamey (2015: 116) believes continues to lure migrants to Europe. Democracy, the 
main prize that sparked the Arab Spring, and something that marks MENA’s neighbours, is an 
ideal that many migrants hope for. The recognition of their liberties and rights, which 
democracy would secure, is what migrants from authoritarian and oppressive conditions want 
most. Thus, democracy is probably the biggest factor pulling them towards Europe.  
2.5 Regulations of Migrant-receiving countries 
This section will provide an overview of the literature that exists around the regulations of 
migrant-receiving countries, and the EU at large. The main themes that have emerged around 
these regulations in the post-Arab Spring context, centre mainly around reception conditions 
within the EU, the Dublin Regulation, burden sharing, relocation and resettlement, border 
control and the hotspot approach. To provide an idea of what scholars have found; the migrant 
crisis was said to have gone from a human security issue to a national security issue, 
highlighting the tension between controlling migration and protecting the rights and safety of 
migrants and the prominence of Fortress Europe7 which has guided regulations (Park, 2015: 5 
& Carling and Hernández -Carretero, 2011: 43).   
The Dublin Regulation, which stipulates that asylum seekers have to have their cases processed 
in the first European country of registration, has come under great criticism post-Arab Spring. 
The Regulation has received criticism for inconsistent implementation and losing its leverage 
and putting immense capacity and structural pressures on frontline member states, such as Italy 
and Greece (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014: 146, 148 & Carrera, Blockmans, Cassarino, Gros & 
Guild, 2017: 4). La Rive (2015:10) and Park (2015: 4) also agree that the post-Arab Spring has 
                                                          
7 Fortress Europe refers to the manner in which Europe controls its borders, detains immigrants and the (often 
negative) sentiments of citizens towards immigration and immigrants. Moving People Changing Places Org.  
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illustrated the limits of the Dublin Regulation, as issues around the distribution of migrants 
across the EU persist. According to Carrera et al. (2017:31), the Dublin Regulation, and 
disproportionate responsibilities within the EU, has left gaps and has led to the involvement of 
defence and military actors in migration management. This ties into another persistent issue in 
the EU - burden sharing.  
According to some (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 350), burden sharing has existed on a 
predominantly voluntary basis and the European Commission maintained that the EU was not 
fully equipped to assist EU member states that were most under pressure from migratory flows 
(Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 359). As a result, Italy requested that the EU transform 
Frontex into an operational agency and appealed that the principle of burden sharing between 
member states be revisited (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 343 – 344 & Trauner, 2016: 
315). Another strategy employed was the ‘hotspot’ approach and resettlement and relocation.  
The hotspot approach was intended to strengthen EU Home Affairs agencies, especially in Italy 
and Greece, as Frontex, Europol and EASO assisted in screening migrants and support Europol 
in establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy Operation in the Mediterranean in 
response to smugglers and trafficking and went hand in hand with the relocation of refugees 
across the continent (Carrera et al., 2015: 3 – 4, 7 & Larive, 2015: 13). Relocation measures 
meant that asylum seekers from EU with higher numbers of arrivals were relocated to those 
with lower numbers of arrivals and the Temporary EU Relocation System was said to have 
detracted and deviated from the Dublin Regulation (Trauner, 2016: 318 and Carrera, 
Blockmans, Gros and Guild, 2015: 5).  
The inclusion of relocation as a provision of the European Agenda on Migration, in May 2015, 
has been criticised for attempting to solve short term symptoms of emergency without 
implementing the Temporary Protection Directive (Jakuleviciene, 2016: 97 & 103). Trauner 
(2014: 322), though agreeing that the relocation scheme and hotspot approach provide an 
additional layer to the Dublin Regulation without replacing it, questions the sustainability 
thereof. More bluntly, however, Carrera et al. (2015: 14) and Carrera et al. (2017: 5) find that 
the approach is insufficient as reception conditions remain deficient, home affairs agencies lack 
support and the temporary relocation system has failed in practice. Despite the belief that the 
EU lacked solidarity and consensus around how to manage the migration crisis, as relations 
between Italy and France have illustrated, the need for border patrol and the Return Directive, 
which required respect for nonrefoulement and information sharing to ensure re-entry bans, 
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was agreed upon by member states (Richey, 2013: 412 – 414, 424 & Carrera et al., 2017: 10). 
Border control mechanisms, one of the EU’s main instruments of migration management has 
also come under scrutiny. Carrera, den Hertog & Parkin (2012: 4 – 5) highlight the failure of 
Frontex and Europol to protect the human rights of migrants. 
Operation Sophia8 has been considered a sensitive matter, a vacuum has been left as Mare 
Nostrum9 has not been replaced by another initiative, thus resulting in increased deaths in the 
Mediterranean, and, finally, the EU has not yet devised a list of coast guard functions (Carrera 
et al., 2015: 17 & Carrera et al., 2017: 19 & 30). Richey (2013: 416), however, appraises 
Frontex for successfully displacing migrant routes. Border control and asylum seeking or 
readmission, as per the Dublin Regulation, are two activities that have formed part of the EU’s 
externalisation of migration management, which has seemingly played into the repressive 
activities of autocratic regimes and accommodated human rights violations, therefore linking 
them to gate-keeping strategies used to control migration and asylum in the EU 
(Triandafyllidou, 2014: 9 & Richey, 2013: 419 – 420, 423).  
2.6 Chapter Summary 
The literature reviewed for purposes of this study has found interesting insights as to what 
scholars have written about the Arab Spring, women’s migration thereafter, the push and pull 
factors of migration and regulations of migrant-receiving countries, as various perspectives 
have been used to analyse and debate these topics, which are certainly open to further research, 
especially since the Arab Spring occurred only seven to eight years ago. By considering each 
subject separately, the relationship between the Arab Spring and the regulations of migrant-
receiving countries in the EU and how these have impacted the push and pull factors of 
migration as well as the migration of women have been shown. As such, they have also 
illustrated the human security concerns and implications of the Arab Spring and state responses 
to the uprisings and the irregular migration that resulted from them.  
Literature written on the Arab Spring has focused on various aspects of the uprisings, revolving 
largely around how they impacted human security, how governments took on a more realist 
approach, how the lack of border control impacted migration, and the responses of the EU to 
the uprisings as well as how these impacted EU-Mediterranean and North African relations. 
                                                          
8 Operation Sophia refers to the EU-launched military operation in response to the shipwrecks of migrant-
carrying boats in April 2015, more formally known as European Union Naval Force Mediterranean.  
9 Operation Mare Nostrum was a year-long sea and air operation carried out by the Italian government in 
October 2013 to prevent increased immigration and wreckages of migrant-carrying ships.  
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Overall, scholars have reached consensus that the responses of regimes and external actors to 
the Arab Spring exacerbated human insecurity, highlighting the threats and violence women 
were exposed to and the hypermasculinist mode and male guardianship over women that 
emerged in the North African and Arab region. As a result, some have found that women’s 
migration was impacted by fear of sexual violence as opposed to war and armed violence alone. 
Contrary to popular belief, scholars have found that, instead of stimulating new flows of 
migrants, the Arab Spring simply rerouted migrants due to the lack of border control. This same 
lack of border control has been regarded as increasing repression, as organised crime has room 
to flourish. Another aspect largely considered, is the role of the EU in the Arab Spring and 
subsequent regime changes.  
Many scholars have found that the EU’s response lacked protection of civilians and supported 
dictatorial regimes instead, therefore, failing to adequately intervene, provide support for 
democratic transitions across North Africa and effectively manage the crises that broke out in 
the neighbouring region. Whereas some criticise the EU for imposing Western concepts on 
MENA states, others criticise them for failing to intervene and, moreover, sympathetic scholars 
have been more sympathetic towards the EU, as they provide reasons for the EU’s lack of 
response. Highlighting priority divergences in European-Mediterranean and North Africa 
relations, some scholars continue to question how the EU provided assistance to the most 
urgent problems, meeting security needs and providing economic recovery to the region.  
Considering the feminisation of migration and women’s migration post-Arab Spring, despite 
debates around the causes of and reasons for women’s migration post-Arab Spring as well as 
the impact of this, literature remains limited overall. As previously mentioned, the changed 
nature of migration because of the Arab Spring has been highlighted, and various reasons for 
migration have been identified by scholars. Some have attributed the increased feminisation of 
migration to rising levels of education, the increase of women in saturated labour markets, 
resistance of patriarchal ideals and structures, the pursuit of personal freedom, political reasons 
and familial motives. On the contrary, others point to insecurity, chaos, war and poverty as 
reasons for the increasingly feminised nature of migration. Scholars have also inquired about 
the impact of the feminisation of migration post-Arab Spring on gender roles and concerns 
about the disintegration of families have emerged. Scholars highlight that, whereas before 
women mostly migrated for family purposes and for family reunification, women migrate and 
leave children and responsibilities of care behind. Despite this feminisation, however, some 
scholars continue to point out that migration of women is limited by their status, as hierarchies 
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emerge during the process of migration, resulting in unequal vulnerability experienced by 
women and children as opposed to men.  Much of the literature that relates to the threats posed 
to the human security of women migrants focuses largely on access to basic amenities, asylum 
applications, and conditions at reception centres.  
There is consensus around the vulnerabilities of women migrants, especially single women, 
their risk of falling victim to sexual violence and other violence and their position of 
disadvantage. Scholars have found that women are much more vulnerable than men with regard 
to these aspects, again highlighting the hierarchical nature of migration and receipt of migrants. 
To illustrate, scholars point to the lack of evidence that women are able to provide for asylum 
applications, which make them less credible and less successful at being granted asylum. 
Additionally, cultural and traditional beliefs and practices and laws also put women migrants 
at a disadvantage to their male counterparts. Despite these insights, however, literature on the 
experiences of North African women migrants remains limited and requires further research, 
as does literature on the role of the Libyan Corridor and slavery in North Africa on women’s 
migration.  
Scholars are in agreement about the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to 
Europe, although some pay more attention to the pre-Arab Spring frustrations and post-Arab 
Spring disappointments. Therefore, some emphasise the illiberal democracy and corruption 
that characterised North African and Arab states, whereas others looked more to the failure of 
the Arab Spring to result in democratic institutions but leading to violence and insecurity 
instead. Scholars have identified various reasons for the Arab Spring, which are insightful for 
understanding the context in which migration has occurred, as well as the reasons for the 
uprisings to emerge. Some highlight limitations on media freedom, oil wealth, manipulation of 
electoral processes, uneven economic development, whereas others focus more on economic 
circumstances, such as income inequality and urbanisation. Moreover, others recall the political 
conditions: suppression of minorities, the youth bulge and fragmented civil society.  
Libya is a major transit country for migrants who migrate due to unemployment, environmental 
factors, conflict and instability in their home countries. Scholars have identified a long list of 
reasons for their migration from North Africa and, particularly, Libya. Some regard inadequate 
political and economic institutions, civil war and the Islamist threat as more influential in the 
decision to migrate, other scholars point to the conditions of society post-Arab Spring and state 
weakening, whilst another group pays attention to foreign nationals who are more vulnerable 
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and increasingly targeted by militia post-Arab Spring. However, there is consensus that the 
resulting state collapse post-Arab Spring has been a major factor pushing migrants and 
nationals out of Libya. Lastly, literature indicates that four factors pull migrants towards the 
EU, with each factor being identified and discussed by different scholars. These range from 
existing migrant communities in Europe, the appeal of rights to education and employment in 
Europe to North African and Arab youth and an overall recognition of rights. All of these point 
the largest contributing pull factor, which is the ideal of democracy and, more importantly, the 
active entrenchment of these.  
Literature written about the regulations of migrant-receiving countries has focused on five key 
characteristics: the Dublin Regulation, burden sharing, the Hotspot Approach, border control 
and the lack of consensus across the EU as to how migration, and the migrant crisis, should 
have been managed.  The Dublin Regulation, meant to provide clear guidelines for receiving 
and processing migrants and asylum applicants, has been regarded as inherently flawed, and 
discussions centre around the inconsistent implementation, and associated pressure on member 
states, limitations thereof, especially in the complexities of the migrant crisis and gaps that 
have been identified. Furthermore, inquiry has increased around the way in which this 
Regulation increased defence and military involvement in migration management. This 
characteristic closely relates to burden sharing, which some scholars have identified as 
voluntary in nature and others have zoomed in on Italy’s response to burden sharing and the 
lack thereof.  
Thirdly, many scholars have critiqued the Hotspot Approach’s, its inadequacy in providing 
migrants with proper reception conditions, whilst others question the Approach’s sustainability 
despite what it contributes to the Dublin Regulation. Scholars have also criticised the relocation 
and resettlement efforts across the EU. Border control, a central theme of the study, draws 
attention to the efforts of Frontex and Europol. Whereas some praise Frontex for displacing 
migrant routes, others highlight how efforts and initiatives failed to protect human rights. 
Adding to this, is widespread discussion about the end of Operation Mare Nostrum and the 
subsequent vacuum left. Lastly, the lack of consensus between member states on border control 
has been the focus of literature on the EU’s response to the migrant crisis.  Much literature 
about the regulations of migrant-receiving countries echoes the sentiments that these 
regulations and the implementation thereof have responded to a migrant crisis that is perceived 
as an issue of national security rather than human security. Furthermore, the literature has 
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remained largely focused on the EU’s externalisation of migration management and ways in 
which the bloc accommodated human rights violations.  
The most prevalent themes that have emerged from the literature include the increase in human 
insecurity and the failure to protect human rights during and after the Arab Spring and during 
the migrant crisis. Scholars agree about the role of patriarchal norms, war, poverty and conflict 
as factors causing migration from North Africa to Europe, however, there is a group of scholars 
who emphasise the role of a lack of economic opportunities. There are also those who focus 
more on post-Arab Spring failures, such as state collapse and failure of achieving democratic 
transition. Scholars who seek to understand pull factors of migration, mostly consider 
democracy and economic opportunities in the EU. Themes around which authors, who have 
written about the EU and the Arab Spring, have expressed concern also include the failure of 
the EU to respond sufficiently, limitations of EU regulations, the sustainability of measures 
taken by EU agencies and a lack of consensus around migration management.   
Much of the existing literature on the topic of migration has a North American, Filipino or 
Asian focus, therefore, a gap in literature on migration from Africa to Europe persists. Due to 
the recent nature of the Arab Spring and migrant crisis, there is more room for the development 
of literature on the aspects considered in this review. Though various insights have been 
provided on what the current themes in academia on the topic are, further inquiry is especially 
necessary where it concerns, firstly, the feminisation of migration from North Africa to Europe 
and, secondly, the regulations of migrant-receiving countries, especially related to the gender 
component of the study and the dangers posed to the human security of migrant women post-
Arab Spring needs further research.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the theoretical framework of this thesis as well as 
substantiate why the method used for data collection has been selected. Therefore, this section 
elaborates the theoretical assumptions of the thesis, factors considered in selecting the type of 
study and what this study contributes to the topic at large. The human security approach and 
Feminist Security Theory (FST), the main theoretical tools that will underpin this thesis, will 
be explored to identify their value for this thesis, the one as a theoretical framework and the 
other as a theoretical approach. An overview of how these challenge realism as an alternative 
International Relations Theory will also be provided.  
As previously stated, the research question of the thesis is: using a gender lens, what is the 
nature of human security issues that economic migrants, who migrate from North Africa to 
Italy, face? The research objectives are: to understand how push and pull factors contribute to 
the precarious human security of migrants, to determine whether EU responses as implemented 
by Italy and, to a lesser extent France, compound or alleviate the human insecurity of migrants 
and, finally, to understand how the experiences of men and women migrants differ. The 
preferred methodology for this study is an exploratory case study, where arguments are 
illustrated with examples from Italy and France. An in-depth discussion of the value for this 
chosen methodology for the thesis follows towards the latter part of the chapter.  
The cases at hand, predominantly Italy and, to a lesser extent and for illustrative purposes, 
France, will be studied and analysed through secondary data, most of which will be collected 
from the internet, since this is where the wealth of data on the topic exists and is most easily 
accessible for research purposes. Substantiation for the selection of these cases will also ensue, 
to assure the reader that the best possible cases for the purposes of the study have been chosen. 
After describing the research methodology and design and the data collection process, potential 
shortcomings of the selected method will be discussed.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
As Abend (2008: 173) writes, theories explain, predict and understand phenomena and, 
oftentimes, challenge and extend knowledge. Additionally, Crowe, Cresswell, Robertson, 
Huby, Avery and Sheikh (2011: 7) point out the importance of a theoretical framework for the 
methodology of a study, as it helps integrate diverse sources of data and examine emerging 
themes. Realism is one such theory that could be used to understand migration and the response 
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and role of states in the process of migration. Realism centers on the notion that global politics 
is characterised by self-interested states operating in an anarchic world (Baldwin 1993: 4, 
Buzan 1996: 60, Morgenthau 1978). Therefore, states are the most important actors in global 
politics, external factors guide their objectives and, because no state will risk its own interests 
for the sake of global peace, an imbalance of power is necessary and better than anarchy 
(Lascurettes, 2002: 878). Realism does not focus on the security of individuals, but of states.  
The two theoretical tools that have proven particularly useful for this thesis, especially when 
used together, are feminist security theory and the human security approach. These tools are 
most appropriate and useful, in terms of explanatory use and have guided the process of 
formulating research questions and the selection of a research method, adding substance to the 
why and how of this thesis. Since the thesis grapples with whether state responses exacerbate 
or lessen human insecurity of migrants and uses a gendered approach as far as possible, feminist 
security theory and human security are most insightful. The theories discussed below help 
identify and define the research questions and discern which insights and information are useful 
and which are not.  
Various concepts, theories and models are used to study migration processes and policies. 
Everett Lee’s Theory of Migration, for example, describes factors that determine the decision 
to migrate and the process of migration, whereas Duncan posits a theory of migration that is 
concerned with the causes of migration of population engaged in agriculture and Standing 
Guy’s theory of Materialism. There is also the Neoclassical theory, which has been criticised 
for not considering country-specific institutional and structural variables (Kurekova, 2011: 1). 
Ravenstein’s Laws of Migration in 1885, which was the first work attempting to theorise 
migration, identifies generalisations that are accepted even today, and Stouffer introduced his 
model in 1960, suggesting that the number of migrants is proportionate to the number of 
opportunities at a destination.   
3.3 Human Security: A Human-Centric approach  
The value of the Human Security approach lies in what Gazizullin (2016) refers to as its 
“’human-centric’ vision”, which calls for the assessment of security risks and the understanding 
that “when a human faces a threat, so does international security”.  Therefore, the focus shifts 
from the state to the individual. Human Security theory will provide this study with key insights 
and considerations, as it will deal with the question: ‘How do threats to migrants impact 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
international security’? In the current global era, globalisation has ensured that no state goes 
unaffected by global phenomena. The migrant crisis is evidence of this. 
According to Amartya Sen (2014: 17), human security can be understood as “the protection 
and preservation of human ‘survival’ and ‘daily life’ […] and the avoidance of various 
indignities that can shower injury, insult and contempt on our lives”. Furthermore, the 
following elements, thus, characterise human security theory: a focus on individual lives, 
acknowledging the role of society and social arrangements in protecting citizens, emphasising 
risks of human lives as opposed to their freedoms and pin-pointing more elementary human 
rights (Sen, 2014: 18). Important for this thesis, is the institutionalising of human security; as 
the UN Commission on Human Security launched in 2001 presented a report in 2003, 
highlighting the need for “policies and institutions [to] respond in new ways to protect 
individuals and communities and to empower them to thrive” (Sen, 2014: 26). Therefore, 
security needs to be people-centred, rather than state-centred. Lastly, human security seeks to 
forge an alliance between individuals and the state (Sen, 2014: 27). This highlights that human 
security theory does not regard individuals and the state as completely autonomous but 
acknowledges that the relationship between the two is mutual.  
Central to human security theory are concepts such as vulnerability and capability, which the 
theory is said to moderate and manage (Gasper, 2014: 35). Gasper (2014: 37 – 39) points out 
that human security theory’s success depends largely on the contexts of its use, as it has the 
capacity to generate fresh case-specific insights, and highlights issues of system re-redesign to 
reduce chances of crises, instead of merely responses, for purposes of policy-design, serving a 
reorientation purpose for policy analysis, and, lastly, builds a type of intellectual bridge and 
promotes solidarity. Just like this thesis hopes to achieve, human security theory advances the 
ability to imagine how others live and feel (Gasper, 2014: 39).  
Christie (2010: 175) cites critical feminist literature as the first body of scholarship that 
employs human security, not only as a subject of study but as a framework for analysis and 
policy. In doing so, he uses the theory to emphasise insecurities, re-defining security to focus 
on women and children, addressing gendered insecurities, whilst challenging dominant 
patriarchal definitions of what security is and whom it protects (Christie, 2010: 180). Therefore, 
the specific challenges and threats by women and children are recognised. A drawback of 
emphasising this, however, remains that this might reproduce or reinforce narratives and 
practices that response to the woman victim (Christie, 2010: 184).  
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According to Fierke (2015: 157), the vulnerability of individuals poses a threat to global 
security, therefore the following are intrinsic to human security: economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and 
political security. States do, however, indeed influence the creation and maintaining structures 
of authority and responsibility (Fierke, 2015: 159 and Sjoberg, 2009: 205 – 206). This is useful 
for the study, in that it seeks to understand the role that EU Member States play in the protection 
of migrants, how they have maintained authority amidst the changes that have taken place post-
Arab Spring and what they consider their responsibilities.   
Vietti and Scribner (2013) undertake the task of comparing the human security model to the 
state security model and find that the human security model provides a more effective approach 
to challenges posed by mass migration. They believe that a human security approach seeks to 
put into place “systems that ‘complement state security, enhance human rights and strengthen 
human development’” and protect individuals against threats and empower them (Vietti & 
Scribner, 2013: 18). A human security approach is also intended to emphasise the factors that 
contribute to migration flows and seeks to address these prior to migration (Vietti & Scribner, 
2013: 23). Human security highlights the need to introduce legal protection for migrants as 
well as establish institutions and structures that enforce these, especially as migrants are 
vulnerable to sexual abuse, sexual and physical violence in transit and human trafficking and 
smuggling (Vietti & Scribner, 2013: 26). 
According to Gasper and Sinatti (2016: 3 – 5), human security is a people-centred framework, 
rather than a precise theoretical model, that explores specificity, diversity and complexity 
whilst focusing on basic human rights and needs, yet simultaneously acknowledging the role 
of power and the state. They have also differentiated four scales of ambition of this framework 
and the second, “human security analysis as a distinctive approach to analysing human/social 
realities/problems”, is the most applicable to this study (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 5). Similar 
to FST, HST asks whose security, security of what and security as judged by whom (Gasper 
and Sinatti, 2016: 6). In line with the aims of the study, HST emphasises vulnerabilities, risks 
and forces of disruption and destruction, seeks to identify structural barriers migrants face, 
including those of power (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 8, 10).  
Gasper and Sinatti (2016: 18) provide insights into the shortcomings of HST, which has often 
been criticised for securitising issues and generalising, however, it tries to counter this by 
focusing on specifics in cases. Furthermore, the framework should be coupled with other 
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approaches so as to prevent vague and broad findings (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 20). 
Furthermore, Sjoberg (2009: 206 – 207) points out critique of HST as being atheoretical, 
indeterminate and potentially causing a return to a top-down approach. HST has been criticised 
for being such a broad concept and that it can be used in a way that legitimises state control 
over society for protection (Fierke, 2015: 159 – 160). 
3.4 Feminist Security Theory: Linking everyday experiences to security  
Feminist Security Theory asks who is welcome and allowed, and who is not and recognises 
that “migrant bodies are racialised as well as classed and gendered” (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 
254). A gendered perspective of migration points out that the entire process, despite whose 
decision it is to leave, is gendered according to roles and relationships in the home, available 
work at home and abroad, forms of violence, exploitation, violence and discrimination in new 
states and are also related to other body differences, such as race, class and nationality (Pettman 
& Hall, 2014: 254).  
The theory also considers citizenship, asking how membership impacts insiders and outsiders, 
how they are engaged and holding that “how a state treats its non-citizens is as important for 
democracy, gender equality and human rights, as how it treats its citizens” (Pettman & Hall, 
2014: 261). According to Blanchard (2003: 1290), the theory asks: who is being secured by 
security policies and recovers women’s experiences, bearing in mind gender-based exclusion 
from decision-making roles, and questions the degree to which women are “secured by state 
‘protection’ in times of war and peace”. By challenging ideas of protection by problematising 
the state in its role as protector and power to protect and emphasising the effects and 
consequences of migration on migrants, Feminist Security Theory is a valuable framework 
through which to approach the topic of this thesis.  
IR scholarship traditionally focused on states rather than people, however, feminist critical 
theory examines prevailing assumptions about women and men, on people rather than the state 
(Whitworth, 2008: 106). According to feminist theorists, gender-neutral scholarship focuses 
on interactions between states and other groups, neglecting consequences for people, and, 
where they do focus on people, it is mostly on men as participants (Whitworth, 2008: 107 – 
108). Therefore, feminist accounts focus on the impacts of war on women and men and 
considers the agency of women in these processes. Sjoberg (2009: 206) argues that feminist 
security theorists use gender as the central category for analyses of inequality surrounding 
social structures, namely gender hierarchies and how they negatively impact the security of 
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people. Feminist scholars challenge the traditional view of IR that international security 
revolves around issues of war and peace, focusing on military strategy and, instead, ask who is 
secured by security policies (Blanchard, 2003: 1289 – 1290).  
Feminist Security Theory makes several key contributions to IR theory. Firstly, it considers 
everyday politics of security rather than ‘high politics’ and recasts the state, problematising it 
and questioning it as the protector of women (Blanchard, 2003: 1294 & 1297). This means that 
it is no longer only high politics that are studied, but also security on the ground, asking what 
the role of the state is as protector of women. Furthermore, it redesigns violence to include 
structural forms of violence where the economic and environmental insecurity of individuals 
is caused by domestic and international structures of political and economic oppression 
(Blanchard, 2003: 1297 – 1298). Furthermore, it highlights the connection between women’s 
everyday experiences and security, critiquing the state, acknowledging the effects of structural 
violence and focusing on inequality and emancipation (Blanchard, 2003: 1298). In its 
consideration of peace, war and masculinity, FST magnifies women’s wartime roles as victims, 
protestors, promoters and participants and pays close attention to the effects of war on civilians 
(Blanchard, 2003: 1300). Therefore, FST provides a type of revision of security if it would 
prioritise gender and, in doing so, it seeks to expose gendered hierarchies, eliminate patriarchal 
structural violence and achieve a common security (Blanchard, 2003: 1305).  
Important for this thesis, which focuses on the human security of migrants, feminist security 
theory contributes as it focuses on protection, and the relationship between protection and state 
power (Blanchard, 2003: 1297). Tickner (2004: 45), using a bottom-up approach and analysing 
the impact of conflict at the micro level, whilst making sense of how physical and structural 
violence compromises the security of individuals and groups, highlights how Feminist Security 
Theory explains how social, political and economic structures of inequality that oppress people 
are legitimated and maintained.  
3.5 Why the Human Security framework & Feminist Security Theory? 
Alternative theoretical approaches could have contributed well to this study. For example, a 
realist or liberal approach would focus on the interests and actions of the European Union and 
individual states in migration processes and policies towards migrants from North Africa. A 
constructivist approach would have highlighted the role of ideas and beliefs, and the 
relationship between agency and structures, in migration to Europe, whereas a Marxist 
approach would have focused on the repressive role of capitalism, as borders exacerbate 
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inequality and dependency, and limitations to the labour market. However, the Human Security 
framework emphasises the individual experience and micro-level implications of macro-level 
decisions. Though not the same, feminist security theory and human security theory share 
common values, as they both recognise the importance of studying those who are at the margins 
of global politics, sharing what Ann Tickner calls a ‘bottom-up’ strategy to security that focuses 
on the individual rather than the state (Sjoberg, 2009: 206).  
Feminism forces IR to acknowledge intersectionalities that interact with gender, such as class, 
race and ethnicity and to understand that the combination of these has implications, not merely 
each intersectionality on its own (Smith, 2018). This compels one to identify how women and 
men’s roles have been constructed, how each group is included and excluded from decision 
making processes and power. The aim of this study is to identify the nature of migration 
processes, policies and responses towards economic migrants in the EU and, to best illustrate 
this, the human security approach the first theoretical point of departure. Secondly, because the 
study seeks to include women, the Feminist Security Theory is the second theoretical 
contribution to this study. A combination of the two should provide IR scholarship with more 
insight on how migration processes and policies are gendered towards economic migrants from 
North Africa. As Steans (2006: 64) wrote, “one does not have to be a feminist to embrace a 
broad conception of ‘human security’, but there is a great deal of overlap between feminist 
interests and concerns and the human security approach”.  
Steans (2006: 63) believes that feminist perspectives on security include the economic, 
political, social and personal circumstances of individuals. Furthermore, a people-centred 
approach allows for women to show that “gender hierarchies and inequalities in powers 
constitute a major source of domination and obstacles to the achievement of genuine security” 
(Steans, 2006: 76). It is also important to pay attention to indirect and structural violence. 
Whereas human security focuses on individual security needs of individuals, feminist security 
theory looks at social security, emphasising the need to pair a normative approach with an 
interpretative approach, thus requiring clarification of who is being discussed, in which context, 
where and for what purposes (Sjoberg, 2009: 206). Gasper and Sinatti (2016: 22) recommend 
that human security analysis be paired with gender analysis and feminist theory to best provide 
insights into the vulnerabilities and exploitation of migrant women.  
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3.6 Challenging Realism  
Realism, at its core, holds that the state is the principle actor in IR and, though other bodies 
exist and exert influence over IR, the state holds more power in this regard than other actors 
(Antunes & Camisão, 2018: 15). However, the theoretical tools employed in this study counter 
realist notions and concepts in a several ways. Firstly, the study recognises the impact of 
migration and bodies of migrants as very powerful in shaping IR, such to the degree that the 
phenomenon has been dubbed a ‘crisis’, thus illustrating the limited control of the state. 
Additionally, the notion of the state having ‘no one to call’ during international emergencies 
and having to rely upon itself, is also challenged, especially as it is the EU that is being studied 
(Antunes & Camisão, 2018: 15).  
As a regional bloc, the EU is expected to act in unison and the study will also make sense of 
how member states have banded together, or not, in response to irregular migration from North 
Africa. Despite realism’s focus on protecting the state and its interests, this study holds the 
interests of the individual in higher regard. Thus, the intended goal is not to perpetuate violent 
or highly-securitised responses to migration, but rather cooperative and human security-
focused responses. This study highlights the actions of migrants, the risks and threats they face 
at the micro level and, in doing so, concerns itself with aspects of IR that are not central to 
realism. Another concept of realism challenged by this study is the ‘balance of power’ concept, 
which concerns itself with how the state, in continuous competition with other states for power, 
advances itself (Antunes & Camisão, 2018: 18).  Rather, this study considers how states have 
responded to migration and in doing so, seeking to protect itself and the region, not with the 
goal of gaining power and, by taking a bottom-up approach, the study counters realism’s top-
down approach.  
3.7 Research design & Methodology   
To answer the research questions and meet the research objectives of this thesis, a unique 
investigation and critical analysis will be required. The chosen method of inquiry for this thesis, 
is to conduct research by using migration from Libya in North Africa to the EU through 
secondary sources. This ought to assist in determining the extent to which states are committed 
to adhering to national and regional legislation and policies and how these compete with their 
national interests. According to Castles (2007: 13), most migration research take on mixed-
method approaches, since quantitative research obtains comparative data to describe macro-
social changes and qualitative methods provide insight into individual and community-level 
actions and contexts.  
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Mouton (2001) provides great insights into different research designs, differentiating between 
empirical and non-empirical studies, primary data and existing/secondary data, numerical 
versus textual data and the extent of control in either highly structured conditions or natural 
field settings. The study that is being undertaken is an analysis of secondary data (Mouton, 
2001: 144). Since textual data will be consulted and the extent of control in the study is low, 
the study can be categorised as a textual analysis (Mouton, 2001: 146).  
3.8 A Case in Study 
The selected research method for the study, is the exploratory case study approach, which 
draws on Italy and France to demonstrate arguments and seeks to provide in-depth insights. As 
such, the study draws on the case study approach to guide the research process. Therefore, 
through the exploration and investigation of the processes undergone by and policies applicable 
to economic migrants from North Africa to two EU member states will be presented. Zainal 
(2007: 2) has described the case study method as unique and particularly useful for observing 
data and providing insights at the micro level. Though some scholars differ on the ability of 
the case study approach to do so, this approach is especially useful for providing descriptive 
insights, such as questions pertaining to the who, what, where, why and how, though 
quantitative analysis is said to be more useful for the how and why (Kitchenham, 2010: 564 & 
Crowe et al., 2011: 4).  
Case studies can be grouped into three distinct categories: exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. Exploratory case studies explore phenomena that appeal to the interest of the 
researcher, descriptive case studies describe phenomena and explanatory case studies examine 
data at surface and a deeper level to explain the phenomena (Zainal, 2007: 3). Crowe et al. 
(2011: 2 & 5) attribute the selection of a case that will be studied to a range of factors, 
depending on the type of study, of which there are three: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. 
An intrinsic study is taken on to learn about a phenomenon, whilst being defined by its 
uniqueness, an instrumental study focuses on a specific case to gain a broader understanding 
of a phenomenon and a collective study considers more than one cases (Crowe et al., 2011: 1 
– 2).  
An exploratory case study method has provided value for the study in that it is deemed useful 
for its contributions that allow one to study a phenomenon in-depth and in a real-life, or natural, 
context (Zainal, 2007: 2, 5 & Crowe et al. 2011: 7 – 8). The research approach adopted, to 
conduct a study and illustrate using Italy and France, has been selected for its relevance to the 
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study’s research question and objectives as well as its relationship to the theoretical framework. 
In using this research approach, the study hopes to produce insightful and useful findings that 
are without bias and align with the theoretical framework. Most valuable for the study, 
according to the thesis’s theoretical underpinnings, is the fact that this research method allows 
for insight at the micro level, therefore, aligning with the human-centric goal of the thesis.  
3.9 Italy & France 
Crowe et al. (2011: 5) point out the necessity to define the case being studied and to explain its 
selection and highlight the role of the research questions, existing literature and theoretical 
issues in this process. The reason why Italy has been selected as the main case of study for this 
thesis, is the influx of economic migrants from North Africa that arrived in Italy when 
migration intensified in 2015 and the ways in which the Italian government has responded to 
and managed this influx. Furthermore, by identifying the push and pull factors of people to the 
European Union, the relationship between these factors ought to provide clarity on the nature 
of migration management, considering the changes brought about by globalisation. By 
studying the case of Italy, as an example of an EU Member State, this thesis hopes to provide 
a clearer understanding of how big of a priority migrants are in Europe, to what extent these 
states provide migrants with protection and access to a higher standard of living. Though Italy 
is the main study site for the thesis, France will also be analysed and used to illustrate aspects 
of migration management in order to provide further insights for the study.  
Furthermore, specific instances of human rights abuses, especially concerning women and 
children, living conditions inside camps, the treatment of migrants during screening processes, 
and actions taken by security forces will be discussed. This thesis seeks to understand the ‘push 
and pull’ factors and the precariousness these cause in migrants’ lives and journeys. Although 
the study considers the period between 2011 and mid-2018, it focuses predominantly on 2015 
and thereafter. The Arab Spring started in 2010, gained momentum in 2011 and the migrant 
crisis broke out in 2015. Furthermore, 2011 was the year that the migration crisis entered the 
stage of the international community with such prominence and captured the world’s attention. 
Since 2015, it has continued to feature in news media across the world, but more so, migration 
from North Africa to Europe persists to this day, despite the horrors that have occurred and the 
increased securitisation measures that have been taken.  
Before providing an overview and discussion of Italy and France, it is necessary to elaborate 
how the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis resonates with these cases. In other words, 
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providing a theory-driven approach to define the cases that will be studied should strongly and 
adequately substantiate the reason for selecting these specific cases.  It is important to recall 
the central concerns and concepts of the two theoretical frameworks shaping this thesis. Firstly, 
FST, challenging ideas of protection and focusing on everyday politics, asks who is welcome 
and who not, reminding us that how a state treats non-citizens is as important for democracy 
as how it treats its citizens. This thesis has employed FST to consider the experience of migrant 
men and women and will include and concentrate on women wherever possible. Thus, the cases 
of Italy and France are important sites to answer questions posed by FST, as the thesis goes on 
to identify how their governments have responded to the migrant crisis and taken up the 
responsibility to protect.   
By looking at how these states treat migrants, especially where it concerns the conditions of 
reception facilities, relocation and security measures, these questions will be answered. 
Studying these cases should also provide meaningful insights about structural forms of violence 
and the relationship between state power and the protection of migrants.   Secondly, as human 
security theory does, this study will focus on the security of individuals, and the responses of 
policies and institutions, to determine whether migrants are protected and how. Lastly, the 
study will produce findings about the vulnerabilities of migrants in Italy and France, as a 
reflection of the vulnerabilities they face across Europe, and their capabilities and agency. Italy, 
and France have experienced the migrant crisis in diverse ways; Italy, for example, is a popular 
destination country for migrants, whereas France is a popular transit country, especially for 
migrants hoping to reach the United Kingdom.  
Each of these states has been characterised by a unique set of challenges related to migration, 
however, combined, they convey a message of the challenges posed to the EU and pitfalls of 
its migration management strategies. The biggest challenges these states have had to deal with 
have demanded attention and clearly illustrate how the human security of migrants is under 
threat. In Italy, the trafficking of migrant women, lack of care for survivors of violence as well 
as gender-based violence, increased border controls, the toxic political debate around migration 
and the barriers to migrant women receiving abortions have emerged as the biggest issues 
related to migration. Demanding global attention towards France, has been the conditions of 
previous refugee camp Calais, which was dismantled in 2016, but continues to house migrants, 
the sexual exploitation, violence and forced labour that unaccompanied minors are subjected 
to, relocations to seemingly substandard facilities and police harassment towards migrants and 
aid workers, especially in Calais (Human Rights Watch, 2017 & 2018). These issues are 
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directly related to human security and, therefore, qualify Italy and France as relevant and 
suitable cases to be studied for the thesis. The similarities as destination countries for migrants, 
the challenges they face, and their responses are enough to relate them to one another, yet the 
differences are enough to require that all three feature in this study.  
Towards the end of 2016, the Human Rights Watch (2016) found that 164,695 migrants and 
asylum seekers had reached Italy by sea, comprising mostly Nigerians, Eritreans, and Sudanese 
and France had received 2091 asylum seekers relocated from Greece and 231 from Italy. 
Additionally, the numbers of unaccompanied children had increased significantly, and an 
estimated 23 000 migrant children were traveling alone to Italy by mid-September 2016, 
compared to 12 360 in 2015. Though new asylum applications increased in 2016, so did 
rejection rates, due to tightened border controls by neighbouring countries, which prevented 
onward movement of refugees and migrants. On the list of top desired destination countries for 
migrants between 2010 and 2015, France ranks Italy, which trails by only 0.2 per cent. One 
could reason that France is preferred because it is often used to access the UK, which is ranked 
as the second most desired destination country (IOM, 2018).     
Since the crisis of 2015, Italy has intensified negotiations with countries such as Sudan, 
Gambia, and Libya on migration control. In Italy, which has witnessed increased intolerance 
towards migrants amongst citizens, there has been much anger over the government’s inability 
to decrease the number of migrants. 2014 (2018) indicates that there were 119 000 illegal 
Mediterranean crossings to Italy in 2017, despite a reduction of these by a third, highlighting 
that, since 2013, Italy has absorbed close to 700 000 migrants arriving by boat from Libya. 
Figures for 1 January 2018 and 28 February 2018 illustrate that Italy received a total of 5 247 
arrivals by sea with 316 deaths, Spain received 2 306 migrants with 102 deaths and Greece and 
Cyprus received 2 653 migrants and 37 migrants respectively, both without deaths 
(Meditteranean Update, 2018). Unable to engage with Libya on land due to continued political 
conflict, the EU has invested in the LCG and, more importantly, Italy has engaged with Libya’s 
Government of National Accord and municipalities providing aid in return for border and 
migration control (Micaleff & Reitano, 2018). The UNHCR also provides up-to-date data, 
where statistics read that 16 739 migrants have travelled to Italy and 18 723 to Spain in 2018 
thus far (UNHCR, 2018). 
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3.10 Analysis of Secondary Data  
Secondary data will be consulted in this thesis, most being collected by studying news articles, 
articles featuring on the websites of non-profit and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)10 
that carry out research on issues relating to human rights, human security, academic literature 
and official statements released by these states. Grey literature will also be consulted for the 
value it provides in conveying urgent issues and illustrations thereof. For example, there is very 
limited scholarly literature available that deals with the dangers and threats women migrants 
face, however, these issues abound in grey literature.  
There is a wealth of information available on this topic and this could cause the process to take 
longer. An important aspect that has been considered in this regard, is that sources be carefully 
selected to ensure that the study’s findings are reliable and unbiased. Only English sources 
were used for the study. Due to budgetary constraints, primary data will not be collected. To 
travel to these states and be granted permission to access refugees at specific sites would prove 
a giant task and would require more time and resources than possible. Therefore, sources such 
as Human Rights Watch, which is also constantly updated, and the International Organisation 
for Migration will be particularly useful for data and staying abreast of developments.  
3.11 Shortcomings & Limitations 
Several shortcomings surround the particular methodology selected for this study, however, 
being mindful of them throughout the process could help reduce the effects of these on the 
study and, more importantly, its findings. Because an exploratory case study approach has 
shaped the study, results cannot be easily generalisable (Mouton, 2001: 150). Thus, the research 
findings and conclusions might not be applicable to other countries in the European Union. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the examples in the study will illustrate and carry the sentiments 
of the greater EU, therefore, this concern, though valid do not pose a great challenge to this 
study.  
3.12 Value for international, migration and gender studies 
The first contribution that this thesis will make to the field of study is that it seeks to inform 
theory; it will illustrate the use of the Human Security framework and Feminist Security Theory 
in the current global era. By applying it to the context of migration to Europe, it offers a link 
to international relations theories and migration and gender studies.  Practically, it will provide 
                                                          
10 NGO refers to non-state actors and organisations that have provided assistance to migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers during the migrant crisis.  
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insights into the perception of migration and migrants held within the EU, as well as the 
sentiments amongst local populations. In the pursuit of meeting the research objectives, the 
thesis will provide the field with an overview of the factors pushing migrants out of Africa and 
towards Europe and how these add to the precariousness of migrant women’s lives and to 
understand the EU’s role in this process too.  
This thesis hopes to contribute to political science and international studies, a gendered 
consideration of the processes of migration in order to achieve the same objective that Fierke 
(2015: 10) set out to: “expose the silences and exclusions and highlight the insecurity of those 
marginalised by practices of state or global security”. It seeks to reiterate that the security of 
individuals is important for state security and draw attention to the deficits of EU protection in 
its response to and management of the migrant crisis. By highlighting the vulnerabilities and 
inadequate protection of migrants from a gender perspective, it will provide the opportunity to 
recognise the issues that need to be addressed so that the human security of migrants can feature 
at the top of the EU’s agenda.  
3.13 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explained in detail the methodology of the study, as it has discussed various 
aspects that comprise the study, that will form the basis of the thesis. Starting with the 
theoretical frameworks, the Human Security approach and Feminist Security Theory have 
proven to be the most suitable and comprehensive tools from which to develop the study. They 
resonate deeply with the research question and objectives and adopt a human-centric approach 
that emphasises insecurities of migrants, re-defining security and challenge patriarchal forms 
of security to include women and children and prioritise the individual above the state. These 
theoretical tools also challenge realism in that they, very importantly, acknowledge the agency 
of individuals to shape international relations, emphasise the power of individuals and question 
the responses of states in times of crises.   
Providing substantiation for the exploratory case study method and approach that has been 
chosen for this study has highlighted the value thereof. This method will produce impact and 
focus for the study, will allow for a certain degree of flexibility so that new findings may be 
incorporated and will make for intriguing insights into the cases under study. The most 
prominent features common to both cases that will be studied are the conditions at various 
facilities, whether it be reception facilities, detention facilities or camps, challenges that come 
with relocation and resettlement programs, the role played by security forces and how these 
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have been criticised and, lastly, how they have served as destinations and/or transit countries 
that migrants travel through to reach other destinations.  
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Chapter 4: Secondary Data Analysis  
4.1. Chapter Overview  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the thesis with data to answer the research question 
and to meet its objectives in a clear and comprehensive manner. By conducting research in line 
with the methodology described in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide necessary 
insights that will allow the thesis to meet its objectives. An exploratory case study method, in 
which arguments will be illustrated by using examples from Italy and France, has been adopted 
in conjunction with a set of criteria, which has been listed below. Italy and France will be 
studied in relation to this set of criteria, with documentary sources, internet sources and grey 
literature providing the sources for data collection. The theoretical frameworks, FST and 
Human Security Theory, have formed the basis of the research and have provided the lenses 
through which to approach, select and extract data that is most useful to the outcomes of the 
thesis. As such, the theoretical basis of the thesis has helped identify a set of criteria that guided 
the study’s analysis of secondary data. These include: push and pull factors, state responses to 
migration and migrants, through its policies, the categorisation process that migrants undergo, 
securitisation as a response to the influx of migrants and the responses of citizens as a mirror 
of state response. Furthermore, the threats and dangers that migrant women and children face 
during the process of migration, at reception, their sexual exploitation and reproductive 
challenges, have guided the research and provided insights to meet the research objectives. 
The chapter commences with a brief overview of the notion of the carceral state and how the 
detention of migrants is a human security issue and then moves onto a discussion of the push 
and pull factors of migration from North Africa to Europe. To understand the gendered nature 
of the policies and processes towards North African migrants in the EU, a set of criteria has 
been identified. The first two items are entry policies and how these have related to EU 
regulation, and the categorisation of persons upon arrival, asking whether they are classified as 
asylum seekers, migrants or refugees and, importantly, what does this process look like.  
Then, biases towards countries of origin on the part of receiving countries and securitisation 
activities will be analysed. The latter will focus on how states have responded to the migrant 
crisis and the inflow of migrants, highlighting how these responses project the idea of this 
inflow as a security issue rather than a humanitarian one. Under this topic, the Hotspot 
Approach, border control measures, the idea of Fortress Europe and role-players in this, search 
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and rescue (SAR)11 activities, relocation and resettlement of arrivals to the EU, and the recent 
increase in port closures will be discussed. Finally, data on the sentiments and responses of 
citizens to these migrants will be included, as will insights on the threats and dangers that 
women migrants who travel from North Africa experience and the gender-specific challenges 
they are faced with.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, certain concepts are central to the human security framework. 
Vulnerability and agency, for example, are central to the framework, as the threats and ensuing 
vulnerabilities people face are considered. Furthermore, their capabilities and limitations on 
these are also important. Additionally, FST also provides useful conceptual tools such as the 
consideration of economic, political, social and personal circumstances of individuals. These 
impact the decision to migrate, the migration experience and the success of migration to 
Europe. Structural violence is also an important concept to consider, as states that consider the 
migrant crisis as a security threat, respond to economic migrants with various forms of 
structural violence, which will also be illustrated in this chapter. These theoretical contributions 
will be used to analyse the data collected, to illustrate how the data relates to theory. The 
chapter will provide various insights that will contribute to the conclusions and findings that 
will be discussed in the fifth and concluding chapter of the thesis.  
4.2 The Carceral State 
Some have noted that the most regular, direct and evident contact people have had with the 
government, has been through prisons, courts or police stations (Weaver and Lerman, 2010: 2 
– 3). The carceral state, a state modelled on the idea of a prison where physical boundaries are 
employed to control urban space, though restrictive to citizens, is especially intimidating to 
vulnerable groups, such as migrants, who are detained. When irregular migrants are considered 
as criminal and a threat to security, they are stripped of their rights, privileges and social support 
(Weaver and Lerman, 2010: 4).  
Furthermore, efforts to control immigration steer the dynamics that policing and confinement 
have on society and determines who is defined and policed as deportable (Hernandez, 
Muhammad and Thompson, 2015: 19 & Hester, 2015: 141 – 142). Therefore, whilst the power 
of states and police to increase surveillance and detain is strengthened, the vulnerability of 
migrants is exacerbated. This chapter seeks to identify what makes Italy and France carceral 
                                                          
11 SAR refers to search and rescue activities that involve the patrolling of the Mediterranean ocean in search of 
vessels and persons in distress, rescue missions to those people and vessels, the provision of aid to organisations 
rescuing people at sea and the return of people to mainland Europe.  
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states, considering their response to the inflow of irregular migrants. Therefore, it interrogates 
the methods used to determine refugee status, conduct SAR operations, to control borders and 
close ports and decisions that are made about where to send migrants that have not been given 
refugee status.  
4.3 Push & Pull Factors  
Push and pull factors are those which push migrants out of their countries of origin and, in the 
case of the Arab Spring, transit countries, and those which pull migrants towards destination 
countries. It is necessary to highlight these factors, as these are the reasons migrants leave 
North Africa, despite the ominous journeys that lie ahead, and the reasons that pull them toward 
Europe, as opposed to other regions. In doing so, one can understand that which is threatening 
the wellbeing of migrants, yet providing them with hope. Without these factors, the migrant 
crisis would not have looked the same as it has. The conflict in North Africa, democratic ideals 
and economic opportunity emerge as the main driving factors for migration from North Africa 
to Europe and, though some factors weigh heavier in the decision to migrate, they are not 
exclusive of one another.  
4.3.1 Push Factors 
4.3.1.1 Conflict in North Africa 
Although North Africa has a history of instability, after the Arab Spring of 2011 this instability 
has taken on a new form. Tunisia, for example, which was successfully transitioning to 
democratic rule, has been undermined by lawlessness in its neighbour, Libya. Libya, an 
infamous state of departure for irregular migration to Europe, has witnessed disputes between 
rival authorities, and various abuses against refugees and migrants have been committed in the 
country, especially in detention camps run by militias, including modern-day slavery (Freedom 
House, Freedom in the World, 2018). Libya is characterised by pervasive corruption in the 
private sector and in government, as oil interests, foreign governments, smuggling syndicates 
and armed groups exert major influence, causing crime and corruption to flourish without 
functioning institutions (Freedom House, Libya Profile, 2018).  
With media, academic, religious and organisational freedom sorely lacking, restrictions on 
freedom of movement and the low regard of civilian’s physical security, Libya is an oppressive 
country to call home or seek refuge in (Freedom House, Libya Profile, 2018). Women in Libya 
are especially vulnerable, as a decree issued by the LNA in 2017 bans women under the age of 
60 from traveling outside of Libya without a male guardian illustrates (Freedom House, Libya 
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Profile, 2018). Rape and sexual violence have also become increasingly problematic in Libya’s 
lawless environment (Freedom House, Libya Profile, 2018). Owing the migrant crisis to 
conflict, de Orellana (2015) who regards the increased violence in Libya as incentive enough 
for people to migrate, writes that people fleeing these conditions are refugees and not economic 
migrants. During a 2017 screening conducted in Sicily, African and Middle Eastern migrants 
who had been rescued explained that they were fleeing the “chaos, general climate of insecurity 
and violence in Libya” (Rescue ship brings 606 migrants to Italy, BBC, 2017).  
Systematic human rights violations towards migrants remains another major push factor for 
migration out of North Africa including those occurring in countries of origin and transit states, 
especially Libya, where migrants are robbed, beaten, extorted by employers, common 
criminals, security forces and militias (Huma Rights Watch, The Mediterranean Migration 
Crisis, 2015: 3 & 19). Many migrants migrating from North Africa to Europe are Eritreans and 
Somalians who are fleeing oppression in their own countries. Eritrea’s open-ended military 
conscription, forced labour during conscription, detentions, restrictions of various freedoms, 
land expropriation and ethnic discrimination are amongst the factors pushing Eritreans, who 
want to escape one of the least developed countries and failed states in the world, to North 
Africa and beyond Huma Rights Watch, The Mediterranean Migration Crisis, 2015: 13). 
Somalians, on the other hand, flee sustained armed conflict, attacks by Islamist group Al-
Shabaab, African Union troops and militias, sexual violence, detention and conditions that 
threaten their basic security and rights (Huma Rights Watch, The Mediterranean Migration 
Crisis, 2015: 15 – 16). Therefore, most migrants departing North Africa are pushed out by the 
turmoil, poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and instability in Libya, where the safety 
and employment that existed before the Arab Spring is no longer available (Bajekal, 2015).  
Coupled with poor governance and political instability, is the spread of jihadism and the impact 
of ISIS on North Africa and the Sahel region. Thus, ISIS, which has significantly impacted 
migratory flows from North Africa to Europe, can be regarded as a push factor. With no 
legitimate government maintaining control and the ISIS has increasingly succeeded in taking 
over territory, especially in cities such as Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and, the capital, Tripoli 
(Truhin, Lesovaya & Sultan, 2016: 982). Additionally, the collapse of Libya’s judicial system 
has accommodated the enforcement of Sharia Law by jihadists. In Libya alone, ISIS has 
threatened security and peace as attacks on foreign symbols and the raid expansion of the 
group’s membership in Libya demonstrates (Engel, 2015: 2 – 3). ISIS has also played on the 
migrant crisis to demonstrate its power and threaten Europe, as a threat made in 2015 to flood 
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Europe with half a million refugees through Libya and a claim that 4000 jihadist fighters would 
be commissioned to Europe demonstrates (Schmid, 2016: 8).  
4.3.1.2 Modern-day Slavery  
Though slavery is not uncommon to North Africa, the International Organisation for Migration 
has reported findings that produce evidence of slavery in Libya since April 2017. Furthermore, 
in November 2017, CNN released footage of men being sold by smugglers for approximately 
$400 at an auction nearby Libya’s capital, Tripoli. International outcry ensued when, the UN 
human rights office reports the buying and selling of migrants in Libya’s ‘open slave markets’ 
as well as slavery along migratory routes in North Africa, and especially in Libya, which hosts 
approximately 700 000 – 1 000 000 migrants, in March 2018 (Naib, 2018 & Sherlock & al-
Arian, 2018).  The southern Tunisia director of an aid group, the Red Crescent, which shelters 
migrants arriving in Tunisia from Libya, has said that since mid-2016 there has been an increase 
in migrant arrivals reporting being traded and sold as slaves (Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018). 
Events prior to and since illustrate the dark reality that many African migrants face, the reality 
of men, and sometimes women, travelling to Libya falling prey to slave markets along the 
migrant routes of North Africa. The lack of rule of law in Libya and the current worsening of 
the country’s political situation has meant that smuggling, trafficking and the slave trade 
flourish. However, Nigerian, Somalian, Ethiopian, Senegalese, Nigerien and Eritrean victims 
and survivors, are now sharing their stories of being sold as slaves.  
The video released in 2017, showed young Nigerian and other Sub-Saharan African men being 
sold for $400, described as strong and fit, for the purposes of farm workers (BBC, Libya 
migrants ‘slave market’ footage sparks outrage, 2017). Most recently, victims of modern-day 
slavery in Libya are initially held captive as detainees in Libya’s infamous and numerous 
detention centres, where after, prison guards trade them as slaves, sometimes leasing them out 
for day labour, where they are exploited (BBC, Migrant Slavery in Libya: Nigerians tell of 
being used as slaves, 2018). Though each victim’s journey is different, there is a general trend 
of being misled by smugglers or traffickers, being held ransom and tortured and being sold if 
they cannot afford the ransom, often repeatedly so. The story of a Gambian man, who was 
detained and sold describes the business of modern-day slavery in Libya, as one where migrants 
are bought from one detention centre and sold to another for profit, where migrants are sold for 
between 300 and 200 dinars, that is $150 and $350 (Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018).  
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The experience of Harun Ahmed, a young Ethiopian man, who eventually reached Germany 
and was granted refugee status, illustrates the complexities around the slave trade of migrants 
in North Africa. His journey started with migration to Sudan and was followed by a journey to 
Libya, for which he paid $600 to smugglers, however, upon reaching the border, the group he 
was part of was kidnapped and taken to Chad, where they were taken to a slave market and 
bought for $4000 each (BBC, Migrant Crisis: ‘I was sold three times by slave traders’, 2017). 
After nearly three months, he and other migrants were resold to a Libyan buyer for $3000 each, 
less than before because they were malnourished and weaker than before (BBC, Migrant 
Crisis: ‘I was sold three times by slave traders’, 2017). The group was tortured and suffered 
more abuse in Libya than they had in Chad, but some were released when their families sent 
ransoms, only to be ambushed by another criminal group and taken to a warehouse, were their 
freedom would cost them $1000 (BBC, Migrant Crisis: ‘I was sold three times by slave 
traders’, 2017). Eventually, Harun reached Tripoli, where he was lucky enough to work and 
depart to Italy, and move on to Germany, where he was granted asylum.   
In January 2018, Al Jazeera published the testimonies of two Eritreans who had been sold as 
slaves in Libya on multiple occasions. Sami, who had travelled 3634km to reach Tripoli, was 
held in an illegal detention centre in Bani Walid where he was forced to witness the torture and 
death of his friend, who had travelled with him from Eritrea (Naib, 2018). He left but after 
being caught, was taken back to Bani Walid, where he was removed and taken “to do farming 
work in return for food and shelter” (Naib, 2018). The other young man, Yonathan, fled Eritrea 
in 2016 and was smuggled into Libya, where he and the group he was with was sold to 
smugglers by Libyan guards and held in tin containers without water unless they could pay 
$5000 to be released (Naib, 2018). In another instance, a Nigerian man, who was part of a 
group that was intercepted at sea by the LCG, was taken to a detention centre in Gharyan, 
where, one night, a prison guard entered the prison, removed twenty men who were blindfolded 
and then discussed prices before putting the men into a vehicle and transporting them to a farm 
where they performed slave labour, slept on plywood, were unfed for days and guarded by 
armed men at night (BBC, Migrant Slavery in Libya: Nigerians tell of being used as slaves, 
2018).  
As the experiences of these migrants’ journeys are complex, so are the reasons for their sales. 
Whereas some are kidnapped by criminal gangs, and told to pay a ransom for their release, 
others are tortured so that their families, some of whom are in Europe, will pay fees for their 
release, and others are sold for labour purposes. In some cases, migrants are bought and sold 
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for bonded labour or debt slavery, where they work for someone who has paid for their release. 
The story of a twenty-year-old Nigerien man, Mohammed, who fled his country when he was 
seventeen years old and was smuggled into Libya, illustrates this, as he was detained by Libyan 
militia and, eventually, bought and sold into bonded labour (Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018). In 
such cases, there are no terms of employment for these migrants, as their duration of bonded 
labour could be indefinite and, regarded as commodities, they sleep and live in extremely dire 
and inhumane conditions, leading to malnourishment. In another case, a Senegalese man who 
had been rescued, told that he paid to pass through Niger and a pick-up driver had been 
arranged, however, the pick-up driver claimed that because the trafficker had not paid him, he 
would take them to a park, which ended up being a slave market, where he was bought and 
thereafter held hostage with one hundred other migrants (IOM, IOM Learns of ‘Slave Market’ 
Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa, 2017). He also told the IOM that women 
were also bought, and many forced to become sex slaves (IOM, IOM Learns of ‘Slave Market’ 
Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa, 2017). 
4.3.2 Pull Factors 
4.3.2.1 Economic Opportunity  
Although the largest single category of people displaced by the Arab Spring, especially so in 
Libya, has been migrant workers, these migrants are not usually legally entitled to claim 
refugee status, as the status of refugee depends on conditions in the migrant’s country of origin 
(Koser, 2012). Therefore, legal gaps in the in the international system for the protection or 
assisting of displaced economic migrants exist. This lack of protection also pushes people out 
of North Africa in search of a state that will protect them and their human rights, which Europe 
has to offer. Egypt and Tunisia have closed their borders to most migrants, except for Libyan 
nationals and those who possess valid documents and stay for a short transit stay (Amnesty 
International Ltd., Europe’s Sinking Shame, 2015: 8).  
Though most migrants travelling from North Africa to Europe are economic migrants from 
elsewhere in Africa, Libyans themselves also have less incentive to stay in Libya, as the 
standard of living has dramatically deteriorated post-Arab Spring. Under the rule of Gaddafi, 
Libya was Africa’s wealthiest nation and had the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy 
on the African continent, however, post-Arab Spring, Libya’s economy is barely under the 
government’s control with militias gaining more control over the state’s resources (Chengu, 
2014). Before the Gaddafi was overthrown, Libyans had free access to healthcare, education, 
electricity and interest-free loans, however, today the health-care sector is on the brink of 
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collapse, many higher education institutions are shut down and the capital experiences power 
outages (Chengu, 2014).  Therefore, Libyan nationals have very little left to stay for 
themselves. In the hopes of receiving welfare benefits, education and employment, they would 
rather migrate to Europe than remain in Libya. Economic opportunities in the EU and 
educational opportunities are especially attractive pull factors for child migrants (Human 
Rights Watch, Boat Ride to Detention, 2012: 18).  
4.4 State Responses  
4.4.1 EU Entry Policies 
Since the EU’s Schengen Border Code allows for the free movement of EU-member state 
citizens across borders, more efficient external border controls had to be introduced (European 
Commission, 2018). Along with this, comes the task of managing inflows of migrants, 
regardless of origin, to the region. Frontex is tasked with assisting member states with 
managing migratory flows at external borders and EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance 
System), an information sharing and cooperation mechanism, helps member states counter 
cross-border crime, unauthorised border crossings and managing the death toll of migrants at 
sea (European Commission, 2018). Of the migrants entering the EU, many from North Africa 
are comprised of asylum seekers, who require international protection, and economic migrants, 
who are in search of improved living conditions and economic opportunities. Furthermore, and 
important to the thesis, EU regulation stipulates that victims of human trafficking are supposed 
to have access to assistance, with the possibility of temporary residence in the EU (European 
Commission, Irregular Migration & Return, 2018). Common to the case of irregular migrants 
is that they enter the EU on short-stay visas but remain there for economic purposes after their 
visas have expired (European Commission, Irregular Migration & Return, 2018). 
According to international law, though refugees receive international protection on the grounds 
of well-founded fear of persecution, those who are at risk of facing serious harm if they return 
to their country of origin may receive subsidiary protection (Papademetriou, 2016). For the 
case of illegal economic migrants, however, law requires that they be returned to their country 
of origin (Papademetriou, 2016). It is with this group of illegal migrants, who are clearly in 
need of protection and have well-founded reasons for migrating to Europe, that the 
implementation of international law and standards becomes unclear. The cases of Italy and 
France illustrate how, despite valid reasons for irregular and illegal migration, migrants do not 
in reality receive the legal protection and rights that international treaties, such as United 
Nations Treaty Collection, guarantee to them.  
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To prevent irregular migration to the EU efforts such as strengthening the mandate of Frontex, 
introducing evaluation mechanisms of Schengen rules, increasing cooperation between border 
surveillance authorities and determining rules for surveillance of external sea borders by 
Frontex, have been made (European Commission, Irregular Migration & Return, 2018). 
Furthermore, the EU ascribes to a humane and effective return policy, which is based on the 
principle of preference to voluntary return, in accordance with the Return Directive, which 
guides the return of non-EU nationals who reside in the EU irregularly (European Commission, 
Irregular Migration & Return, 2018).  
Member States are, according to EU regulations, expected to guarantee the rights of arrivals to 
effectively make claims for international protection without hindrances or delay and have to 
ensure that applicants are able to submit applications with the appropriate authorities 
(Papademetriou, 2016). The Common Procedures Directive prescribes that well-equipped and 
qualified personnel handle asylum claims, trained by the EASO and that interviewers 
accommodate the interviewees (Papademetriou, 2016). Applicants are also subject to 
interviews and, in the case of large influxes of migrants applying simultaneously, personnel 
from various national authorities may temporarily conduct these and sufficient time needs to 
be given for interviewees to present evidence for substantiation of their application 
(Papademetriou, 2016, Directive 2013/32/EU). Medical examinations may be ordered, if the 
applicant consents, covered by public funds if the authority deems it necessary (Papademetriou, 
2016, Directive 2013/32/EU).  
Furthermore, arrivals have the following substantive rights: the right to legal and procedural 
information in a language they understand, which includes information relating to the right of 
appeal in the case of negative decisions (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, supra note 32, art. 2, 
paras. 1 & 2. - Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013), the right to legal assistance, the right to liaise 
with the UNCHR, the right to remedy (review of negative asylum decision before a court or 
tribunal), the right to remain in the Member State where they applied until a decision has been 
made, the right to move freely within that state or an area assigned to them and permission to 
leave that area, the right to material reception and healthcare (Directive 2013/33/EU). Member 
States are expected to consider applicants’ age, gender and needs of vulnerable people when 
housing them, the right of minors to access the state educational system within three months 
of application as well as preparatory classes, the right to access the labour market within nine 
months of their application and to vocational training despite access to the labour market 
(Directive 2011/95/EU). Finally, the detention of applicants for international protection is not 
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allowed, except on the following grounds: to verify nationality or identity, to determine on 
which aspects application was based, to review the applicant’s right to enter the territory, where 
the person is subject to a return procedure, or when it is required to protect national security or 
public order (Directive 2013/32/EU). Detention needs to be ordered in writing with the grounds 
for detention stated and the duration needs to be as short as possible, being subject to judicial 
review and applicants are to have free access to legal representation and assistance (Directive 
2013/32/EU).  
4.4.1.1 The Dublin Regulation 
The Dublin Regulation stipulates the criteria and protocol for determining which member state 
is responsible for applications for international protection, that is refugee status. In order to 
prevent individuals from abusing the system by applying for asylum in more than one state and 
too circumvent having applicants sent from one member state to another by national authorities, 
it requires that refugees be sent to first country of entry to the EU for processing asylum claims. 
(Papademetriou, 2016). However, the migrant crisis has highlighted how it persists as a 
structural problem since it places unequal burdens on member states, as the cases of Italy and 
Greece illustrate. The Regulation allows for the processing of a case, claim or refusal of 
permission to enter, to be delegated to other national authorities (Papademetriou, 2016). 
According to the criteria, which includes the existence of family in a member state, the 
possession of a visa or residence permit for a state and entry into a member state, the member 
state of in which the application was first submitted takes responsibility for examining it 
(Papademetriou, 2016).  
4.4.1.2. EURODAC  
On 20 July 2015, this Regulation came into effect, and a computerised, encrypted and 
centralised fingerprint database was established, requiring that member states take the 
fingerprints of all applicants of international protection who are fourteen years and older be 
taken and forward these, along with other information, to the Central System within seventy-
two hours of submitting applications (Papademetriou, 2016). Additionally, the fingerprints of 
all fingers of all third-country nationals or stateless persons fourteen years and older who are 
detained by border patrol agencies for irregular border crossings must also be obtained 
(Papademetriou, 2016). The purpose of this regulation is to maintain a record and verify who 
is in territory illegally but has filed an application for asylum in another state.  
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4.4.1.3. The Common European Asylum System  
Those who flee their country of origin for fear of persecution or serious harm and need 
international protection, are considered asylum seekers. CEAS stipulates the minimum 
standards and procedures for processing and decision-making about asylum applications, the 
treatment of those regarded as asylum seekers and refugees, however, on the ground twenty-
eight different asylum systems are at work (Open Society Foundations, Understanding 
Migration and Asylum in the European Union, 2018). According to law, asylum seekers are 
not compelled to claim asylum in the first EU state they arrive in, however, the Dublin 
Regulation gives permission to states to return asylum seekers to the country of first entry to 
the EU so that they can process their claim for asylum there (Open Society Foundations, 
Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, 2018). According to CEAS, 
states need to agree about the standards of refugee protection and procedures need to be fair 
and effective throughout the entire bloc, with asylum seekers being welcomed “in a dignified 
manner”, receiving fair treatment and having their cases “examined to uniformed standards” 
(European Commission, Common European Asylum System, 2018).  
Several items of the Geneva Convention ensure the rights of international migrants and 
refugees. The principle of non-refoulment in article 33, for example, which is central to CEAS, 
prohibits a member state from returning refugees or asylum seekers to countries where they 
could be faced with persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership of 
a certain social or political group (Papademetriou, 2016). Furthermore, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU safeguards the right to asylum (article 18) and bans the return 
of a person to a country where a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of torture or degrading 
treatment exists (Papademetriou, 2016). The European Court of Human Rights judges human 
rights violations committed by state parties of the European Convention, making provision for 
bans on inhuman and degrading treatment as well as collective expulsions, the rights to liberty, 
security, family and private life as well as effective remedy, especially where it concerns 
reception and detention conditions (Papademetriou, 2016). Lastly, since most of the tragedies 
of migration from North Africa to Europe occur at sea, maritime law becomes pertinent. 
According to maritime law, all ships have an obligation to aid vessels in distress and to take 
rescued passengers to a place of safety (Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over 
rescues put lives at risk, 2018).  
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4.4.1.4. French Policies  
France has recently signed a new asylum and immigration bill, which has largely impacted the 
time frame for asylum applications, duration of detainment, rules for deportation, the 
withdrawal of refugee status, when work in France may resume and family reunification. 
According to this bill, migrants have 90 days to submit asylum applications, whereas before 
they had 120 days (Dockery, 2018). Asylum seekers may now be detained for 90 days, twice 
the previous duration (Dockery, 2018). Asylum seekers can work in France as soon as six 
months after arrival, as opposed to the previous nine months and, lastly, family reunification 
can be extended to siblings and children (Dockery, 2018). Furthermore, France now has 
authority to withdraw refugee status from those who have committed crimes in the EU or a 
third country that is considered ‘democratic’ (Dockery, 2018). Although some aspects are 
positive, concerns persist about how this bill limits the scope of asylum cases and doubles the 
duration of detention, for adult and child migrants alike (France24, Macron’s government 
passes controversial asylum and immigration law, 2018). Detention, according to international 
law and EU regulation, should be the last resort, however, the French government appears to 
be employing it as a normal way of handling migrants.  
Where the rights of child migrants and refugees are protected by the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, the French government has acted contrary, especially in the manner it has handled 
child refugees from the refugee camp in Calais, known as the ‘Jungle’. Out of the two thousand 
children assessed before and after the clearance of the camp, 750 were transferred to the United 
Kingdom (UK) at the end of 2016, and the 1300 children whose refusal to do so were provided 
with insufficient reasons (Smith, 2018). Therefore, the French government ignored the rights 
of these children to information as well as their right to review. Correspondence between UK 
Border Staff and French officials have illustrated that the French Home Office chose not to 
provide more information for fear of legal action over the refusals (Smith, 2018). This has 
resulted in hundreds of unaccompanied children being left to fend for themselves in Calais, 
without legal protection and denies the rights of child refugees to protection and safe passage. 
In July 2018, a migrant camp in Nantes was evacuated due to appalling conditions, however, 
only 100 could be accommodated in emergency shelters, leaving approximately 300 migrants 
without shelter (The Local, France, French Police Clear 450 Migrants from Camp in Nantes, 
2018). This and efforts to speed up deportations of migrants illustrate a neglect of the human 
rights of migrants travelling from North Africa in France (The Local, France, French Police 
Clear 450 Migrants from Camp in Nantes, 2018).  
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4.4.1.5 Italian Policies  
Italy, despite its initial welcoming response when the migrant crisis first broke out, has adopted 
an increasingly hard-line approach, as the push-back on SAR operations demonstrates. Vessels 
with migrants on them have been blocked, delayed and prevented from disembarking and 
nongovernmental rescue organisations (NGROs)12 prohibited from carrying out SAR activities 
in the Mediterranean (Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues put lives 
at risk, 2018). As previously noted, international law requires that those at risk of harm should 
receive subsidiary protection, however, Italy’s refusal of migrant-carrying vessels and the 
closing of its ports illustrate its unwillingness to conform to international law. Contravening 
maritime and refugee law, since Libya is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Italy 
knowingly returns migrants to a country where their right to apply for asylum is ignored and, 
thus, where their safety and rights are not safeguarded. Contravening CEAS, Italy does not 
welcome migrants at all, let alone in a dignified manner. Additionally, humane return policies 
have also been contravened, as Italy has entered a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Sudanese police authorities and nationals returned to Sudan where brutality awaits them 
(Amnesty International, Italy: Beatings and unlawful expulsions amid EU push to get tough on 
refugees and migrants, 2016).  
1In Febraury 2017, Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya’s Government 
of National Accord, taking the lead in EU’s building of Libya’s capacity to secure its borders 
and patrol the Mediterranean (Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues 
put lives at risk, 2018).Contravening the principle of non-refoulment, Italy has breached 
international law by allowing the LCG to intercept boats carrying migrants and sending them 
back to Libya for detention, where extreme risk of persecution, torture and degrading treatment 
is rife. Italy has also contravened the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which stipulates that a 
state is legally obliged to provide shelter for a refugee and may not expel or return a refugee to 
a place where their life or freedom would be endangered, as migrants have been forcibly 
returned to Libya, where no refugee law or procedure exist (Human Rights Watch, 
EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues put lives at risk, 2018 & Prakash, 2015). By endorsing 
the LCG and providing vessels and equipment, Italy is strengthening SAR activities that 
endanger migrants and leave them more vulnerable.  To this day, people trapped in Libyan 
detention centres endure torture, indefinite detention, extortion and abuse and concerns about 
                                                          
12 NGROs refer to non-governmental rescue organisations, which have directed resources and efforts to search 
and rescue activities in the Mediterranean during the migrant crisis.  
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the voluntary return programme continuing to expose migrants to abuse in their country of 
origin remain (Amnesty International, A year after Italy-Libya migration deal, time to release 
thousands trapped in misery, 2018).  
Italy has also fallen short where basic provisions for migrants are concerned. Having run out 
of dry clothes and water for those who arrived with hypothermia, having hundreds sleep outside 
due to inadequate housing capacity, overcrowding centers, sleeping on dirty mattresses and the 
inability to provide sufficient towels, blankets or soap, and not separating men and women at 
reception facilites, Italy’s reception has been poor (Doctors Without Borders, Italy: Failure to 
Provide Humane Conditions for Migrants and Refugees, 2011). Priority treatment, which is 
meant to include specialised healthcare and mental health support, and a process of informing 
migrants of their rights and legal procedures available has also been greatly lacking in the past 
(Doctors Without Borders, Italy: Failure to Provide Humane Conditions for Migrants and 
Refugees, 2011). These inadequacies of Italy’s reception system and the country’s failure to 
prioritise the health and psychological wellbeing of migrants persisted to the extent that, in 
2015, Doctors Without Borders withdrew its medical activities in reception centres in the 
Ragusa Province of Italy (Doctors Without Borders, Italy: MSF Ends Activities in Pozzallo 
Reception Center, 2015).  
The Hotspot Approach has also placed refugees and migrants in vulnerable positions, as 
authorities beat, electrically shock and sexually humiliate them and forcibly obtain fingerprints 
(Amnesty International, Italy: Beatings and unlawful expulsions amid EU push to get tough on 
refugees and migrants, 2016). If not through these screening processes, Italy exposes migrants 
and refugees to abuse by adopting measures to close off migratory routes to Europe, including 
entering agreements with local authorities in Libya and prohibiting rescue operations by non-
governmental rescue organisations (Amnesty International, Libya: European governments 
complicit in horrific human rights abuse of refugees and migrants, 2017).  
4.4.2 Categorisation of Persons 
The UN classifies international migrants as people who change their country of usual residence 
and this term encompasses asylum-seekers and economic migrants, those who move to improve 
their living conditions or job opportunities (Bajekal, 2015). Refugees, on the other hand, are 
those who flee conflict or persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or membership 
of a certain social group or political union, whereas asylum-seekers are those who have applied 
for asylum but whose statuses have not been determined (Bajekal, 2015). Policies define who 
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is wanted and who is unwanted, which migrants are welcome, and which are not. As such, it is 
important to distinguish between the types of migrants in Europe, each of whom differ in 
characteristics; different migration motives, type of homeland, gender and ethnicity (Mugge 
and van der Haar, 2016: 77). By identifying different characteristics, the realities of migrants 
can be understood, according to these unique characteristics. The purpose of this section is to 
understand how migrant arrivals to the European Union from North Africa are categorised and, 
importantly, to understand the role of the country of origin in processes of categorisation. 
Highlighting the impact of a migrant’s country of origin his or her future, Mugge and van der 
Heer (2016: 81) summarise that the country of origin determines whether the migrant becomes 
a target of integration policy or return policy. Furthermore, migrants from outside the EU are 
not simply categorised as ‘third country nationals’ but rather on the basis of their admission 
labels; that is, labour migrant, asylum seeker, family migrant, refugee and postcolonial migrant 
(Mugge & van der Heer, 2016: 83).  
Whereas labour migrants migrate for employment purposes, family migrants migrate to form 
a family or be reunited with family members and postcolonial and colonial migrants originate 
from countries previously colonised by the destination country (Mugge & van der Heer, 2016: 
83). Important to note is the overlap between these categories. In Italy, before the Hotspot 
approach was implemented, most arrivals were directly channelled to the asylum system, 
however, early identification of irregular migrants became a strategy for separating asylum 
seekers from migrants (Amnesty International, Hotspot Italy, 2016: 32). The three main 
categories that emerged were, firstly, those claiming asylum, secondly and amongst them, those 
who qualified for relocation to another EU state and, lastly, those deemed not in need of 
international protection.  
The Hotspot Approach, a strategy adopted in Italy to identify and fingerprint arrivals from 
North Africa, screen and repatriate those whose asylum applications were refused was integral 
to the categorisation of migrant arrivals in Italy. More specifically, screening procedures were 
conducted to separate asylum seekers from others who were considered to be irregular migrants 
(Amnesty International, Hotspot Italy, 2016: 12). Pre-identification screening in Italy 
comprised of interviews of arrivals with police officials, where personal details are registered 
and an indication of whether or not they are applying for asylum or not and allows for asylum 
seekers to be differentiated from irregularly present persons (Amnesty International, Hotspot 
Italy, 2016: 12). Though screening processes for the purpose of assessing whether arrivals are 
entitled to remain in the EU based on their protection needs, or not, the screening process needs 
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to consider and protect the human rights of arrivals, considering how these have been abused 
on the journey to the EU and the trauma caused as a result (Amnesty International, Hotspot 
Italy, 2016: 32). With a screening process that identified persons not in need of international 
protection and would consequently be deported or returned to their country of origin, Italy’s 
screening process breached the principle of non-refoulment (Amnesty International, Hotspot 
Italy, 2016: 33).  
The extent of the involvement of police in this process has also been cause for concern, as law 
enforcement is not qualified nor trained to handle asylum matters. Whereas before police would 
merely be present and ask a set of questions upon disembarkation of migrants, the Hotspot 
Approach allowed them to be involved in questioning around reasons for migration (Amnesty 
International, Hotspot Italy, 2016: 33). Additionally, this questioning took place after arrivals 
had been transported to hotspots immediately after disembarkation, whilst some are in shock, 
and questioning appears simple, with arrivals having limited chance to explain their 
circumstances and an expectation to provide a clear and concise explanation of their reason for 
migrating (Amnesty International, Hotspot Italy, 2016: 12). Categories that police officers 
categorise arrivals into are: ‘job search’, ‘rejoining family’,  ‘fleeing from poverty’, ‘fleeing 
for other reasons’ and ‘to request political asylum’ (Amnesty International, Hotspot Italy, 2016: 
35). Contravening international and domestic law that refugee status is determined by the 
situation an individual would face if returned to their country of origin rather than their reasons 
for leaving, Italy neglects its duty to protect these migrants.  
Although the categorisation of migrants looks different in France, there are practices of this 
process that are cause for concern. Although France is more of a ‘passage’ that migrants use to 
access the rest of Europe, France has received a large number of refugees, and, to illustrate, in 
2015 the state offered asylum to 20 630 refugees (BBC News, EU migrant crisis: France plans 
asylum ‘hotspots’ in Libya, 2017). Despite the initial welcoming spirit towards arrivals from 
North Africa, France has increasingly adopted a hardline approach towards arrivals, especially 
since 2017. Now, only refugees threatened by war and political prisoners are welcomed whilst 
economic migrants have been accommodated in other ways. In December 2017, regional 
authorities were ordered to form “mobile teams” that were tasked with forcing undocumented 
migrants out of emergency shelters confirming Interior Minister Collomb’s stance that France 
welcomes refugees but not economic migrants (Kern, 2018). Following suit, France planned to 
introduce hotspots for processing asylum claims in 2017. These hotspots, however, are set to 
be established in Libya instead of France (BBC News, EU migrant crisis: France plans asylum 
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‘hotspots’ in Libya, 2017). The purpose of these hotspots would be to pre-screen asylum 
applicants and determine who is ineligible for asylum. Another, and equally infamous aspect 
of France’s categorisation of migrants, is its age-determination process, which seeks to 
differentiate between migrant children and adults.  
What has been described as a “flawed age assessment system” has left many child migrants 
without shelter in France (The Local France, Paris: Hundreds of migrant children ‘left 
homeless due to flawed process’, 2018). The process is meant to distinguish between adult and 
child migrants in order to determine which migrants are entitled to protection under 
international law and provisions guaranteed. Many instances in which children are wrongly 
categorised as adults, based on an inspection of appearance and a short interview, have 
occurred (The Local France, Paris: Hundreds of migrant children ‘left homeless due to flawed 
process’, 2018). Further exacerbating the vulnerability of child migrants during this procedure, 
is that child migrants are often denied interviews when they are unable to provide identity 
papers (The Local France, Paris: Hundreds of migrant children ‘left homeless due to flawed 
process’, 2018). Despite the treacherous journeys these child migrants endure, the state of 
France deals somewhat ruthlessly with them, not accommodating their circumstances, nor 
responding leniently towards them.  
Cases of Italian authorities displaying discriminatory deportation and detention practices 
illustrate biases towards certain countries of origin. For example, the request of the Interior 
Minister to reserve 95 places for Nigerian nationals in CPRs/CIEs for their deportation to 
Nigeria, as agreed to by the Nigerian embassy (Global Detention Project, 2018: 10-11). Italian 
police were to trace undocumented Nigerian citizens, despite contravening the principle of non-
refoulment and non-discrimination (Global Detention Project, 2018: 11). Sudanese nationals 
have also been on the receiving end of police brutality during fingerprinting procedures (Global 
Detention Project, 2018: 11). Agreements with countries of origin have also been made, as 
Italy’s agreement with Sudan illustrates. A group of forty-eight Sudanese refugees were taken 
from Ventimiglia to a hotspot in Taranto and once on board a flight in Turin, were deported 
back to Sudan (Global Detention Project, 2018: 12).  
4.4.3. Securitisation & Externalisation 
Various measures of securitisation and externalisation have been adopted in response to the 
migrant crisis. France and Italy, though different in detail, have both employed methods of 
responses that have relied on military, police and coast guard forces, resulting in a highly 
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securitised environment for migrants, in which states are protecting borders from migrants 
instead of migrants from human rights abuses. With the end goal of understanding how the 
migrant crisis has been securitised and how the inflow of migrants has been regarded as a 
security issue rather than a humanitarian issue, this section draws attention to various 
components of how Italy and France have employed securitisation in its response to the crisis. 
These aspects include measures of border control, SAR activities and associated complexities, 
relocation and resettlement (R&R), the closing of ports and refusal of disembarkation and the 
Hotspot Approach. 
4.4.3.1 Border Control 
The idea of ‘Fortress Europe’ has come to sum up the “increasingly impenetrable fortress” that 
has been built to keep irregular migrants out of Europe, to defend its borders using sophisticated 
surveillance measures (Amnesty International, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, 2014: 5). 
Measures have included the closing off safe routes by erecting fences, increased surveillance 
and the deployment of security forces and the detention of migrants and refugees in transit 
countries where rights are abused. This comprises ‘Fortress Europe’ (Amnesty International, 
The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, 2014: 6). Financial support for these measures compared 
to that given to the support of asylum procedures illustrate this (Amnesty International, The 
Human Cost of Fortress Europe, 2014: 9).  Central to ‘Fortress Europe’, has been border 
control measures that have been adopted by EU member states and third countries, such as 
Libya, as part of efforts to monitor borders to regulate the movement of people. The most 
prominent border control measures adopted have included Frontex operations, clampdowns on 
NGROs and the increased capacity and mandate of the Libyan Coastguard in managing 
migration from North Africa to Europe.  
4.4.3.2 Frontex 
Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, responsible for co-ordinating joint 
operations between EU member states on the external sea, land and air borders of the EU, has 
resumed patrolling activities outside of EU’s territory. According to Regulation (EU) 656/2014 
SAR activities are to be initiated whenever it appears a vessel’s conditions does not allow for 
safe travel (Amnesty International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 56). The principle of non-refoulment 
also holds for non-state actors, such as Frontex (Amnesty International, The Human Cost, 2014: 
13). To illustrate the disproportionate resources given towards border control and refugee 
support, in 2014, Frontex had a budget of €89.2 million whereas the European Asylum Support 
Office had €15.6 million (Amnesty International, The Human Cost, 2014: 16).  
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In August 2014, Operation Triton was set up to assist Italy with patrolling Europe’s southern 
sea borders after Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), acclaimed for its humanitarian results and 
the extension of its activities into Maltese and Libyan SAR zones, ended (Amnesty 
International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 8, 23 & Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 10). 
Operation Triton, however, patrolled a much smaller zone than OMN had. Frontex has also 
been instrumental to the plight of reducing the presence of NGROs, as, since 2016, reports 
have explained the presence of these as a contributing factor to illegal immigration (Amnesty 
International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 47). EUNAVFORMED, the joint military 
operation launched in June 2015, aimed at identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels to 
curb human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean, also carried out SAR activities 
(Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 11). In June 2016, the naval operation mandate 
was amended to include capacity-building and training of the Libyan navy and the LCG 
(Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 45). Concerns about an agency 
tasked with controlling borders focusing on SAR and guaranteeing access to asylum persist.  
4.4.3.3 NGROs 
Events in 2013 magnified the need for increased SAR activities, humanitarian aid and presence 
of vessels in the Mediterranean. To illustrate the contribution to SAR made by NGOs, statistics 
reveal the following: in 2015, NGOs rescued 20 063 lives, whereas Frontex saved 15 428, in 
2016, NGOs rescued 46 796 lives in comparison to Frontex’s 13 616 and, between January and 
April 2017, NGOs rescued 12 647, with Frontex only rescuing 2726 lives (Amnesty 
International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 16). Lately, however, these NGROs have come under 
fire, with Italy launching parliamentary inquiries after claims of collusion between NGOs and 
smugglers in 2017, and the LCG retaliating too (Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 
17 & 25 & Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 47). Italy has 
implemented measures to restrict NGO activity at sea since the Italian Senate Defence 
Committee’s recommendations for stricter regulation of their activities since May 2017, 
culminating in the signing of a code of conduct by NGOs in July 2017 (Amnesty International, 
A Perfect Storm, 2017: 17 & 25 & Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 
2017: 47 – 48). As a result, NGROs may not conduct SAR activities in Libyan waters and 
limits on the transferral of people from one vessel to another have been imposed and, though 
not legally binding, refusal to sign or contravention of the code will meet action by Italian 
authorities and a range of unspecified consequences (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web 
of Collusion, 2017: 4). Although the Italian coastguard and customs police have carried out 
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rescue activities, since mid-2009, these have intercepted vessels at sea and returned passengers 
to Libya, in what is called push-backs (Amnesty International, S.O.S. Europe, 2012: 10 & 
Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 11).  
Many rescue operations have been delayed as a result of being ordered to wait for LCG 
intervention before rescuing people, as an incident on 15 August 2017 illustrates, when a 
Migrant Offshore Aid Station vessel, following the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in 
Rome’s orders, waited two hours for the LCG to intervene before it could take people on board 
and return to Italy (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 48). The 
LCG has also restricted SAR work performed by NGROs. Various accounts tell of NGRO 
vessels being put in dangerous situations by the LCG in international waters. Three incidents 
have stood out: an attack on a Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders) rescue 
vessel, which had no rescue personnel on board, in August 2016, the LCG cutting in front of a 
lifeboat lowered by NGO rescue boat Sea-Watch 2 to assist migrants in a nearby wooden boat 
which was later boarded by LCG officials and returned to Italy in May 2017, and, in May 2017, 
LCG speedboats approached and opened fire during a rescue operation conducted by NGOs 
Jugend Rettet, SOS Mediterranee and Save the Children (Amnesty International, A Perfect 
Storm, 2017: 23 – 25). This year alone, an Open Arms rescue vessel was seized in Pozzallo, a 
Sicilian port, in March, and Italian authorities seized a Spanish NGO boat after its refusal to 
hand over rescued migrants and refugees to LCG after which it was impounded (Amnesty 
International, Italy Targeting of NGO Ship Displays Reckless Disregard for Common Decency, 
2018).  
4.4.3.4 The Libyan Coast Guard (LCG)  
The LCG, which forms part of the Libyan navy and operates under the Ministry of Defence, 
has attracted militia members who had ambitions of controlling the sea and its smuggling route 
(Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 34 – 35). Although it has 
performed SAR activities, it has taken on a harsher stance, in that coastguards have reportedly 
committed acts of abuse during rescue operations and returns to Libya, neglecting its SAR 
duties. The LCG attributed the initial lack of SAR operations to a “grave lack of resources for 
rescue operations” (Amnesty International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 34). Since, 2016 and 2017, 
however, EU member states, especially Italy, have provided the coastguard with increased 
support, especially ships, training and funding (Amnesty International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 35). 
Italy has led EU efforts to increase capacity of Libya to secure its borders and patrol the 
Mediterranean, by signing the MOU with the Government of National Accord in early 2017 
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which included the provision of vessels for SAR functions and assistance in setting up a 
maritime rescue coordination centre (Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya disputes over 
rescues put lives at risk, 2018).  
To this day, Libya is receiving support. In August 2018, Italy’s parliament approved the 
donation of another twelve patrol vessel to the LCG, thus strengthening the LCG’s ability to 
perform push-back activities without the EU’s assistance, the training of LCG officials and 
naval authorities, an aid package that amounts to €2.5 million (Italy confirms patrol boat 
donation to Libya, 2018). The failure of the LCG to perform SAR functions in alignment with 
international law and standards is blatant, as interceptions are violent and delayed, and people 
are returned to inhumane conditions in Libya. The control of the LCG over the sea is growing, 
especially following the release of a statement by the EU in late June 2018, which stipulates 
that vessels in the Mediterranean are not to interfere or obstruct operations of the LCG (Human 
Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya disputes over rescues put lives at risk, 2018).  
Cooperation with the LCG by migrants and refugees on boats oftentimes results in human 
rights violations and arbitrary detention in Libya and SAR does not appear to be at the top of 
the LCG’s agenda. During an interception by the LCG November 2017, it failed to deploy its 
vessel’s rigid-hulled inflatable boat to help migrants and refugees at sea, resulting in the death 
of approximately 50 people (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 34). 
The incidents recalled in the previous sub-section illustrate the LCG’s disregard of human 
rights and the violent approach it has adopted, toward NGOs, migrants and refugees alike. 
Recently, a Spanish NGO found a survivor and two corpses on a destroyed rubber boat 80 
nautical miles from Libya’s coast, whom they suspect the LCG had left after boarding 
passengers and returning to Libya (Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya disputes over rescues 
put lives at risk, 2018).  
Furthermore, is the alleged collaboration between human smugglers and the LCG, which 
involved smugglers marking boats once they have paid the LCG so that the LCG can easily 
identify them at sea and exchange safe passage for payment (Amnesty International, Libya’s 
Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 38 – 39). Various accounts of refugees and migrants confirm 
these suspicions (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion, 2017: 39 – 40). 
However, EU aid and support has led to increased push-backs to Libya, with approximately 
18 904 people intercepted at sea and returned to Libya in 2016 and 19 452 in 2017 (Amnesty 
International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 21 & Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of 
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Collusion, 2017: 40). These raise questions and concerns about the human rights of migrants 
and refugees and contradicts the principle of non-refoulment, as these people are returned to a 
country without an asylum system, no protection for refugees and where torture of detainees 
and various abuses are rife.  
4.4.3.5. Search & Rescue (SAR) 
The SAR landscape has changed significantly since the migrant crisis ensued, with initial 
efforts on the part of the EU seemingly slow and ineffective, the recent influence of Libyan 
authorities increasing, NGROs being criminalised and the fate of migrants and refugees and 
their protection significantly restricted.  A tragedy that occurred in the Mediterranean in March 
2011 illustrated the failure of the EU and Libyan authorities to launch effective SAR responses 
at the start of the migrant crisis. A boat carrying 72 people, of which only nine survived, was 
in distress at sea for over two weeks and, despite being alerted, the Italian and Maltese national 
Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres, Frontex and NATO left distress calls unanswered 
(Amnesty International, S.O.S. Europe, 2012: 12 – 13).  
In an effort to provide an adequate and sufficient humanitarian response to the crisis after two 
major shipwrecks occurred in the Mediterranean, Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), an 
operation that required the Italian government spend over €9 million per month, was launched 
by Italy in October 2013, and the operation achieved the rescue and safe disembarkation of 
approximately 166 000 people (Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 10). After it was 
ended in 2014 for fear of a political backlash, however, the death rate in the Mediterranean 
increased to 6.2%, or one person in 16, between January and April 2015 (Amnesty 
International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 10). This resulted in continued critique of Europe’s 
response and NGROs, merchant vessels and commercial vessels had to fill the gap left by 
OMN’s termination. To illustrate, on 3 March 2015, eight ad-hoc SAR operations in the Strait 
of Sicily were responsible for rescuing approximately 941 lives (Amnesty International, Latest 
Mediterranean tragedy exposes EU’s failure on rescue operations, 2015). As some kind of 
replacement, Operation Triton was launched, however, its SAR capabilities were significantly 
less than OMN’s, as it had less assets, which were inadequate to address the crisis and its ability 
to enhance SAR operations was also limited (Amnesty International, Europe’s Sinking Shame, 
2015: 20).  
Operation Triton’s SAR focus was severely reduced in scale, it operated in international waters 
inconsistently, had a much smaller operational area than OMN and did not primarily focus on 
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SAR activities, but moreso on border monitoring (Amnesty International, EU ‘burying heads 
in the sand’ as hundreds more migrants die at sea off Italy, 2015 & Amnesty International, 
Europe's response: "Face-saving not a life-saving operation", 2015 & Amnesty International, 
Europe’s Sinking Shame, 2015: 19). Since the EU’s expectation of reduced migration to Europe 
from North Africa was sorely disappointed, eventually a surge in financial resources and assets 
extended Triton’s operational area and capacity to perform SAR more effectively to the extent 
that it could surpass OMN (Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 10).Since 2016, 
there has been an increase in SAR cases as well as double digit multiple SAR cases, which are 
often protracted for days on end, especially close to the Libyan coast resulting in more complex 
SAR operations. The necessary assets for specific SAR purposes have not been provided 
(Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 14).  
For a long time, NGROs appeared to be the only group dedicated humanitarian missions in 
patrolling close to Libyan waters (Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 2017: 14 – 15). 
Though they filled the gaps and performed significant SAR operations, achieving great results, 
there has been a recent clampdown on NGROs, as governments are taking hostile action against 
them and restricting their activities to prevent migration to Europe. The recent approval of 
Italy’s code of conduct for NGOs illustrates this (Freedom House, Italy Profile, 2018). Whereas 
before, EU Member States assumed responsibility for saving lives in the Mediterranean, 
especially after the tragedy nearby Lampedusa, Italy, in 2013, and NGROs were embraced for 
their capabilities and vigour, these NGROs have now been obstructed by the EU and 
responsibility for SAR activities has been handed over to the LCG (Human Rights Watch, 
EU/Italy/Libya Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives at Risk, 2018). NGROs have focussed 
activities around human rights. In 2017, several issued complaints that EU states were not 
sufficiently supporting rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and not doing enough to intervene 
in the exploitation of migrants in Libya by smugglers (BBC, Rescue ship brings 606 migrants 
to Italy, 2017). 
The EU has also, especially since 2016, engaged with states of departure and entered bilateral 
agreements to manage migration, where the reduction of migration towards Europe in exchange 
for aid becomes the key interest. Before the migrant crisis, Libya and Italy had entered into 
agreements in the name of curbing illegal migration, with another signed between Italy and 
new Libyan authorities in April 2012 (Amnesty International, S.O.S. Europe, 2012: 8). Despite 
reports of abuse by guards and smugglers, aggression on the part of coastguard officials, 
collusion between coastguard officials and smugglers, Italy has continued to support the LCG, 
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even bolstering support, fully aware of the poor conditions that await migrants in Libya 
(Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya Disputes over Rescues Put Lives at Risk, 2018). SAR 
responsibility has increasingly shifted to the court of Libya and its coastguard, as NGROs, 
which picked up the slack in SAR operations, have become restricted and the capacity of the 
LCG strengthened by aid from Europe, mainly Italy (Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, 
2017: 20). The Italian Maritime Centre’s instructions for boats in distress and rescue vessels to 
defer to LCG instructions have caused delays in rescues and sometimes migrants jump 
overboard for fear of being handed over to Libyan forces (Human Rights Watch, 
EU/Italy/Libya Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives at Risk, 2018). A result of increased LCG 
interceptions at sea, albeit for SAR purposes, more people are detained in Libya’s 
overcrowded, inadequate, poorly conditioned detention centres.  
Disconcertingly, returns to departure points by states also increasingly characterise SAR 
operations, as a recent incident illustrates. In July 2018, an Italian towboat rescued over one 
hundred migrants and, instead of taking them to Italy so that they could apply for asylum, they 
were returned to Libya (Reuters News Agency, Italian ship accused of taking migrants back to 
Libya for first time, 2018). Human rights violations and abuses are likely to follow 
disembarkation, when migrants and refugees are handed over to Libya’s Department for 
Combatting Irregular Migration of the Ministry of Interior and detained (Amnesty 
International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 34). Considering the principle of nonrefoulment, this directly 
breaches international law, as migrants are not to be returned to a country where they or their 
human rights will be at risk of abuse. Despite obscurity about who conducted the rescue, the 
fact that EU states, such as Italy, are increasingly adopting harder line approaches to curb 
migration to Europe, even if it means returning migrants and refugees to states where their 
protection is not guaranteed. Whereas previously the priority of disembarking those rescued at 
a place of safety, that is a location where survivor’s lives or safety is no longer threatened, 
which was for some time Italy, those rescued are now returned or pushed back to Libya 
(Amnesty International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 25 & 29). Actions taken illustrate how states have 
indeed given in to temptation to limit their responsibilities towards refugees and migrants and 
avoid disembarking them on their territory, thus breaching their rights to “life, safety and access 
to protection” (Amnesty International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 31). 
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4.4.3.6 Returns, Resettlement & Relocation  
According to Italy’s Consolidated Immigration Act, returns of irregular migrants from border-
entry point to departure points are allowed, as is the refusal of entry for those without the 
necessary documentation and their return to the country of departure (Amnesty International, 
Turned Away, 2013: 26). However, in instances where there are claims for political asylum, 
refugee status and temporary protection, these measures are prohibited for humanitarian 
purposes as is the expulsion of unaccompanied minors unless for security reasons (Amnesty 
International, Turned Away, 2013: 27). The Act also compels destination states to provide these 
arrivals with assistance at the border, with all returns being recorded (Amnesty International, 
Turned Away, 2013: 27).  Since 2015, the EU has tried to prevent departures to Europe. This 
was initially characterised by an EU-Africa trust fund that was created in November 2015, 
where EU leaders offered €2 billion to help deport unwanted migrants (Rice-Oxley & Rankin, 
2017). In 2017, news of prospective camps being set up in Africa by the EU for screening 
processes emerged. The purpose of proposed camps would be to prevent the migration of 
economic migrants, who do not need protection from persecution, and take those who do, 
‘genuine refugees’ to Europe (EU looks to fund camps in Africa to cut migration, 2017). 
Accompanying these, however, were concerns that returning people to Libya where even the 
UN-backed government lacks control over its territory, would violate their rights and 
international law, since their lives would be in danger in such a lawless country (EU looks to 
fund camps in Africa to cut migration, 2017).  
In Bari, a port in Italy, the police have authority to determine who gains access to the asylum 
system, with most of those without the necessary documentation being returned to Greece, as 
figures have indicated. Between January 2011 and June 2012, only twelve out of 900 migrants 
were granted permission to remain in Italy to apply for asylum (Amnesty International, Turned 
Away, 2013: 30). Liiban, a twenty-two-year old Somalian man was one such migrant who was 
returned to Greece, though being told he would arrive at a refugee camp, was taken to Patras, 
a high security port (Amnesty International, Turned Away, 2013: 39). Reports of detention on 
vessels have also been reported. Amnesty International interviewed migrants, some of whom 
told of poor conditions on ferries that took them from Italy to Greece, where there was 
inadequate food, water, sanitation, and some were locked in rooms without bathrooms, others 
held in machine rooms or parking areas, and some handcuffed to pipes (Amnesty International, 
Turned Away, 2013:40 – 41). This contravenes law which requires that returns be conducted 
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humanely, and that detention occur only when there are no other alternatives available, with 
children also not being detained (Amnesty International, Europe’s Refugee Crisis, 2015: 15).  
In 2018, nearly 1100 people have died or vanished whilst trying to reach the EU from North 
Africa and between January and July, the death rate was almost triple that of the same period 
in 2015, the height of the migration crisis (Smith, 2018). Furthermore, there has been an 
increase in the number of returns to Libya as opposed to the number of those taken to Italy, 
since the LCG, with its growing influence and independence to control borders and stave 
migration from Libya, returns migrants to shore (Smith, 2018). Additionally, politicians are 
assuming increasingly hard-line approaches. Italy’s Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini, is one 
of them, as he recently prevented the disembarkation of 177 asylum seekers onboard the 
Ubaldo Diciotti for ten days (Tondo, 2018). The two cases under study currently have opposing 
stances towards the migration of migrants from North Africa. Whereas France is taking a 
migrant-friendly approach, Italy would rather protect its borders. With regards to burden 
sharing and the relocation of migrants, Italy is pushing for the distribution of migrants across 
the EU and has given the bloc until the end of August to devise a clear relocation scheme 
(Tondo, 2018). With reports that have found that Italy spent at least €200 000 EU funds in its 
rejection of the migrant rescue boat Aquarius, the political priority of preventing arrivals to the 
EU is clearly illustrated, as this was a move that was mostly politically motivated rather than 
logistically or organisationally (Barnes, 2018).  
4.4.3.7 Closing Ports & Disembarkation  
Italy has borne the brunt of most of Europe’s influx of migrants from North Africa, as 
approximately 650 000 migrants have landed in the coastal state since 2014 (EU Ignores Italy’s 
call to open ports to migrants, 2018). As a result, it has appealed to the rest of the EU’s member 
states to assume responsibility for the burden sharing of receiving and processing these 
migrants. Despite having welcomed migrants with open arms, Italy’s stance is increasingly 
taking on a less-welcome, tougher approach towards migrants, as is evident in the closure of 
ports for rescue ships to dock and the prevention of disembarkation of those rescued. Despite 
calls to member states for the rotation of ports for rescue ships to dock at, Italy has been met 
with rejection, which has fuelled the closure of ports until other states agree to share the burden. 
Several incidents have occurred in 2018, illustrating the increasingly hard-line approach being 
adopted towards migrants.  
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Following the arrival of nearly 11 000 refugees to Italy within 5 days in 2017, the Italian 
government proposed the closure of its ports to vessels carrying migrants, in what was 
described as a measure of panic (Wintour, 2017). Subsequently, Italy requested the “drastic 
revision of EU asylum procedures” occur and confirmed the refusal of docking privileges to 
boats without Italian flags. Debates about the role of NGOs as a pull factor ensued at the same 
time and it was confirmed that previous efforts, including the bolstering of LCG capacity and 
resources, had been unsuccessful. Italy’s deputy prime minister and interior minister, Matteo 
Salvini, who has campaigned against NGROs who carry out activities in the Mediterranean, 
has refused and delayed vessels from disembarking migrants rescued at sea, with the five-week 
exception of military ships partaking in EUNAVFOR MED ((Human Rights Watch, 
EU/Italy/Libya Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives Risk, 2018).  
In July 2018, Italy closed its ports to the rescue ship Aquarius that had 630 migrants on board 
and was stranded at sea for approximately ten days (Smith, 2018). On another occasion in July 
2018, after an Italian police ship and a British ship belonging to Frontex picked up 
approximately 450 migrants, Italy allowed these to dock in Italy after France, Malta, Germany, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland agreed to take migrants for processing (Deutsche Welle, Italy 
Threatens, 2018). Another incident that demanded international attention was the refusal of the 
rescue ship Sarost 5, which was stranded at sea for almost two weeks and had approximately 
fourty migrants onboard, two of whom were pregnant and one injured, by Malta, Italy, France 
and Tunisia, with Tunisia eventually allowing the vessel to disembark at its port (Mezzofiore, 
Andrews, Bradpiece & McGann, 2018, InfoMigrants, 2018 & North Africa Post, 2018). In 
August, Aquarius was again denied safe harbour, when it had 141 people onboard, of whom a 
quarter of the passengers were between the ages of thirteen and fifteen years old and many of 
whom require urgent medical assistance, until five countries agreed to take them after 
disembarkation (Amnesty International, Italy/Malta: Stop Playing, 2018 & The Local France, 
Exhausted Migrants, 2018). Despite Libya having been deemed unfit for the disembarkation 
of migrants, Italy unloaded a ship with 100 people onboard at a port nearby Libya’s capital, 
Tripoli (Nielson, 2018).  
4.4.3.8 Hotspot Approach & Detention   
The Hotspot Approach and detention are another two aspects of state responses to the Migrant 
Crisis that have been met with concern and criticism. Specifically, hotspots have become 
increasingly securitised with allegations of fuelling abuse and have fallen short of international 
standards to the extent that they have been closed and fended off humanitarian assistance. This 
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last section, dedicated to understanding how securitisation has been looked as a solution, will 
also consider the demolition of refugee camps in France, proposals for the establishment of 
centres in North Africa by the EU, detention centres and conditions in Libya and the provisions 
made for unaccompanied migrant minors in France. With hotspots initially established to 
identify and fingerprint new arrivals to the EU with the purpose of swiftly determining their 
protection needs and processing applications for asylum or returning them to their country of 
origin, reports have found that migrants are, instead, met with ill treatment, abuse and unlawful 
expulsion (Amnesty International, Italy: Beatings and unlawful expulsions amid EU push to 
get tough on refugees and migrants, 2016). Detention, which is by law meant to serve as a last-
resort solution, has become the looked-to method of housing and maintaining control over 
migrants, in the EU and North Africa alike. To illustrate, approximately 9000 people have been 
arbitrarily detained in Libyan detention centres, as at the end of June 2018 (Amnesty 
International, EU: New migration plans “dangerous and self-serving”, 2018).  
In Italy and France alike, police authorities have securitised the environment of refugees and 
migrants, as the EU has encouraged member states to “get tough on refugees”, resulting in 
unlawful expulsions and ill-treatment at hotspots and camps (Amnesty International, Italy: 
Beatings2016). With Frontex’s continued presence at Italian hotspots, forced fingerprinting, 
and the detention of migrants without court orders, a requirement by law, Italy’s stance towards 
housing migrants has become highly-securitised (ASGI, Hotspots, no date). Furthermore, the 
Association regards the Hotspot Approach, and Lampedusa in particular, as characterised by 
“the violation of the right to asylum, the implementation of collective returns and unlawful 
detention” (ASGI, Migrants disembarked in Lampedusa: compliance with the law must be 
guaranteed, 2018).  
In France, Calais is decorated with five-metre high fences topped with razor wire that run along 
train tracks and the presence of armed police at the port, to prevent the travel of migrants from 
France to the UK (Burton, 2018). Since Calais’s refugee camp, ‘The Jungle’, which housed 
approximately 6500 migrants, being demolished in 2016, thousands now sleep in the forests of 
Northern France (Burton, 2018). The police’s intimidation and abusive actions taken towards 
asylum seekers and migrants to clear the camp, have included the use of pepper spray on 
children and adults by riot police, when they are asleep or pose no threat, the spraying of pepper 
spray on water and food, the confiscation of bedding, clothing, the disruption of humanitarian 
assistance, threatening and acts of intimidation towards migrants and harassment of aid workers 
(Human Rights Watch, Living in Hell, 2017: 15, 23, 31). Excessive use of force by police 
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against refugees, including children, and the deployment of forces meant to deal with crowd 
and riot control illustrates the highly securitised response of France towards migrants, the 
precarious and vulnerable conditions they are subject to and the abuse that has been condoned.  
The closure of hotspot facilities, reception centres and camps due to sub-standard conditions 
and provisions has occurred, albeit temporarily in some cases. During the Arab Spring, Italy 
was unable to accommodate the migrants that rushed to its shores, as reception centres received 
hundreds more than could be accommodated by the facility’s capacity and these arrivals could 
not receive the health care and mental health support they required (MSF, Italy: Failure to 
provide, 2011). In 2015, the Lampedusa reception, built to house 380 people, was filled with 
more than 1400 due to the influx of rescued migrants (Fortune, 2015). Later that year, Medecins 
Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders) announced the end of its activities in Pozzallo, 
Sicily, and others in Italy’s Ragusa Province, due to unacceptable conditions, which included 
overcrowding and a lack of protection for vulnerable migrants, amongst whom were pregnant 
women, minors and victims of torture (MSF, Italy: MSF ends activities in Pozzallo, 2015). 
Lampedusa was closed again in March 2018 for renovations following protests by migrants 
and refugees and the raising of concerns by NGOs and civil society organisations that the 
facility was inhumane, the lengthy period of detention, systemic human rights violations and 
the lack of a proper exit for the centre (Gostoli, 2018). In France, the forced eviction of up to 
200 migrants and asylum seekers took place, followed by the demolition of The Jungle in 
Calais in 2016, after which thousands were distributed across France and sent to immigration 
centres (Amnesty International, France: Fears over the fate, 2015 & Burton, 2018). In 2018, 
approximately 450 people were cleared from a park due to concerning sanitary conditions and 
incidents of scabies, of whom only 100 had been allocated to emergency shelters (The Local 
France, 2018).  
 In June 2018, what some consider a policy of detention, an EU agreement issued detailed the 
plans for controlled centres for asylum seekers and migrants in the EU with landing areas 
outside of the EU, in transit countries, where their applications would be processed (Amnesty 
International, EU: New Migration Plans, 2018, OxFam, 2018 & InfoMigrants, 2018). 
Furthermore, the EU has failed to stipulate what would be done to address human rights 
violations in Libya (Amnesty International, EU: New Migration Plans, 2018). This proposal 
has been met with refusal by Libya’s Prime Minister, Serraj, but the notion remains on the 
EU’s agenda (InfoMigrants, Tripoli rules out EU migrant camps in Libya, 2018). Detention 
centres in Libya have been coupled with EU’s inadequate response to the migrant crisis.  
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Undocumented migrants and refugees, including unaccompanied minors, face risk of arbitrary 
and indefinite detention in Libya, where detention centres are overcrowded and run by the state 
and militias, who beat, whip, torture and abuse them in other ways (Amnesty International, The 
Human Cost of Fortress Europe, 2014: 25). Since the LCG has gained traction over migration 
management in the Mediterranean Sea, Libyan detention centres have become overcrowded, 
as boats intercepted by the LCG and, recently, EU member states, return migrants to Libya 
instead of the EU. At the end of July, it was confirmed that 11 800 migrants had been returned 
to Libya, though the centres to which they are returned remain unregulated and migrants are 
held in inhuman conditions and become victims of sexual violence, exploitation, trafficking 
and torture (MSF, Stop Arbitrary Detention, 2018).  
To illustrate the conditions that detainees are held in, MSF reports the following about Libyan 
detention centres:  
MSF treats detainees with second degree burns, scabies, respiratory infections, 
dehydration. In Khoms, over 300 migrants are locked in an overcrowded detention 
centre, without ventilation, limited access to drinking water and detainees resort to 
escape attempts and hunger strikes. There are no registration nor record-keeping 
activities performed. As a result, the number of voluntary returns to countries of origin 
has increased.  
    (Doctors Without Borders, Stop Aribitrary Detention, 2018) 
The recent outbreak of violence between rival groups in Tripoli, which has culminated in a 
State of Emergency being declared in September, has endangered residents and the 
approximate 8000 refugees and migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in arbitrary detention, 
with some having been trapped for 48 hours without food (MSF, Conflict in Tripoli, 2018 & 
Deutshce Welle, Libya imposes SOE, 2018). Rockets have been reported to have landed next 
to detention centres, leaving thousands trapped inside (Libyan Express, MSF demands 
evacuation of thousands from Libya, 2018). As a result, the dangers faced by migrants trapped 
in Libya is leaving them extremely vulnerable. Leaving them more helpless, is the fact that 
international organisations had to suspend their activities in Tripoli (Libyan Express, MSF 
demands evacuation of thousands from Libya, 2018).  
Where it has concerned unaccompanied migrant minors, the French government has dealt with 
migrant minors unfairly and unlawfully, despite them having rights to special protection under 
international law. This was especially so after it had cleared the Jungle in Calais in 2016, where 
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1300 of the 2000 child migrants had been refused passage to the UK without adequate reasons, 
if any (Smith, 2018). In December 2016, unaccompanied minors left temporary reception 
centres and, by the time these were closed in 2017, 700 had already left and gone missing, 
trying to reach Paris, sleeping on the roadside, under bridges or along the riverbank along the 
way (Smith, 2018 & Human Rights Watch, Living in Hell, 2017: 11). Though the state becomes 
separated and unaccompanied children’s de facto caregiver and despite them being able to have 
access to education whilst outside their country of origin, unaccompanied child migrants in 
France live a contrary reality (Human Rights Watch, Like a Lottery, 2018: 53 & 55). Without 
adequate child protection and social services for these children, the question of whose duty it 
is to provide care emerges.   
4.4.4. Citizen Responses  
Necessary to determine the environment into which migrants are received, that is whether the 
environment is hostile or welcoming, is understanding the general sentiments amongst the 
native population that received migrants. As such, this sub-section illustrates citizen responses, 
as shaped by state responses, to the migrant crisis and to understand what the rhetoric is towards 
North African migrants. As taxpayers and recipients of state provisions, the responses of native 
populations can tell a lot about the attitude with which migrants have been, are being and will 
be received. With Italy’s New Populist Government, this section seeks to identify whether there 
has been an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments towards migrants to make sense of what this 
means for the precariousness of North African migrants’ positions, and whether these are 
aggravated by anti-immigrant sentiments or not. To illustrate the discrepancy between the 
perceived number of non-EU immigrants to the actual proportion, the results of a 
Eurobarometer survey published in 2018, revealed that in 19 out of the 28 Member States, the 
perceived estimate of present non-European migrants was double the actual proportion 
(European Commission, 2018).  
In the year of the Arab Spring, Human Rights Watch (2011: 3) wrote the following in its 
publication, based on research conducted between December 2009 and December 2010, that, 
in Italy “worrying signs already exist that increasing diversity has led to increasing intolerance, 
with some resorting to or choosing violence to express racist or xenophobic sentiments”. This 
could perhaps be due to the negative portrayal of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the 
country and the impact of the media on perceptions of the public (Human Rights Watch, 
Everyday Intolerance, 2011: 10). Migration, the dominant topic of Italy’s most recent electoral 
campaign has overwhelmed Italian politics and has been regarded as epitomising economic 
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and social issues and the reason for increased securitisation and, more recently, containment 
(Tazziolo, 2018). Violent and racist attacks have plagued Italy with nine shootings having 
occurred within 50 days in July and August, and the number of racially-motivated incidents 
significantly increasing, with 33 having occurred in a space of two months since June, whereas 
incidents of the same nature for 2016 amounted to 28 (Speak, 2018 & Gostoli, 2018).  
With the frequency and severity of attacks increasing, incidents have come to illustrate the 
surge of racism and xenophobia in Italy. Many have attributed a rise in these anti-immigrant 
sentiments to the climate of hatred that has been fostered by Italy’s Interior Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister, Salvini, who has publicly expressed his own anti-immigrant stance and 
has depicted migrants as posing a threat to Italy (Speak, 2018). Another factor adding fuel to 
the xenophobic fire is the populist coalition government of Italy which has been clear about 
the way it will respond to illegal migrants and irregular migration. With the signing in of the 
new coalition government, between the Populist Five Star Movement and right-wing Salvini’s 
League, in June 2018, the anti-immigrant atmosphere appears to be spreading (Italy’s Senate 
passes tough anti-migrant decree, 2018).  
One of the first decisions the government made, was to prevent a vessel, which had rescued 
hundreds of migrants, from docking in Italy (Basu, 2018). Salvini has also confirmed his anti-
immigrant approach, as he has met with Hungary’s Orbán and both have agreed to establish a 
type of anti-immigrant axis (Kern, 2018). Thus, the populist government has displayed its 
potential to serve as a threatening force, despite constitutional checks and balances. Despite 
protests by citizens, the government has gained the support of anti-immigrant, nationalist 
citizens who have come to regard, perhaps due to the government and media’s depictions, 
migrants as a threat to their livelihoods. These anti-immigrant sentiments have also trickled 
down to the Italian and French youth. Many youngsters participated in an anti-immigrant 
protest organised by the far-right Generation Nation, previously National Front Youth, and 
Youth League, the youth leagues of the French National Rally and Italy’s League (Ksiazek, 
2018).  
4.5 Threats & Dangers to Migrant Women 
The World Migration Report (IOM, 2018: 50) indicates that migrants in North Africa face a 
wide range of abuses: deaths at sea, in the desert and other transit locations, exploitation, 
physical and emotional abuse, trafficking, smuggling, sexual and gender-based violence, 
arbitrary detention, forced labour, ransom demands and extortion. Although men, women and 
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children alike are exposed to a variety of abuses and exploitation during the process of irregular 
migration, women face a unique set of challenges. According to UNODC, 79% of all detected 
trafficking victims across the world are women and children, with most of them being 
trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation, sham or forced marriages, begging and domestic 
servitude (IOM, Trafficking in Human Beings, 2018: 36). UNICEF has also reported that three-
quarters of all children and one half of all women migration across Africa experience sexual 
violence (Sanderson, 2018). This illustrates the attempts of women to escape the threats that 
endanger their human rights and wellbeing in their countries of origin, which force them to 
migrate. They are met with various forms of sexual violence along their migration journeys.  
The threats and dangers posed to women migrants, the subject of this closing section of the 
chapter, highlight the gendered differences in the experiences of migration and the challenges 
that aggravate the precariousness of migrant women’s lives. Scrutiny of gender-based violence, 
the sexual violence migrant women experience and the sexual exploitation they are subjected 
to throughout the process of migration, a gendered experience of human rights abuses is 
illustrated. Additionally, the threat posed by trafficking and torture at reception centres and 
camps in Italy and France, as well as detentions centres and camps in Libya, depict just how 
vulnerable women migrants are. Lastly, by understanding the reproductive challenges these 
migrant women face where it concerns pregnancy, abortion and access to medical assistance, 
one can make sense of how state responses have left women migrants unprotected.  
4.5.1 Reception Conditions 
There is a higher probability that violence against women is more prevalent in conditions that 
lack privacy and where men and women are housed together, with overcrowding putting 
women and children at risk of violence, even sexual violence (Bonewit, 2016: 12 – 13). 
Conditions in Libyan detention centres and camps as well as those in European reception 
centres and refugee camps are predominantly sub-standard and have exposed women and child 
migrants to extreme violence. In 2012, the FIDH reported a lack of basic services and inhuman 
living conditions at places of detention in Libya, finding that women at the Toweisha Camp in 
Tripoli housed a group of forty-eight Nigerian women, some of whom were pregnant, that had 
been held there for over three months and had no regular access to medication or doctors 
(FIDH, 2012: 50 – 51). The Bou Rashada camp, the largest in Libya’s western region, which 
housed detainees in sheds with sheet-metal roofs, ringed by iron bars, appearing like cages, 
housed 120 women and seven babies at the time (FIDH, 2012: 53).  
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In some facilities in Libya, men, women and children, some of whom are sick or elderly are 
held together, depending on the facility (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion 
2017: 30). Furthermore, all rooms are guarded by men, making women especially vulnerable 
to beatings and other forms of torture, such as the intrusive strip—searches that are conducted 
by these male guards (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion 2017: 30 & 
Amnesty International, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, 2014: 25). The account of a 
twenty-two year old Eritrean woman, who was detained in Libya for eight months told of being 
in a room with twelve other women in a Libyan detention centre, where this one room was 
meant for sleeping, using the toilet, drink water in and wash laundry and where their belongings 
were stolen, illustrates the horrific and inhumane living situation of migrant women (MSF, 
From North Africa to Italy, 2018). Furthermore, these women experience abuse and torture, 
without their right to protection.  
Women are also at a disadvantage when it comes to departure, as they are required to pay more 
than men. In 2017, women were required to pay 1500 dinars whereas men were only required 
to pay 1000 dinars (Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion 2017: 41). Along 
the journey from Libya to Europe, women are no less at risk of abuse, as the rape and torture 
of women survivors, who were saved from a trawler that caught fire off the coast of Lampedusa 
in 2013, by organisers of the trip highlights (Amnesty International, Lives Adrift, 2014: 15). In 
Italy, these risks persist. For example, reception centres have had inadequate separation 
between men and women, and what Doctors Without Borders has deemed “a lack of tailor-
made care to the most vulnerable”, which includes victims of torture and violence, 
unaccompanied minors and single women (MSF, From North Africa to Italy, 2018). Separating 
men and women is important for safeguarding the privacy and security of women migrants, 
who are more vulnerable, as is the provision of a safe and comfortable living space. Where 
these are not guaranteed, women who have undergone severe trauma live in fear of abuse by 
men whom they are housed with. Accounts given by a sixty-seven year old Tunisian woman, 
speaks of the fear women migrants live with, as she fended off a man when she went to the 
toilet one night and another, a twenty-two year old Eritrean, whose room had been flooded with 
women from the room next to hers because a man had entered theirs (MSF, From North Africa 
to Italy, 2018). The hotspot at Lampedusa, which was temporarily closed, was also reported as 
having insufficient privacy and security, as the spaces that minors and women lived in were 
easily accessible by others, to the extent that one migrant child witnessed an attempted rape of 
her mother (Gostoli, 2018). Women have also been exposed to torture in Italy’s Cara di Mineo 
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refugee camp, notorious for sex work within the camp and in its immediate surroundings, 
where a twenty-six-year-old woman was allegedly murdered by her boyfriend in January 2018 
(Tory-Murphy, 2018).  
In France too, women migrants are fearful for their safety, as they lack protection and, unless 
they are accompanied by male companions, remain vulnerable. In 2015, Calais’s women’s 
shelters were full, and women had to reside in the main camp, the ‘Jungle’, where there was 
“no security or street lighting, let alone dedicated toilets or bathrooms for women” (Graham-
Harrison, 2015). Since the clearance of the ‘Jungle’, outnumbered by men, these women are 
especially vulnerable to rape, trafficking and exploitation, especially without shelter (Taylor, 
2017). At the end of 2017, the number of lone migrant women residing in the Calais region 
was said to be at 20, most of whom younger than thirty years old (Bulman, 2017). This 
illustrates the grim reality that women, especially those without male family members, spouses 
or companions, face in Europe.  
4.5.2 Sexually Exploited in Transit & Abroad 
Women migrants are also at elevated risk of sexual exploitation, whether it be in their home 
country, transit countries, or when they arrive in Europe. It appears to be the pattern that those 
who have been trafficked are most likely going to exposed to some form of exploitation, with 
men being subjected to forced labour and women to sexual exploitation. To illustrate, 80% of 
the Nigerian women who arrived in Sicily in 2017 were trafficked and will live in prostitution 
(Kelly, 2017). With the increased presence of trafficking gangs and militias controlling the 
Mediterranean, migrants fall prey to these in efforts to reach Europe. Human trafficking in 
North Africa is also rife, as a report released by Human Rights Watch on the trafficking of 
Eritreans in Egypt illustrates. Victims of human trafficking experience horrific abuses and 
violations, with women often used as a tool to get male victims to comply. In Egypt traffickers 
rape these women and plastic objects get inserted into their vaginas and anuses, their genitalia 
and breasts are burnt and they are stripped naked and beaten, whilst in Israel the same abuse 
persists, yet Eritrean males who are held captive also assault these women, as they are forced 
by traffickers to sexually abuse them (Human Rights Watch, I wanted to lie down and die, 
2014: 31 & 36).  
In Libya, the same exploitation is found, with people-smugglers sexually abusing women 
migrants (BBC, Rescue ship brings 606 to Italy, 2017). Libya’s notorious slave trade is also 
responsible for the sexual exploitation of migrant women. Before dying from thirst or in car 
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accidents, women are often held for ransom or forced into prostitution and sexual exploitation 
by those who have captured and smuggled them (Younes, 2017). A man who witnessed the 
sale of five women told journalists that they were “sold by one commander to another who 
immediately forced them into prostitution”, and others were instructed to work in private night 
clubs (Younes, 2017). In Europe, sexual exploitation of migrant women continues, with 
children also being exploited to reach their destinations. The exploitation of children who want 
to travel from Italy to France is common. Children performs sex acts to paying drivers, if they 
are unable to afford the 50 and 150 Euros the service costs, and in exchange for food and 
shelter, as in Ventimiglia where migrant minors are now on the streets because the camp that 
housed them was cleared in April this year (Giuffrida, 2018). Not limited to Ventimiglia, sexual 
exploitation is common in other part of Italy, such as Rome, Veneto, Abruzzo, Marche and 
Sardinia, areas accounting for the sexual exploitation of more than 1900 girls between January 
2017 and March 2018, of which 160 were children (Giuffrida, 2018).  
4.5.3 Reproductive Challenges  
As has been established, single migrant women are at more risk of violence and exploitation 
and, therefore, these women turn to migrant men for protection and sometimes engage in sex 
with the men who they regard as their protectors. Thus, many migrant women fall pregnant 
during the process of migration. Although anti-immigrant phrases such as ‘anchor babies’13 
have been used to describe the pregnancies of migrant women, this overlooks the complex 
dynamics that exist between migrant men and women, which sometimes includes sexual 
exploitation, and the fact that during migration they are without access to birth control measures 
and abortion procedures (Plambech, 2017). In Milan, seven out of eight women who are victims 
of sexual exploitation have reportedly requested abortions (Plambech, 2017). The reproductive 
challenges women migrants face in detention, transit and reception cannot be overlooked. A 
study conducted in 2014 found that eleven per cent of women migrants arrive pregnant 
(Plambech, 2017). With many women and children susceptible to sexual exploitation and 
violence, pregnancies are common.  
Pregnant migrants need regular medical attention and are physically more susceptible to serious 
illness or death if they do not get the necessary medical attention. They also need to be able to 
access counsellors and legal representation so that they can report sexual assaults (Bonewit, 
                                                          
13 The term ‘anchor babies’ has been used to describe babies who have been conceived so that the parents can 
claim citizenship in the country the babies are born, thus allowing the parents to receive government benefits. 
(https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=anchor%20baby)  
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2016). Some women arrive pregnant, others have given birth onboard SAR vessels and others 
fall pregnant shortly after their arrival in Europe (Plambech, 2017). An obstetrician in France 
confirmed that most of the women and girls he treated in Calais were physically or sexually 
abused, and because of the precarious living conditions in forests, lack of food and sanitation, 
these women are at risk of infection and, because they do not undergo regular check-ups, they 
are at risk of going into labour prematurely or suffering miscarriages (Taylor, 2018). Because 
some women are too scared to seek professional medical assistance for fear of deportation, this 
problem only persists (Plambech, 2017). To aggravate the vulnerable position of women prone 
to rape and prostitution, the police in Calais do not intervene in cases of trafficking or sexual 
abuse and there is said to be nobody to report these incidences to (Taylor, 2017).  
4.6 Chapter Summary  
The main reasons for the migration of migrants from North Africa to the EU have been 
discussed above, as have the entry policies, categorisation of migrants and responses of Italy 
and France. This has been provided to illustrate how migrants have been handled in the EU. 
The responses of citizens also reflect realities that migrants face and, importantly, the threats 
and dangers that women face during the migration process from North Africa to the EU depict 
the gendered nature of the migration process and impact of policies on migrant women. With 
security measures focused on protecting the state as opposed to protecting the individual, the 
carceral nature of these states has been illustrated by security measures such as: border control, 
the changed nature of SAR operations, the way returns, resettlement and relocations are 
conducted, the closures of ports and refusal to disembark migrants, and, lastly, the Hotspot 
Approach and detention.  
The core push and pull factors that drive the migration of migrants from North Africa to Europe 
span across countries of origin, transit countries and destination countries. With restrictions on 
media, academic, religious and organisational freedom, limited freedom of movement, the 
increase of violence, including sexual violence, and systematic human rights violations, 
migrants and Libyans alike have increased desires to migrate to Europe. Furthermore, arbitrary 
and open-ended military conscription, forced labour, detention, ethnic discrimination, armed 
conflict and sexual violence are among the causes for migration from countries of origin to 
Libya, for migration to the EU and the lack of legal protections for displaced economic 
migrants exacerbates the vulnerability of migrants in Libya. Modern-day slavery, which has 
become more prevalent along migratory routes in Africa, especially in North Africa, is a 
horrific reality many seek to escape. Misled by smugglers and traffickers, held ransom, being 
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tortured in exchange for release fees and being sold for (bonder) labour or debt slavery, Sub-
Saharan Africans do their best to cross the Mediterranean to safety in the EU. Coupled with 
the lack of legal protection and provisions for displaced economic migrants and others alike, 
migrants undertake dangerous journeys to escape the deteriorated standard of living in post-
Arab Spring North Africa, as welfare provisions that were previously available no longer are 
and as the grip of militias over state resources increase. The economic opportunity and 
democratic ideals that characterises the EU then become enticing to migrants. 
EU entry policies make provisions for migrants and refugees and are clear about the provision 
of subsidiary protection for those who face serious harm should they return to their country of 
origin, however, uncertainties regarding provisions for illegal migrants persist. A number of 
the rights of migrant arrivals have been imposed upon. These include rights to legal and 
procedural information, information regarding appealing their cases, legal assistance, liaison 
with the UNCHR, rights to remain in member states they applied for asylum and to move freely 
within that state or in an area allocated to them. They also have the right to material reception 
and healthcare, and minors have the right to access the education system but these have gone 
largely ignored. The cases of France and Italy illustrate how these rights have not been 
guaranteed. Furthermore, the prohibition of detention of applicants unless in exceptional 
circumstances, has also been breached.  
The Dublin Regulation has emerged as a structural problem, authorities have gone to extreme 
lengths to obtain fingerprints according to EURODAC and the provision of CEAS that asylum 
seekers be welcomed in a dignified manner and receive fair treatment has been neglected. 
Additionally, the principle of non-refoulment has been breached in several cases, as has 
international maritime law, which stipulates the obligation of ships to aid vessels in distress 
and take passengers to a place of safety. France’s new Immigration Bill has disregarded the 
provisions made by these policies and regulations and has also increased the precariousness of 
child migrants. Italy has also breached these in various ways, of which include the agreements 
entered into with African states, support for the LCG’s capacity and control over the 
Mediterranean, preventing aid vessels from disembarking rescued from north and redirecting 
them to Libya and by failing to provide adequate reception facilities.  
Not limited to these cases, Italy and France’s securitisation methods and strategies have 
become increasingly carceral in nature, as more sophisticated border control and surveillance 
measures have been adopted. As a result, a Fortress Europe is emerging, even if it means 
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cooperating with countries in which systemic human rights abuses occur on a regular basis. 
With Frontex’s activities functioning with fewer resources and capacity, the Italian Senate 
Defence Committee’s recommendations for stricter regulation of NGROs, increased push-back 
by Italian authorities, the use of delay tactics and the increased support and strengthening of 
LCG capacity and resources, despite the Guard’s collusion with smugglers and the abuses they 
commit, Italy and France are increasing control over spaces and adopting migration 
management strategies that protect the state from migrants, instead of vice versa.  
Though a humanitarian response was initially a high priority of Italy’s, the nature of SAR has 
changed significantly. Despite the obvious humanitarian contributions made by NGROs, and 
their operation in Libyan waters, they have become increasingly obstructed and the number of 
LCG interceptions have increased significantly as a result, and the breaching of the principle 
of non-refoulment persists. The conditions of returns, resettlement and relocation have also 
been sub-standard in that migrants lack the basic provisions guaranteed by international law 
and EU regulations. The recent closure of ports and refusals to disembark also illustrate the 
tough approach taken towards migrants as incidents in July and August of 2018 illustrate. The 
Hotspot Approach has become highly securitised over the years, with more abuses and ill 
treatment being reported and detention, which is by international law only meant to be the last 
resort, is taking on a popular and inadequate nature. The closure of facilities, camps and 
reception centres due to inadequate conditions and provisions, police intimidation and 
detention conditions illustrate the shift towards securitisation instead of a humanitarian 
approach towards migrants.  
Furthermore, the EU’s proposal to establish centres in Libya as well as returns to Libya, where 
many migrants already reside in arbitrary detention under horrific conditions and which has 
seen a recent outbreak of violence in the capital city Tripoli, makes no provisions for the 
protection of migrants, especially those who are already vulnerable. With the rise of anti-
immigrant sentiments, especially in Italy where Salvini has bluntly expressed his stance 
towards them, migrants are less welcome to seek refuge and opportunity in Europe. Lastly, the 
threats and dangers that migrant women face put them in even more precarious conditions as 
they are considered more vulnerable than their male counterparts, as they also experience 
gender-based violence. Within overcrowded conditions of detention and without sufficient 
security in reception, single women and children are most vulnerable. Women, who also pay 
more to depart for Europe, are also particularly vulnerable to trafficking and many are forced 
into into sex work and prostitution to sustain their livelihoods, as are unaccompanied migrant 
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children. Lastly, the migration process of women is often characterised by complex dynamics 
and reproductive challenges. Many women fall pregnant during the process, but have very 
limited access to birth control measures, medical services and provisions as well as counselling. 
Under these circumstances, women are at increased risk of violence, sexual exploitation, illness 
and death.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
5.1 Introduction 
This final chapter will demonstrate the findings of the research undertaken, provide an 
interpretation thereof and convey the conclusions drawn from these findings. A discussion of 
the objectives of the study and consideration of how the research questions have been answered 
will also make it possible for the study to contribute towards an understanding of the 
implications of the findings A summary of the approach used is important, as it reiterates the 
methods and procedures employed, giving clarity to the findings and results and, lastly, 
drawing a link between the findings and the research objectives. Additionally, the chapter 
highlights the theoretical contributions of the study, limitations thereof and finally, 
recommendations for future research related to the topic.  
The study has determined that the EU has assumed an increasingly securitised response to 
migration, especially irregular migration, and has placed greater value on national security than 
human security. Border control, SAR operations, relocation, resettlement and returns, the 
closure of ports, refusal to disembark migrant-carrying vessels and the Hotspot Approach have 
illustrated a highly securitised response to migrants from North Africa. The study has also 
discovered interesting dynamics within the process of migration from North Africa as well as 
between the process and receiving and sending states alike. Migration from North Africa has 
taken on an increasingly irregular nature and has been the source of great discomfort for EU 
member states. As such, EU member states have turned to transit and origin states to prevent 
irregular migration, without calculating the costs to human rights and human security.  
It has also determined that conflict, violence and exploitation have played a huge role in the 
migration of people from North Africa and that economic opportunities and democratic ideals 
are what attract them to Europe. The study has illustrated how these factors threaten the human 
security of migrants throughout the process of migration; that is, when they depart their home 
country, along migratory routes, in transit destinations and upon departure. Furthermore, the 
study determines the specific contexts that contribute to the precariousness of migrants and, as 
far as possible, has illustrated the specific precariousness of women and child migrants. The 
Arab Spring has been found to be a turning point for migration from North Africa and the 
impact thereof has been demonstrated during the study.  By adopting a gender lens to the study 
of migration from North Africa to Europe the unique threats to the human security of women 
and child migrants have been determined. This has been achieved by focusing on the 
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experience of women and child migrants, recalling cases of gender-specific violence, 
exploitation, discriminatory treatment and reproductive challenges.  
5.2 Findings  
Adopting a gender lens has drawn attention to the importance of including women when 
studying migration, as theirs is a unique experience, as they are vulnerable to and suffer 
different forms of violence and exploitation than migrant men. Therefore, the double curse that 
migrant women face is evident, as they experience discrimination and are more vulnerable as 
they are women migrants. Although migration challenges cultural power hierarchies, these 
persist nonetheless, affecting the experience of women’s migration, receipt and what happens 
thereafter. Therefore, women need to be explicitly and intentionally included in literature on 
migration. Furthermore, there is the urgent need to focus on the individual level of state 
responses to migration and, moreover, the impact of securitisation measures employed by states 
on the human rights and human security of migrants.  
Conflict, economic opportunity and slavery are three of the most influential factors that have 
contributed to migration from North Africa to Europe in the post-Arab Spring context. 
Migrants departing from Libya either seek to escape conflict or slavery in their home country 
or Libya, or they seek economic opportunities and improved living conditions abroad in 
Europe. These factors, driving migration, have also contributed to the precariousness of 
migrants’ migration experiences and, thus, their lives. The post-Arab Spring conflict and reign 
by militia in Libya, smuggling and trafficking across North Africa and to Europe and the lack 
of adequate responses to these have left migrants in more precarious situations than before. 
Therefore, the driving factors of their migration exacerbate the threat to their security.  
The criteria used in this study to assess the nature of migration processes and policies, listed in 
the fourth chapter’s overview, toward economic migrants from North Africa in Europe 
provides certain insights. That is, that migrant-receiving states have responded in ways that can 
be described as protectionist, state-centric, highly-securitised and carceral in nature, where law 
or policy is contravened for the sake of state security and aid-providing actors are eliminated, 
therefore, placing state security above human security. As a result, citizen responses have 
increasingly started matching the anti-immigrant sentiment and responses of states, based on 
how these have chosen to respond to the migrant crisis. Though entry policies guarantee the 
rights of migrants, realities on the ground reflect otherwise.  
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Central to the study’s theoretical foundation, discussed in chapters one and three, has been the 
concept of protection and the responsibility to protect. The study has found that, despite initial 
efforts to protect migrants from North Africa, Italy’s responses to migrants have been 
protectionist and increasingly securitised. Furthermore, Italy has to a large degree externalised 
its migrant crisis, as stemming migration at departure points has become a policy priority. 
Although there are policies that stipulate the responsibilities of receiving states, Italy, 
overwhelmed and resentful towards the rest of Europe for being unhelpful, has devised its own 
strategy, which has shown increasingly restrictive measures. The closing of its ports, refusals 
of ships to disembark rescued migrants, tighter restrictions on NGROs and granting border 
control responsibilities the LCG illustrate the state-centric and anti-immigrant attitude of Italy.  
The study has also highlighted that Italy’s responses to the migrant crisis, especially over the 
last few years, reflect that migrant bodies are less important than indigenous bodies. 
Furthermore, Italy has governed migrant bodies in ways that reduce the value thereof, as the 
categorisation of persons, conditions of reception, relocation, return and resettlement and the 
Hotspot Approach illustrate. The study has also found that women migrants’ bodies are also 
misgoverned and unprotected as human trafficking, sexual exploitation, gender-based violence 
and reproductive health issues and complications plague these women during migration from 
North Africa to Europe. Furthermore, migrants who escape conditions which increase the 
precariousness of their wellbeing at home and transit countries are met with the same, if not 
more, precariousness during and after migration. Proposals for the establishment of processing 
centres in North Africa made by Italy and returns to Libya where migrants are held in 
overcrowded, unsanitary and dangerous centres reiterate how responses by migrant-receiving 
countries exacerbate the precariousness of migrants’ lives. As Parshotam (2018: 10) holds, 
measures such as those taken by EU member states might have limited long-term effects for 
migration, both regular and irregular. Furthermore, securitisation and externalisation of 
migration management illustrate that only those “with the correct profile” are afforded human 
rights (Parshotam, 2018: 10).  
The study has also discovered that varying geographies of power characterise migration from 
North Africa to Europe. A focus on the threats and dangers North African migrant women face 
has illustrated the existence of gendered geographies of power, as the vulnerability of women 
depends on their social locations that is according to intersections of race, class, age, marital 
status, sexuality and gender. Single migrant women, those who have no choice but to work as 
sex labourers, those who are trafficked and young and elderly women are more vulnerable to 
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violence and exploitation. However, migrant men also experience geographies of power, as 
their poverty, race, age and sexuality also expose them to certain dangers and exploitation, as 
the modern-day slave trade illustrates. Migrants from North Africa are received and handled as 
criminals, despite their lack of representation, rights and agency. As a result, EU member states 
have responded by exerting control over spaces, restricting migrants and those who help them 
and increasing surveillance as a means to manage migration.  
5.3 Implications of the study 
The study has provided detailed and in-depth insights on how migration has been managed in 
and by Italy and, to a lesser extent, France. Moreover, it has provided human-centric, micro-
level insights for a global phenomenon and has remained flexible throughout. Firstly, the 
identification of factors that push and pull migrants out of their countries of origin as well as 
transit countries and those that pull them towards Europe, has illustrated the reasons for 
migration from North Africa and, more importantly, over the last decade. Therefore, the 
insights into migration from Africa to Europe are specific to the period following the Arab 
Spring. The study links the consequences of the Arab Spring and for migration to Europe and 
illustrates the changed nature of migration. Furthermore, the concept of the carceral state has 
illustrated how EU member states have taken measures that are akin to carceral states, 
contributing to the perception that migrants are a threat to national security, despite entry 
policies as dictated by EU legislation that protect the human rights of migrants.  
Methods of categorisation and state responses in the form of securitisation, which includes a 
vast number of measures taken to mitigate migration, illustrate restrictive governmentality of 
bodies, where these state responses compound the human insecurity of migrants, instead of 
alleviating it. These sentiments have trickled from the macro level to the micro level, where 
xenophobia and associated violence are increasing. Important for FST, are the insights 
provided on the unique risks and threats that women face, as well as how states have failed to 
respond to their security, health, reproductive and care needs in a number of instances.  
5.4 Informing Human Security & Feminist Security Theory 
The study has kept in step with the human security framework and FST throughout and has 
given voice to aspects of each theoretical tool. For example, by focusing on migrants and 
individual experiences, the study has illustrated the threats to the human security of migrants. 
It has also recalled instances in which the state, looked to by migrants as protector and care-
giver, has failed to protect them and, even worse, been responsible for the violation of their 
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human rights and placed them in precarious and vulnerable positions as they protect national 
security instead. This recalls the idea that the state is responsible for creating and maintaining 
structures of responsibility.  
The study has clearly painted a picture for Feminist Security theorists as well, by describing, 
firstly, the forms of violence and discrimination that exist in the case of North African migrants 
in Europe, then, how Italy and indigenous populations treat non-citizens and, finally, the 
security of migrants on the ground. The thesis has also informed theory through its emphasis 
on the factors that cause migration flows, whilst recognising the complexities of the irregular 
migration that has marked the North African and Mediterranean regions. Lastly, and quite 
importantly, the study contributes valuable insights for migration studies on the impact of 
migrant bodies, which can be approached from various perspectives, as the impact on these 
bodies, though not prioritised, remains significant.   
5.6 Gaps for Further Study  
The study has identified gaps in the literature related to the topic, especially where it concerns 
the feminisation of North African migration and associated changes in gender roles and 
hierarchies, entry policies of the EU and Arab Spring-related factors of migration. Other gaps 
concern the specific consequences of securitisation measures used by receiving countries for 
migrants’ human security and biases towards countries of origin. Literature on the feminisation 
of migration in North Africa would contribute to a wider understanding of the reasons for and 
nature of women’s migration from North Africa to Europe, as well as the implications thereof 
in the public and personal domains. Literature focusing on the entry policies and regulations of 
the EU towards African migrants would highlight provisions for African and irregular migrants 
and pitfalls thereof. Linked to this, literature could also offer practical value, and be used to 
contribute towards less securitised and more human-security focused migration management 
strategies. Similarly, work dedicated to determining biases towards countries of origins could 
be used to identify and negotiate biases for the sake of human security, which would in turn 
benefit national security.  
5.7 Conclusion  
The study set out to describe the nature of migration policies and processes towards economic 
migrants from North Africa to Italy and France and adopted a gender lens to do so. It set out to 
identify the factors that push economic migrants out of North Africa and pull them towards 
Europe, considering the role of the Arab Spring. Then, it sought to determine how these factors 
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impact the security of these migrants and, lastly, to understand the implications of EU 
responses for these migrants’ human security. The meeting of these objectives was expected to 
result in a description of contemporary migration from North Africa to Europe and the issues 
associated with this process. Furthermore, it hoped to consider the human security and human 
rights implications in order to understand the climate of migrant reception in Europe, to 
determine what about the migrant policies and processes need to change.  
Although there are hopes to stem migration from North Africa to Europe, the study found that 
the persistence of modern-day slavery, conflict and poverty will only continue to encourage 
migration, and more so irregular migration, from North Africa. As the feminisation of 
migration has revealed, more women are migrating and gender roles are changing, therefore, 
the chances of familial migration increasing is also likely. Special attention needs to be paid to 
the protection of women migrants as well as child migrants, as they are most vulnerable to 
various forms of exploitation and violence. European states need to provide adequate health 
care and basic amenities to pregnant women and children, and states need to display more 
support of anti-trafficking and anti-exploitation initiatives and provide child migrants with the 
care, schooling, housing and provisions that international law guarantees.  
The relationship between globalisation and migration is complex and, as a result, states cannot 
manage migration and migratory flows as they previously did. Due to the impact of 
globalisation on migration, states need to reconsider the manner in which they receive migrants, 
how they respond to high inflows of migrants and the agreements they make with third 
countries to manage migration. Highly-securitised and externalised responses to migration will 
likely change the patterns and routes of irregular migration, rather than put a stop to it. Although 
the EU has shifted its focus to protecting its borders from migrants, the human cost has been 
enormous and, therefore, the EU should reconsider its responses and strategy towards irregular 
migration, as these currently do not align with entry policies and international law. Moreover, 
it should reconsider harsh restrictions towards those who perform SAR activities, the closure 
of ports and sub-standard facilities that house migrants. Without sounding overly idealistic, it 
is recommended that the EU reach consensus about united migration management, where 
burden is shared and penalties for human rights violations are imposed on member states who 
deviate from the agreement.  
Human security is linked to international security. Therefore, by guaranteeing the security of 
individuals, the international community becomes more secure. As American reformer and 
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activist, Jane Addams, once said, “The good we secure for ourselves is precarious and uncertain 
until it is secured for all of us and incorporated into our common life” (Bush, 1993: 48 – 49). 
Migration, as an earnest and genuine quest for survival, let alone happiness, is a complex 
process. Migrants needs to be protected against threats to human security, not vilified as threats 
to national security.  
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